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Abstract 
This thesis traces transformations in the history of higher education in twentieth-
century Australia from the perspective of the ownership and regulation of knowledge. 
Using primarily archival sources from universities and government, I argue that after 
the Second World War, the university’s place in society and the economy was 
radically altered because of challenges to its authority over knowledge.  
In the 1940s and 1950s, the Australian government increased its interest in research. 
Among political and tertiary leaders, this led to questions about the role of research 
and higher education for society, resulting in uncertainties about the ongoing 
independence – and thus reliability – of university knowledge. A growing reliance on 
higher education to support government aims linked the growth of universities in 
Australia to nation-building and the government’s economic strategies. But in the 
1960s and 1970s, a small but influential group of university staff and students resisted 
the connection of higher education in Australia to established goals and values, 
exposing the university’s vested interests in society and its role in legitimising and 
perpetuating social and economic injustices. As a result of mounting questions about 
its integrity, in the 1980s, the university’s authority waned. This opened the door to 
increased control by government, who confronted changing economic priorities. 
Facing new pressures, university leaders sought to regain their standing in society by 
reconfiguring their task in commercial terms. By the 1990s, the question about the 
role and autonomy of higher education had developed into a significant contest over 
the ownership and control of knowledge as a form of intellectual property. Unlike the 
public institutions they had been in the 1940s and 1950s, universities were treated as 
an industry, competing with others for government support and commercial revenue.  
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We are specialists in examining, analysing and measuring. We are the guardians and 
constant verifiers of all alphabets, multiplication tables and methods. We are the 
bureaus of standards for cultural weights and measures. Granted, we are other things 
also. In some circumstances we can also be innovators, adventurers, conquerors and 
reintepreters. But our first and most important function, the reason the people need 
and keep us, is to preserve the purity of all sources of knowledge. 
 
 
- Herman Hesse, The Glass Bead Game 
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Chronology of Higher Education in Australia 
 
1850s: Universities of Sydney (1852) and Melbourne (1853) established 
1874: University of Adelaide 
1890: University of Tasmania 
1909: University of Queensland 
1911: University of Western Australia 
1930s: Six universities enrol total approximately 10,500 students 
1930s: Canberra University College (1930, Melbourne), New England University 
College (1938, Sydney) 
1942: Universities Commission established 
1946: Australian National University 
1949: NSW University of Technology (to become UNSW in 1958) 
1944 – 1951: Commonwealth Reconstruction Training Scheme 
1949: Total university enrolments 31,753  
1957: Murray Review of Australian Universities 
1960s: New universities established. Institutes of Technology established.  
1965: Martin Review of Tertiary Education 
1965: Berkeley ‘Free speech’ movement (USA) 
1968: Total university and CAE enrolments 138,794 
1968: May 1968 Paris Barricade uprising (France) 
1973: Sydney Philosophy Strike 
1975: Annual growth rate of student enrolments 8.6% 
1974: Whitlam government takes over all funding of Higher Education, establish 
Commonwealth Tertiary Education Commission 
1975: Total university and CAE enrolments 276,559 
1981: Annual growth rate of student enrolments has dropped to 1.3% 
1986: International ‘export market’ higher education established 
1986: Total university and CAE enrolments 389,968 
1987: Annual growth rate of student enrolments lowest since 1953 at 1%. 
1987: Dawkins Reforms 
1988: Total university enrolments 420,850 
1990: Total university enrolments 485,066  
2000: Total university enrolments 695,485  
2008: Bradley Review of Higher Education 
2009: Total university enrolments exceed 1 million 
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Introduction 
At the outbreak of the Second World War, the Australian government did not 
immediately turn to the universities for help in the war effort. This reflected the 
principles of the public university tradition in Australia. Universities and their 
scholars occupied a place in the nation’s high culture that precluded them from the 
pragmatic problems of wartime science. Professors were certainly figures of public 
importance whose arrival, normally from Great Britain, was announced in the 
newspapers, as was their attendance at official functions, where their wives’ outfits 
were documented as items of public interest.1 Their standing enabled academic staff 
to promote the university and their disciplines in the public sphere. But within the 
institution, professors protected and imparted truth by reading, teaching and setting 
examinations that would test and assure the accuracy of their students’ learning.2 
What they rarely did was research.  
By the 1990s, research infused university life.3 Research defined the very idea of the 
university and the creation of new knowledge that was useful to others (even if only 
other scholars) was now the key source of academic distinction. Professors were not 
lauded as they had been, but many still had substantial standing and respect on the 
                                                
1 For example, Professor Eric Ashby’s arrival to take up a chair in Botany at the University of Sydney 
was announced in the press: ‘Eric Ashby’ Daily Telegraph, 22 February 1938. Unlabelled Press 
Clipping of Eric Ashby's Arrival in Sydney. Eric Ashby Biographical File 1939-1993, USYD/961. 
(Sydney: University of Sydney Archives, 1938). Also in 1938, Sir Robert Wallace, Sydney 
University’s Vice-Chancellor, held his birthday party in the Union Refectory. Mrs Wallace, the Sydney 
Morning Herald reported ‘wore a frock of pale blue romain’ and a ‘velvet cape in a deeper shade of 
blue, edged with ostrich feathers’; Mrs Sadler, wife of Professor Sadler, wore ‘black velvet, with green 
satin bishop sleeves’; and Eric Ashby’s wife wore ‘lavender and blue taffeta with a short lavender 
cape’ ‘Two Birthdays Celebrated. Parties at University and Town Hall’, Sydney Morning Herald, 2 
August 1938. 
2 When James Conant visited Australia and asked university professors about their roles, this is what 
they told him. James B. Conant, ‘Confidential Report to the Carnegie Corporation on the University 
Situation in Australia in the Year 1951’, Reproduced in History of Education Review, 39 (1), 2010, 7. 
3 Julia Horne and Geoffrey Sherington, Sydney: The Making of a Public University (Melbourne: 
Miegunyah Press, 2012, in press), Chapter 7.  
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basis of their research and its impact. Academics continued to promote their 
discipline, but their purpose, often, in doing so was to attract new research funding. 
New income was always needed to enable them (and, commonly, whole teams of 
collaborators) to keep developing new ideas and discovering new applications. The 
worth of research was now often valued by the amount of funding it brought into the 
university, changing that institution’s sense of purpose.4 No longer a monument to the 
guardianship of truth, higher education was increasingly identified – particularly by 
government – as an industry, trading in the intellectual property that was the product 
of academic research. What had been deemed, albeit exaggeratedly so, ‘disinterested 
scholarship’ in the 1940s no longer seemed to make any sense. The university not 
only explicitly served particular interests and economic purposes but was also now 
itself re-imagined, often by its own leaders and staff, as an interested party. 
This transformation raises some important questions about the connections between 
university knowledge and the development of the nation’s identity and economy. The 
shift towards a substantial national investment in research reveals the changing 
relationship between the government, public expectations, and Australia’s public 
universities. But what if academic staff and students did not wish to endorse 
government goals? What were the implications for academic freedom and 
institutional autonomy? Perhaps more to the point, as universities continued to 
change, what if they did seek to conform, assenting to a government imperative that 
they operate in an increasingly commercial manner? The commercialisation of higher 
education is a familiar story, but there are aspects that remain elusive. For while the 
character of the university as an institution and its importance to society and the 
                                                
4 Simon Marginson and Mark Considine, The Enterprise University: Power, Governance and 
Reinvention in Australia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 136–50. 
 10 
economy have been frequently articulated, the ways the different parties characterised 
and sought to regulate university knowledge through research funding, teaching, 
examination and a trade in intellectual property has not been readily explained. 
It is an important set of relationships, however, for in the twentieth century society 
grew to rely on university knowledge to a considerable degree. To be deemed the 
possessor of knowledge granted individuals access to professions and social standing: 
examining and legitimising knowledge conferred, then, considerable authority to the 
university over labour supply and social capital. The university’s growing research 
focus amplified this influence. Research fuelled economic growth, which in the 
second half of the twentieth century was underpinned by technological development, 
so that the control of university research priorities became central to national 
economic management. Even parliamentary decision making was increasingly 
legitimised by expert opinion, making academic advice a key tool of modern 
democracy. Given this importance, was it really plausible in a capitalist democracy 
like Australia that research, education and the legitimation of expertise be left to the 
vagaries of an unelected, socially elite group of scholars? 
Literature Review  
The loss of academic control of the university is a global pattern that scholars of 
higher education describe as a symptom of the ‘corporate university’. These 
observations have been most potent in the United States, where a substantial for-profit 
sector emerged in the 1990s.5 Among the critics, Stanley Aronowitz has pointed to the 
drift in the universities away from ‘academic’ values, replaced by a growing focus on 
                                                
5 Derek Bok, Universities in the Marketplace: The Commercialization of Higher Education (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2003), 1–17. 
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commercialism.6 Aronowitz is not alone in arguing that this has led to universities 
that are now more controlled by administrators than professors. In The Fall of the 
Faculty, Benjamin Ginsberg claims that the re-focus of the universities towards profit 
has led them to replace collegial, academic-run systems with corporate-style 
bureaucracies.7  
Aronowitz and Ginsberg are representative of a substantial American critical 
literature on ‘academic capitalism’. Anthony Grafton has recently divided this body 
of work into ‘polemical’ and ‘research-based’ categories. The first represents what 
Grafton calls scholarly ‘Jeremiads’ whose work is based solely on their experience 
and observations. The latter describes books grounded in empirical educational 
research, though the message delivered by each classification is similar.8 In this genre 
as a whole, ‘academic capitalism’ covers a multitude of criticisms that vary between 
authors. Nevertheless, the phrase generally refers to patterns of knowledge exchange 
that resemble commercial structures, so that the pursuit of knowledge and the pursuit 
of profit no longer seem distinct enterprises.9 Scholarship along these lines is not 
confined to the United States, despite the distinctiveness of its large for-profit sector. 
In fact, in the mid-1990s a comparative study by Sheila Slaughter and Larry L. Leslie 
                                                
6 Stanley Aronowitz, The Knowledge Factory: Dismantling the Corporate University and Creating 
True Higher Learning (Boston: Beacon, 2000). 
7 Benjamin Ginsberg, The Fall of the Faculty: The Rise of the Administrative University and Why It 
Matters (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
8 Anthony Grafton, ‘Our Universities: Why Are They Failing?’, The New York Review of Books, 24 
November 2011, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2011/nov/24/our-universities-why-are-
they-failing/?pagination=false Retrieved 26 January 2012. 
9 See Sheila Slaughter and Larry L. Leslie, Academic Capitalism: Politics, Policies and the 
Entrepreneurial University (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1997). Sheila 
Slaughter and Gary Rhoades, Academic Capitalism and the New Economy (Baltimore and London: The 
John Hopkins University Press, 2004). Marc Bousquet, ‘The Informatics of Higher Education’, in Marc 
Bousquet and Katherine Wills (eds) The Politics of Information: The Electronic Mediation of Social 
Change (Stanford, CA: Alt X Press, 2003), 233–57. Marc Bousquet, How the University Works: 
Higher Education and the Low-Wage Nation (New York: New York University Press, 2008). Daniel S. 
Greenberg, Science for Sale: The Perils, Rewards and Delusions of Campus Capitalism (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2007). 
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found that between the United States, Canada and Australia, academic capitalism had 
progressed most quickly in Australia.10 Their observation was that market-derived 
values had infused university priorities as a result of rapidly implemented government 
policies. This had led, they argued, to a new focus on commercialisable research, a 
growing for-profit biotechnology sector with strong links into the universities and a 
tendency to identify student fee income in market terms. Australian universities, then, 
provided an early indication of the pattern as it was emerging internationally.11  
Globally, more mobile students were now consumers, according to Slaughter and 
Leslie, their consumer choice expressed in course selection and a new prominence 
given to student evaluation. In addition, universities in each of the countries they 
analysed were increasingly compelled, under a growing requirement to commercialise 
research, to act as businesses.12 Other scholars made the same observations. Reduced 
government funding in Australia and the United Kingdom, critics argued, had led 
universities to look to other sources of income, pushing institutions into a new global 
marketplace for higher education.13 
The narrative of decline and crisis that permeates this literature is common, but not 
universal: there are those who support the recent changes in higher education 
globally. The decision by governments to fund a mass university system was likened, 
                                                
10 Slaughter and Leslie, Academic Capitalism, 100–8, 216–9. 
11 Ibid.  
12 Ibid. 
13 Simon Marginson, ‘The New Higher Education Landscape: Public and Private Goods, in 
Global/National/Local Settings’, in Simon Marginson (ed.), Prospects of Higher Education: 
Globalisation, Market Competition, Public Goods and the Future of the University (Taipei: Sense 
Publishers, 2007), 29–78. Michael Peters, Knowledge Economy, Development and the Future of 
Higher Education (Rotterdam: Sense Publishers, 2007). Mark Olssen and Michael A. Peters, 
‘Neoliberalism, Higher Education and the Knowledge Economy: From the Free Market to Knowledge 
Capitalism’, Journal of Education Policy  20 (3), 2005, 313–45. Leonard J. Waks, ‘In the Shadow of 
the Ruins: Globalisation and the Rise of Corporate Universities’, in Simon Marginson (ed.), Prospects 
of Higher Education: Globalisation, Market Competition, Public Goods and the Future of the 
University (Taipei: Sense Publishers, 2007), 101–20. 
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by Martin Trow, an American sociologist and scholar of higher education, to the 
development of a mass consumer market. To him this was a positive transformation. 
A mass system, such as the American one, as he had observed it in the 1970s, 
reflected an industrial economy underpinned by equal economic opportunity. When 
nearly everyone could go to university, Trow argued, they could also access the 
economic benefits resulting from an educated workforce. By contrast, a small and 
elite tertiary system, like in Britain at the same time, reflected and perpetuated a more 
stratified society by restricting access, usually on the basis of class, to educational and 
thus economic aspiration.14 In the 1990s, Trow praised the shift in Britain and 
elsewhere (which would have included Australia) towards what he called the 
‘massification’ of higher education, a drift towards universal access, which Trow saw 
as the inevitable conclusion to mass tertiary education. Such expansion could not be 
wholly paid for from the public purse, Trow argued: egalitarianism was enabled by 
the conversion of higher education from a state-funded privilege to a market.15 
In Unmaking the Public University, Christopher Newfield argues that the conversion 
of America’s public universities into a mass market had the opposite effect to the one 
that Trow described. Reduction in public spending on higher education since the 
1970s, Newfield claims, was a systematic undermining of the economic power of the 
tertiary-educated middle class: now that there were so many of them – around one 
quarter of American adults – they presented a threat. By transferring the costs of 
higher education from the state to private citizens, the middle class lost the wealth 
gained from ‘university type’ jobs by paying for the universities themselves, leaving 
                                                
14 Martin Trow, Twentieth Century Education: Elite to Mass to Universal (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2010), 88–141. 
15 Trow, Twentieth Century Education, 513–47. 
 14 
the majority of American wealth in the hands of a very small percentage of its 
population.16  
According to most of the literature on academic capitalism in Australia and 
internationally, the move towards a mass market for higher education has led to a 
repositioning of academic work as the fleeting and replaceable provision of 
‘content’.17 While academics have retained some control over knowledge itself, the 
significance of that control has declined in a changing environment where non-
academic managers who control funding streams, have set institutional teaching and 
research priorities.18 Critiques of ‘audit culture’, meaning the structuring of academic 
priorities of the basis of administrative requirements to report, reflect a similar 
concern.19  
Among the critics of the corporate university, few point to a way forward, a tendency 
that frustrates Anthony Grafton.20 Derek Bok, former Harvard President, is an 
exception. His Universities in the Marketplace and Our Underachieving Colleges, are 
among the more respected of those works not based on empirical research. Bok 
argues that academics should accept the multiple purposes of higher education – 
embracing both ‘knowledge for its own sake’ as well as professional skill 
development, for instance – and focus on continually improving the pedagogical, 
                                                
16 Christopher Newfield, Unmaking the Public University: The Forty-Year Assault on the Middle Class 
(Cambridge M.A.: Harvard University Press, 2008), 1–15. 
17 Eric Gould, The University in a Corporate Culture (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003). Frank 
Donoghue, The Last Professors: The Corporate University and the Fate of the Humanities (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 2008). Slaughter and Rhoades, Academic Capitalism and the New 
Economy. Greenberg, Science for Sale. 
18 Marginson and Considine, The Enterprise University, 64–7. 
19 Cris Shore and Susan Wright, ‘Coercive Accountability: The Rise of Audit Culture in Higher 
Education’, in Marilyn Strathern (ed.), Audit Cultures: Anthropological Studies in Accountability, 
Ethics and the Academy (London: Routledge, 2008), 57–89. 
20 Grafton, ‘Our Universities: Why Are They Failing?’  
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curricular and extra-curricular aspects of their work.21 In research, while commercial 
opportunities have helped the universities better address society’s requirements, Bok 
argues that the long-term sustainability of American higher education will be 
dependent on the university’s ability to hold fast to academic values.22  
Before considering the specific issues in Australia, some context is needed: what are 
these values that so concern scholars of higher education and how is it that they are 
deemed to be so opposed to the values of the market? Why do critics think it matters 
that academics retain authority, not only over their own expertise, but also over the 
priorities of the university? When higher education commentators are asked to 
enumerate the scholarly values they insist upon for their institutions, they often turn, 
as if to a theologically foundational and even prescriptive text, to Cardinal John 
Henry Newman.23 In the 1850s, just as Australia’s first universities were being 
formed, Newman prepared nine lectures examining and proposing a university 
designed for Irish Catholics, who were then excluded from Oxford and Cambridge. 
These lectures were later collated as The Idea of the University. 24 In 1992 Jaroslav 
Pelikan, a theologian in Britain, undertook a study of Newman’s Idea of the 
University from the perspective of contemporary higher education. On its basis, 
Pelikan articulated six values, or virtues, that he considered central to university 
scholarship. They were free inquiry; intellectual honesty; trust in rationality; the 
imperative to communicate results; a valuing of humanity; and finally, the practice of 
self-discipline, by which he meant the hard work, long hours and passion that is the 
                                                
21 Derek Bok Our Underachieving Colleges: A Candid Look at How Much Students Learn and Why 
They Should Be Learning More (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005). 
22 Bok, Universities in the Marketplace. 
23 Sheldon Rothblatt, ‘Thinking in Perfect Paragraphs.’ Minerva 45, 2007, 445–58. 
24 John Henry Newman, The Idea of a University Defined and Illustrated in Nine Discourses Delivered 
to the Catholics of Dublin in Occasional Lectures and Essays Addressed to the Members of the 
Catholic University (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1852: 1966 Edition), 75–93. 
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habit, Pelikan argued, of good scholars.25 The similarity to monastic values was 
intentional. The long-historical connection of tertiary and ecclesiastical education 
imbued the values Pelikan wished to promote with a sense of permanence and 
universality. Are these the values Bok and others seek to retain? 
Those who consider academic values historically rather than theologically describe 
the growth of the university’s authority on the basis of its reputation for reliability. 
Such reliability was grounded on an assumption that work was conducted honestly. 
Academic freedom and institutional autonomy were reassuring to the beneficiaries of 
research. Joan Wallach Scott has recently reflected on the tradition of academic 
freedom in Western universities. She argues that the aim of those traditional structures 
was to protect university scholarship from vested interests that might lessen the 
reliability of knowledge.26 University leaders had in the past been particularly 
concerned to defend their institutions from interference by sectarian and political 
groups: the university would be of most use to society, argued leaders and thinkers 
like John Dewey, if it could offer critical perspectives without being compelled to 
take sides in the community’s most divisive debates.27 Similarly, it was also central to 
the reliability and authority of the university, at least since the mid-nineteenth 
century, that it be detached from commercial interests.28 
Concern that a mass, commercial market for higher education and research would 
undermine the university’s long-fought reliability is as present in Australian 
                                                
25 Jaroslav Pelikan, The Idea of the University: A Re-examination (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1992), 44–56. 
26 Joan W. Scott, ‘Knowledge, Power and Academic Freedom.’ Social Research 76 (2), 2009, 451–80. 
27 Ibid., 454–5. 
28 Corynne, McSherry, Who Owns Academic Work? Battling for Control of Intellectual Property 
(Cambridge M.A.: Harvard University Press, 2001), 37–8. Conrad Russell, Academic Freedom 
(London: Routledge, 1993), 78–81. 
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scholarship as it is internationally. This literature is concentrated in the discipline 
broadly described as ‘higher education studies’. Grant Harman, Simon Marginson, 
Anthony Welch and Kim McShane are among those who have critiqued the shift in 
government policy to encourage universities towards more market-like approaches.29 
Their focus is the recent past, particularly the Dawkins reforms of 1987 and 
subsequent policies under Australian Prime Minister John Howard, elected in 1996.  
Cultural studies scholars like Guy Redden concur with the perspective provided by 
higher education studies that the marketisation of Australian universities is a result of 
neoliberal policy.30 Neoliberalism is the ideology and economic theory that several 
governments deployed worldwide, to varying degrees, beginning in the early 1980s. It 
was characterised by a move away from centralised state regulation of the economy 
and the maintenance of a large public sector. Deregulation of markets and 
privatisation of publicly owned assets were core methods, in line with the theory, for 
allowing the ‘free’ market to determine the allocation of resources, an approach they 
believed would better assure quality and efficiency.31 In a neoliberal policy 
framework, universities were expected to behave in a more entrepreneurial manner.32  
The ‘entrepreneurial university’ has even been analysed by the Australian Federal 
government: in 2000 the Department of Education, Training and Youth Affairs under 
                                                
29 Grant Harman, ‘Adjustment of Australian Academics to the New Commercial University 
Environment’, Higher Education Policy 19, 2006, 153–72. Simon Marginson Education and Public 
Policy in Australia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). Anthony Welch, Australian 
Education: Reform or Crisis? (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1996). Anthony Welch, ‘Challenge and 
Change: The Academic Profession in Uncertain Times’, in Anthony Welch (ed.) The Professoriate: 
Profile of a Profession (Dordrecht: Springer, 2005), 1–20. Kim McShane, ‘Technologies Transforming 
Academics: Academic Identity and Online Teaching’ (PhD Thesis, Sydney: University of Technology 
Sydney, 2006). 
30 Guy Redden ‘Publish and Flourish, or Perish: RAE, ERA, RQF, and other Acronyms for Infinite 
Human Resourcefulness.’ M/C Journal 11 (4), 2008, http://journal.media-
culture.org.au/index.php/mcjournal/article/viewArticle/44 Retrieved 20 January 2012. 
31 David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 2. Simon 
Marginson, The Free Market: A Study of Hayek, Friedman and Buchanan and Their Effects on the 
Public Good (Sydney: Public Sector Research Centre, 1992). 
32 Marginson, Education and Public Policy in Australia, 57–8. 
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Michael Gallagher reported on ‘The Emergence of Entrepreneurial Public 
Universities in Australia’, citing ‘government push’ and ‘market pull’ factors as equal 
causes.33 Best known, however, is The Enterprise University, an empirical study of 
changes in university governance conducted by Simon Marginson and Mark 
Considine, published in 2000. ‘Enterprise’ captured the change better, they believed, 
than ‘academic capitalism’ for in their study they identified a blend of academic and 
market values. Their research found that the environment in which universities were 
managed had changed since the Dawkins reforms of the late 1980s. University leaders 
– vice-chancellors, deputy and pro vice-chancellors, registrars and administrative 
managers – now had a range of incentives, which had not previously existed, to look 
to new markets, to adjust the administration of universities towards techniques more 
commonly associated with commercial organisations, to seek productivity increases 
and to centralise decision-making to smaller, more flexible leadership groups.34 Many 
of these resembled corporate strategies and the universities were increasingly focused 
towards entrepreneurship. Despite that, there were nuances in the shift, suggesting 
some academics adapted the new approaches to more traditional modes of 
scholarship, creating a hybrid commercial and non-commercial scholarly enterprise.35 
Analyses of the growth of commercial values in higher education in Australia and 
internationally argue that market priorities disrupted the university’s authority over 
knowledge. This is the source of scholarly anguish over the shift of control within 
institutions away from academic faculty. The entrepreneurial university, according to 
this body of literature, was trading on its past reliability for profit, even though that 
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reliability was derived from its separation from commerce. Such a position conveys 
the sense (often by default) that universities operated under one, long, uninterrupted 
tradition before 1980s politicians applied neoliberalism to the universities as they did 
to other sectors. But in so doing they conceal, in fact, the changes commercialisation 
had on the production of university knowledge, not just its governance structures. 
Such an approach often leads to an unintended impression of an earlier, ‘golden age’ 
of university research and governance. Nostalgia is not confined to higher education 
studies: in fact, it infects history even more, particularly in the many histories written 
by academics who were present at the events that they recount. The authority of 
having been there often leads to an idealisation of the particular type of university 
they sought to create. One example is Gavan Butler, Evan Jones and Frank Stilwell’s 
account of the struggle to establish Political Economy at Sydney University. This 
history, along with other accounts of 1960s and 1970s student and academic 
radicalism, offers an archetype against which neoliberal structures are contrasted. 
These works idealise a particular construction of the ‘community of scholars’ – a 
dissenting, debating egalitarian community – as the proper body to legitimise 
knowledge. 36 Alan Barcan’s accounts of the ‘old left’ and ‘new left’ at Sydney 
University similarly recall periods of university political and intellectual activity that 
to him are unmatched in later eras.37 These books are important, along with Alison 
Mackinnon’s recent history of women in American and Australian universities in the 
1950s and early 1960s, for they are among the few detailed studies of student life in 
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twentieth century Australian universities. These histories often present an implicit 
ideal in which student refusal to accept dominant values contributed to social change. 
Nevertheless, they do not offer a real understanding of the ways academic, political 
and civic leaders identified the relationship of higher education to society. 
If some collections of nostalgic histories idealise rebellion from below, the corpus of 
vice-chancellor memoirs suggests the reverse. Beginning with A.P. Rowe’s If the 
Gown Fits in 1960, vice-chancellors’ autobiographies structure professorial leadership 
as the source and location of university distinction.38 Unlike in some national tertiary 
systems, where ‘professor’ refers to any teacher, in Australian universities, as in most 
other Commonwealth countries, the title of professor is granted only to the most 
senior of academic staff. Throughout much of the period explored in this thesis, 
boards consisting only of professor-level scholars ruled the academic function of the 
universities. The position is affirmed by most vice-chancellor accounts of the 
university’s history, who have drawn on that authority themselves to reflect and 
reminisce about their own leadership style and its effects.39 The role of professorial 
power and authority over other staff and students in the university was a key item of 
contention and the vice-chancellor accounts give insight into the perspective of 
leaders. In fact, it may well be Rowe’s book that sparked a longstanding confrontation 
between professors and sub-professorial staff. In a review of the book, P.H. (Perce) 
Partridge commented in the staff association journal Vestes that Rowe’s key theme 
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was the power of the ‘professor-god’, provoking opposition to the figure of the ‘god-
professor’ by a subsequent generation of student radicals.40 
Institutional histories, by contrast, focus on a more collegial authority, tending to tell 
the story of small, struggling numbers of professors, the gradual development of new 
disciplines, periods of growth as a result of philanthropy or government policy and 
the key struggles and controversies that shaped each institution. Histories of the oldest 
two Australian universities, the Universities of Melbourne and Sydney, established in 
the 1850s, offer the most comprehensive accounts.41 Institutional histories are also 
available for the University of Adelaide, inaugurated in 1874, and Tasmania, 
established in 1890, the University of Queensland (1909) and the University of 
Western Australia that opened in 1911.42 S.G Foster and Margaret Varghese’s history 
of the Australian National University, which began in Canberra in 1946 and Patrick 
O’Farrell’s account of the University of New South Wales, established in 1949, both 
give important accounts of post-war university concerns and innovations.43 To these 
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larger institutional histories can be added accounts of the smaller, more specific ones. 
Histories of residential colleges, of sections of university organisation, such as the 
university staff associations and particular departments are complemented by studies 
of disciplines, such as James Franklin’s history of philosophy in Australia.44 But in 
most cases, the institution is the subject: it is acted upon by government, economic 
circumstance and by the vagaries of its own administrators. The question ignored in 
all these genres is what is the relationship between the universities and society? Such 
a question and its implications for the regulation of knowledge is not readily 
explained in the institutional accounts, not even in each university’s contributions to 
the public good, despite the genre’s tendency to cautious triumph. Gestures to the 
national historical context, occasional links to local politics and perhaps the local 
economy raise, but do not elucidate, the ways that knowledge, nation, economics and 
culture were seen and linked throughout Australian university history. 
Broader histories of Australian higher education have been rarer, though they do tend 
to take a more national perspective, giving more context. These help to explain the 
connections between the character and priorities of higher education in Australia in 
relationship to the concerns of government; the qualities of labour conditions and 
economic development and their effect on curricula and research as well as the social 
conditions the universities perpetuated and sometimes sought to change. J.J. 
Auchmuty’s 1963 article ‘The Idea of the University in its Australian Setting’ was 
among the first of these and was much cited for some decades. Auchmuty argued that 
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Australian pragmatism had left the universities under funded and undervalued, 
colonial institutions with no clearly defined role in the community or for the nation.45 
If Auchmuty’s analysis was fair, it was too soon for him to see that the 1957 Murray 
Review was changing that, giving higher education a new and esteemed place at 
national level, with substantial new funding and an official national body to oversee 
it. Peter Tannock’s 1969 PhD thesis and some articles that followed it outlined 
government policy before and after the Murray review. He exposed the power – still 
latent in 1969 – that the Commonwealth had gained, giving government the potential, 
Tannock warned, to take control of the universities; a warning echoed in A.P. 
Gallagher’s 1982 account of the Australian Universities Commission.46  
Stuart Macintyre’s 2010 book The Poor Relation, takes a different view of the 
relationship between government and the universities, focusing on the social sciences 
specifically, since the Second World War. In this account, the nation is centre-stage. 
Social scientific research was embedded in Australia as governments and bureaucrats 
in the 1940s sought expertise and new knowledge to formulate a vision for the 
collective national good. Those social scientists hoped that a science of society, a 
project they believed had unique potential in Australia, would help the world prevent 
the disasters of war and economic depression that had recently been so devastating.47 
By the 2000s, according to Macintyre, the social sciences, by contrast to their 1940s 
incarnation, were professional, well-funded and consisted of thousands of specialist 
researchers. But as a result of the neoliberal policies to which they had responded, the 
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contemporary disciplines lacked coherent vision. Each researcher sought a niche in 
the market for their research as part of the project that, Macintyre argues, infected the 
sciences: the formation of intellectual property.48 The key contrast from the present to 
the 1940s, in Macintyre’s view, was that those older advances in knowledge were 
public goods, available and accessible to all, unlike contemporary intellectual 
property, which is privately owned and traded.49 
Knowledge as a public good, as opposed to a form of private property, is a central 
preoccupation of Simon Marginson’s, whose postgraduate research Macintyre helped 
supervise.50 In the 1990s, Marginson published four major books: Education and 
Public Policy in Australia sought to question the dominance of economic reasoning in 
educational policy, particularly the Dawkins reforms; Educating Australia gave a 
history of economics and education in Australia since 1960; The Free Market was a 
monograph, critiquing neoliberalism and Markets in Education considered the 
character of educational markets as they were just emerging.51 Through each of these, 
Marginson interrogated the economic assumptions used in formulating education 
policy. He began by investigating the economic value of education. The value of 
higher education for graduates, he demonstrated, was not primarily in the knowledge 
gained and skills learned. Rather, the degree was a ‘positional good’, giving 
university graduates social and economic advantages derived from the degree’s 
credential rather than its substance.52 Later, Marginson extended this to show that 
some credentials were worth more than others, depending on the reputation of the 
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institution from which the credential was received – making global university 
rankings important signifiers of value.53 
The economic value of higher education was therefore the degree, not knowledge. For 
Marginson, this freed knowledge from the market. In Education and Public Policy he 
articulated a theory that university knowledge was an inherently non-market product. 
It was ‘non-rival’, an economic term that refers to a purchase which, despite its sale, 
does not remove the commodity or its utility from its original owner. The construction 
of markets around knowledge that were based on the possibility of owning knowledge 
as a private good, Marginson concluded, was therefore not commensurate with the 
nature of the substance of knowledge.54 
The political aim of this analysis was to ensure university knowledge remained 
publicly owned. The private ownership of intellectual property was, to Marginson, 
part of the 1980s and 1990s government project to privatise public assets. 
Transforming university research into privately owned intellectual property was 
similar to privatising (as the Hawke-Keating government did) the Commonwealth 
Bank, Qantas and other national institutions.55 A key distinction was that instead of 
selling the institution, intellectual property reconfigured the nature of knowledge to be 
a different kind of commodity. When knowledge was public property it had the 
potential to benefit everyone. Private knowledge, however, would only benefit the 
few who traded it. In this approach to intellectual property, Marginson believed he 
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located a weakness in the neoliberal agenda: a weakness that, when exposed, would 
demonstrate that privatising university research would undermine its intrinsic 
economic value. He sought to take on the neoliberal economists using their own tools. 
This led Marginson to construe knowledge as a public good. In repeated economic 
discussions, this public good – meaning publicly-owned commodity – exactly equates 
with the public good, meaning the public benefits of knowledge. This was to contrast 
with neoliberal economic interpretations of education as a commodity that had 
‘positive externalities’ – benefits resulting from, but not intrinsic to, the character of 
knowledge.56 Marginson instead detached education from knowledge. Once 
conceived as a distinct substance, knowledge could also be separated from the market 
for education. He then reconstructed knowledge as a publicly owned commodity. 
Even though a university degree was a privately-possessed good, knowledge was not: 
its non-rival character, Marginson argued, required it to be publicly owned.57 But 
there was a problem with equating public ownership with public benefit, for what if 
knowledge was not always beneficial? This question had a very odd answer – these 
were not public goods. They were, he argued, ‘public bads’.58  
What exactly ‘public bad’ implies for the ownership of knowledge is not at all clear. 
Nor does the non-market argument hold up. Non-rival commodities – music 
downloads, for example – are commonly traded as privately-owned goods. Who is to 
say that a public ‘good’ (or bad) could not be privately traded? The problem appears 
to be Marginson’s angle of analysis. Looking at education from the perspective of its 
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economic good immobilises knowledge; it means education and knowledge which, 
from other angles may or may not be treated as commodities, must be. This position 
seems to result eventually in Marginson adopting an at times ambivalent, even 
contradictory stance. Whereas in the 1990s, Marginson’s intention to critique 
commodified, privately traded knowledge is stated up front, in his post-2000 work, 
where Marginson’s attention shifted from public policy to the institution, such an 
intention is no longer clear. In considering education as a global positional good and 
knowledge as a public commodity, in his recent work it becomes very difficult to tell 
whether Marginson is critiquing university entry into a global marketplace or 
providing instruction on how to do so to greater effect.59 
The historical implication of Marginson’s account is that the government approach to 
higher education prior to the 1970s was, like the Keynesian economics that dominated 
public policy, focused on public benefit as the endpoint to widespread private gain. 
Government faith in the theories of John Maynard Keynes had led to an enlarged 
public sector, which aimed to use government spending to assure circulation and 
distribution of capital, leading to full employment and a growing middle class.60 
When their faith in Keynesian strategy was undermined in the economic turmoil of 
the 1970s, so was the government’s focus on the public good. Government interest 
would now concentrate on the regulation of higher education as an industry, rather 
than as a function of the state.61  
Keynesian-inspired approaches to public policy did not previously have a wholly 
benign influence on higher education, however: government commitment to the 
                                                
59 See Ibid. 
60 Tim Rowse, ‘Coombs the Keynesian’, History of Economics Review, 30, 1999, 108–25. 
61 Marginson, Education and Public Policy in Australia, 55–7. 
 28 
universities for specific public benefits was no recipe for independence and 
autonomy. Higher education was a part of the nation-building project that dominated 
political sensibilities in the post-war period.62 University research funding was 
therefore, in part, for the purpose of strengthening the state. Such a tendency was not 
new: since the establishment of Australian universities in the nineteenth century, 
some university scientists sustained connections to imperial research networks, 
positioning the university within the imperial mission.63 Twentieth century funding of 
research for the purpose of bolstering the state was a practice inherited from its use in 
earlier centuries to nourish imperialism.  
The connection of science in Australia to empire went deeper than the provision of 
colonial data to the metropole, however: it went to the core of the nature of the 
scientific endeavour.64 Historians highlight the colonial power asserted by early 
science in Australia and the imperial assumptions informing its applications. 
Indigenous knowledge, for example, was appropriated by scientists and sent to Great 
Britain as their own discoveries.65 Race and ‘whiteness’ was connected to population 
health management, so that medical advances and the colonial project worked in 
concert.66  
The argument that science functioned as a type of imperial authority is founded in 
Michel Foucault’s claims to a nexus between knowledge and power. The impulse to 
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colonise the world was paralleled in the scientific desire to know it. Ownership claims 
by humans over nature was a kind of imperialism of the knower over that which they 
knew.67 Observations of the natural world were by necessity ‘objective’, in that they 
described a world that existed beyond its discoverer and would exist whether they 
discovered it or not. Such knowledge was thus deemed ‘truth’ and granted a status 
above other ways of knowing.68 This type of knowledge gave authority to the expert 
not only to shape the public’s understanding of the world but, in doing so, to also 
make implicit demands on the behaviour of those living within the boundaries of the 
world they described.69 As nineteenth-century universities across Europe and the 
world slowly welcomed the sciences into its mission and purpose, the implications for 
the university was an elevation of its authority: the kinds of claims to truth that 
science permitted gave higher education increased power in society. By the twentieth 
century, other disciplines and activities – history, economics, sociology, even cooking 
(‘domestic science’) sought, particularly in the ‘social sciences’, some of the 
legitimacy scientific knowledge had acquired.70 Scientific authority enhanced the 
university’s entitlement to the guardianship of knowledge – to possess truth and its 
purity, or ‘universal’ knowledge, as Foucault described it.71  
Scientific authority, however, was augmented by the tangible role of the university in 
national development, increasing still further the university’s influence. For this to 
occur, the universities needed to acquire a more local perspective. Historians of 
science describe the shift from imperial exploration of Australia to a science for 
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Australia, developing an eye to the national (rather than imperial) benefit, as a gradual 
one.72 Despite the increased nationalisation of science, however, especially after 
Australian Federation, scholarly connections to the Empire, as Peter Hobbins, 
Kathryn Hillier and Tamson Pietsch demonstrate, were long maintained.73 Ongoing 
links notwithstanding, the rise of institutions such as the Commonwealth Scientific 
and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) and the development of disciplines, 
academies, societies and universities are depicted – for example in collections such as 
those edited by Rod Home and Roy Macleod – as providing the intellectual 
infrastructure for the modern, maturing nation.74 
The value of scientific infrastructure for the nation was explicitly economic, since 
science translated into new technologies.75 This too asserted a type of power, argues 
Stanley Aronowitz (in a study of science that preceded his critiques of the 
contemporary university). Arguing from a Marxist perspective he sees scientific 
knowledge as having wrested control of labour away from expert crafts-men and 
women.76 The use of science to innovate and create new industrial technologies thus 
made science a tool of capital, promoted as progress. Technological progress, based 
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on scientific discovery, was the marker of modernity as economies and cultures 
sought mechanisation, automation, speed and constant change. The universities were 
an important component of this development. 
The adoption of technological knowledge by the university was – as this thesis will 
discuss – a contentious decision. As Nicholas Brown argues, this was partly a result 
of a longstanding division between utilitarian and liberal aims in higher education.77 
The division between practical and liberal education, however, does not wholly 
explain it. In the late 1970s, philosopher Jean-Francois Lyotard suggested that the 
shift of university attention from scientific observation to technological development 
constituted a transformation that challenged the legitimacy of the university’s 
authority over knowledge.78 If Lyotard was right, defending the university from a 
shift towards technology was not just a defence of liberal knowledge over vocational 
training. It protected a past epistemology that defined the university’s traditional role 
in society.  
According to Lyotard, the modern university (since the German Enlightenment and 
the French Revolution) was founded on two modes of legitimacy, or authority over 
knowledge, both based on scientific research norms. One form, derived from German 
idealism, stated that scientific knowledge legitimised itself – that is, the value of 
knowledge was knowledge itself. This suggested that knowledge was elemental – it 
was life or spirit. The state had no authority over this knowledge – indeed, only 
knowledge could ‘say what the state and what society are’.79 The university’s 
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separation from the state was thus, ironically, a mechanism to legitimise it. As an 
independent institution, with the capacity to develop and guard truth, the university 
could give the state an authority to rule that was deemed, by the structure of the 
pursuit of knowledge, independent and reliable. This was a position of great power 
that the universities would battle to defend. 
There was, however, a second mode of legitimacy for the university that did not sit 
easily with the first, according to Lyotard, though they both arose almost 
simultaneously. Eventually this second mode dominated the other (although never 
absolutely), for it was founded in a larger, more inclusive and compelling narrative of 
human liberty. Knowledge was legitimised, not by elitist mastery as in the first form, 
but by consensus. Knowledge was thus found to be ‘truth’ or ‘untruth’ by the people. 
It was, Lyotard explains, a heroic myth, depicted as a part of a human struggle for 
freedom. This mode of legitimacy had expression in democracies: the people decided 
what knowledge was and through their control of knowledge they also controlled the 
state. As democracy began to dominate the Western world, national universities were 
established in the name of freedom, argued Lyotard. The struggle by researchers to 
win control of knowledge reflected exactly the struggle of democratic people to rule 
themselves. As citizens overthrew other tyrannical forms of rule to establish 
democracy, so would researchers conquer nature and, in doing so, rule themselves, no 
longer subject to the caprice of unpredictable natural forces.80  
This second mode of legitimacy meant that university knowledge was pushed towards 
action rather than truth.81 The value of science would be determined by the people, 
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who sought observable, practical benefits. Science became what the people required it 
to be – useful. This, Lyotard explained, meant that inquiry swayed from its ‘pure’ and 
independent form and became increasingly technological. An important consequence 
of this was the connection between usefulness and the market. Once knowledge was 
useful in this way, that use had market value.82 As a result, the worth of research was 
no longer located in itself; it was realised when it worked and valued when it was 
sold.  
The ascendancy of that second mode of legitimacy over the first, Lyotard argues, 
carried within it the seeds of the delegitimisation of the university. Given that 
authority was now located in the people, not in mastery, the university was not 
necessarily more able to offer technological solutions than any other sector.83 
Knowledge was not ‘life’ or ‘spirit’, it was merely another tool to effect progress. 
Progress, not knowledge, therefore became the goal of the university, undermining its 
formerly unique position in modern society. The university’s role, as a result, was less 
and less attached to the state and democracy, the two structures that had made it so 
powerful. Its efficiency in achieving progress became the key measurable way of 
evaluating society’s need for higher education.84 
Moreover, technological use became of value to the university too, as it could often 
also be applied to enhance knowledge itself. Some technologies – like laboratory 
equipment – would improve research outcomes. In fact, without some technologies 
there could be no guarantee of proof. As a result, knowledge would be increasingly 
reinvested into the production of more knowledge. Since research leading to 
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technologies was also translated into market value, investment in the efficiency and 
effectiveness of research increased: ‘whoever is the wealthiest has the best chance of 
being right’, Lyotard suggests, and whoever produces quality knowledge is also likely 
to be the wealthiest.85 This link between knowledge and wealth, Lyotard argues, 
resulted in a situation where the circulation of knowledge came to resemble the 
circulation of capital, since surplus knowledge was reinvested into the university for 
the purpose of producing more.86 
University and political leaders, navigating the shift to the technologically-focused 
university did not typically undertake such complex philosophical reflections. 
Nevertheless, the issues Lyotard outlined are reflected in simpler form throughout 
debates over the inclusion of technological knowledge as the proper domain of 
university activity (see Chapter One). The significance of technological universities 
and their link to the economy is not, however, reflected in the historiography. While 
technological development occurred in Australia as it did across the Western world, 
fuelling the post-war economic boom, its global emergence is a narrative in which 
Australia rarely features. As a result, historians have not closely considered the 
significance of Australian technological development, particularly in its relationship 
to the universities. Terry Irving, Raewyn Connell and other historians have pointed to 
the skilled workforce, led by ‘technocrats’, that contributed to Australia’s post-war 
manufacturing capacities.87 And yet despite the evidence that technological 
development and technological education was central to Australian post-war 
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modernisation, the structures that enabled the development of a skilled labour force 
have been largely ignored. 
An exception to that broad neglect is Nicholas Brown’s Governing Prosperity, which 
documents the post-war rise of the universities among the key social changes of the 
1950s in Australia.88 In this period, the university’s link to applied technology forged 
its connection to the nation and the government’s aims for its economic growth.89 It 
was an international phenomenon that drew the objections of philosopher Jacques 
Derrida in the 1980s. In its alliance to modernity and the state, Derrida argued that 
universities had revealed the emptiness of everything they had claimed to be. In his 
view, the apparent decline of the university under neoliberal policies, and the loss of 
its claims to truth was timely and deserved.90  
Taking up Derrida’s argument, scholars in the 1990s – in part a response to the North 
American ‘culture wars’ – argued that the university’s authority had been false, its 
knowledge claims constructed on elaborate apparatuses of power. This scholarship is 
primarily represented by Bill Readings’s The University in Ruins.91 Readings suggests 
that academics, like the student radicals of the 1960s and 1970s (who he idealises as 
those who knew best how to engage with the university), ‘dwell in the ruins’.92 The 
university has no value, no raison d’etre according to Derrida, an emptiness of 
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purpose that Readings sees as an improvement on the oppressive structures of its 
past.93 
Readings’ criticisms of the effects of the university’s past claims to truth are difficult 
to reconcile, however, with the types of value in knowledge that political, civic and 
academic leaders have had to navigate in building the university: issues like the health 
of the people, their ability to participate in democracy and their standard of living. 
Nevertheless, Readings does raise some important questions. Was it legitimate for the 
university to maintain such authority over knowledge? Is the loss of that authority (if 
indeed it has been lost) in fact just and correct, redistributing the ownership of 
knowledge beyond the university’s still-elite membership? 
Corynne McSherry argues that instead of ‘living in the ruins’, as Bill Readings would 
have them do, many academics have chosen to invoke the concept of intellectual 
property to stake their claim to the ownership of knowledge. She suggests, however, 
that this is not only about market participation. Rather – or perhaps more accurately, 
also – it is a claim to academic freedom.94 To understand how she makes this 
argument requires a turn to a different author, Henry Etzkowitz.  
In the late 1990s, Etzkowitz and his Dutch colleagues prepared an argument for 
university collaboration with society based on the metaphor of the ‘triple helix’.95 
Towards the end of the twentieth century, they argued, universities, government and 
industry had formed a bond – an unstable, but productive relationship that created 
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new knowledge.96 In this argument, Etzkowitz was responding specifically to a 
widely-read book by Michael Gibbons and colleagues, which had observed a 
significant change in the patterns of university research. 
Gibbons and colleagues had suggested that the marketisation of universities was 
associated with changes in research behaviour. Rather than a linear pattern where 
discovery was turned into application, research was now more often conducted in 
multi-disciplinary teams that included industries – a relationship that brought profit-
motives into the university. The risks, Gibbons argued, were that the university’s 
unique reliability was based on its separation from financial and political interests. 
Alliance with the state and industry threatened that status.97 Etzkowitz contested the 
novelty of what Gibbons had defined as ‘Mode 2’ research. The production of 
knowledge for profit, Etzkowitz argued, was in fact the original mission of the 
university, an approach that had been disrupted by the claims to objectivity derived 
from German idealism.98 This offered the universities a justification for engagement 
in knowledge for profit, where profit ‘means different things’ to different 
stakeholders.99  
Extending the analysis by Etzkowitz and his colleagues, McSherry argues that the 
university’s separation from profit had its origins in the leisured scholarship of past 
aristocratic amateur scientists, rather than in principled claims about truth and 
reliability. Their leisured discovery, she maintained, was contrasted to the lesser 
status of industrialists who pursued applied innovations for profit. It was thus a class-
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based distinction that informed university research norms and gave the university an 
authority over others. This granted university research a higher status than workplace-
based or industrial knowledge – a status that universities converted into a claim for 
greater moral integrity.100 The defence of academic values, then, is seen – particularly 
among advocates, like Etzkowitz, for university research commercialisation – as 
much a reflection of scholarly arrogance as a desire to protect the integrity of 
research. The university’s turn to commerce does not collapse any genuinely moral 
high ground, they argue, only some out-worn elitism.101 
For McSherry’s analysis of intellectual property, this ability for profit to ‘mean 
different things’ offered academics the opportunity to reclaim the ownership of 
knowledge, using the market’s own tools. Academic claims to intellectual property 
fulfilled Derrida and Readings’s plea for ‘interested’ scholarship – though a stake in 
intellectual property was, she admitted, unlikely to be the sort of interest they 
meant.102  
The growth in the emphasis on intellectual property in higher education globally is a 
sign of the importance of the issues of ownership, control and regulation that became 
attached to university knowledge towards the end of the twentieth century. And yet, 
while the legal and moral implications have been discussed throughout the 
scholarship, the historical complexities that have led to them have not. In the history 
of Australian higher education, the regulation of knowledge is an issue that sits 
tantalisingly beneath the surface of the historiography (including, as is needed here, 
the contributions of other disciplines than history). Tensions between government 
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aims, economic necessity and university autonomy were present in accounts of the 
universities during the war; in the expansive and hopeful plans of post-war 
reconstruction; in histories of the ‘long boom’ of post-war economic prosperity and in 
critiques of higher education policy from the Whitlam and Dawkins reforms up to the 
present. In accounts of all these well known events, however, the mechanisms for 
setting the boundaries of knowledge and controlling research priorities are unclear. 
By contrast, having power over knowledge was at the forefront of histories of science, 
as historians recognised connections between the projects of empire and nation and 
the aims of science.103 Their recognition of the link between scientific discovery and 
imperial goals did not ordinarily extend to reflections on higher education, however, 
so that the implications of imperial science for the idea of the university were rarely 
specifically articulated. In an exception to this general tendency, histories of student 
radicalism often carry an underlying challenge to the legitimacy of university rule 
over the realm of knowledge by idealising dissent as the source of progressive 
scholarship. And yet, those separate criticisms have not been connected to consider 
which historical actors controlled, owned and validated knowledge in Australian 
universities or, moreover, what the implications were as that control shifted. Even 
Marginson, who closely considered the market for knowledge, only focused on its 
economics, not its regulation. The issue raises further questions: where among all this, 
was academic freedom? To what extent, despite the pressures, have universities and 
academics retained control of knowledge – and has it made any difference when they 
have done so? 
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Approach, Methodology and Sources 
This thesis traces changes in the university in Australia from the beginning of the 
Second World War until the mid-1990s, exploring the control, regulation and 
ownership of university-based knowledge. It is focused on moments of change or 
crisis, where in controversy, issues and assumptions that often lay beneath the surface 
of academic norms, are better able to be seen. These events include: the use of 
universities in the project of war, post-war reconstruction and nation-building; the 
inclusion of technology in the university; the Cold War decision to send government 
spies to observe and influence academic ideas; academic and student rebellion against 
the expectation that the university reinforce and justify social and political norms and 
hierarchies; government interventions in university priorities and values; and the 
decisions that made university research and teaching objects for sale and trade. 
Science features prominently among these, but this is not just a history of science: it is 
a story simultaneously about changes to the idea of the university in Australia in the 
twentieth century and shifts in the use and value of the knowledge attached to it. 
In considering the issues that academic, political and civic leaders believed threatened 
academic values and the integrity of the university, this thesis identifies the changing 
ways that university knowledge was imagined, understood and valued. The questions 
university members confronted were remarkably consistent throughout, despite 
significant changes in the implications of their answers. At every point, academics 
found that they needed to agree on the basis for inclusion of topics and disciplines in 
the university and the right people and institutions to judge their validity and quality. 
They were also compelled to negotiate on the university’s responsibilities to society 
and to stand firm in the instances that they agreed it must remain autonomous. As 
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time passed, any ability to remain separate seemed increasingly difficult. This led to 
new questions about the political, ideological and economic elements of university 
work and the possibility – and desirability – of maintaining the ideal of disinterested 
scholarship that had given the university so much authority. In short, this thesis 
examines university autonomy, academic freedom, legitimation and the 
commodification of knowledge. It focuses on research, but does not ignore teaching 
and examination as other key areas where knowledge was perpetuated, legitimised 
and sometimes challenged. 
These issues, particularly prior to the 1980s, were often seen as a crisis of the 
professoriate. The struggles of university professors to maintain the integrity of 
university knowledge were paralleled by their effort to maintain the right to control 
and legitimise it. The personal papers of professorial staff, used extensively in this 
thesis, have often been compiled, organised and archived with a view to 
demonstrating the rightfulness of their authority and actions. The value of this 
tendency is that personal papers often contain concentrations of material that pertain 
to the moments of controversy that arose within the universities. Their personal and 
professional bias, when compared to the university histories and other institutional 
sources, provide useful insights into the strategies and concerns of the different 
interests and players as the university environment evolved and was transformed over 
the decades.  
For this reason, minutes of university meetings are useful sources, for they 
demonstrate the responses and decisions of Australian universities collectively as well 
as distinctions and nuances between the institutions. The minutes of past decades, 
assiduously taken, transcribed and indexed by the armies of secretaries who laboured 
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in the universities, very helpfully specify far more than the disciplined minutes that 
are the preference of the chair of many contemporary meetings. Disputes and their 
originators are often detailed in extensive accounts of even the most contentious 
meetings, providing useful inroads to the key debates as they arose within the 
universities. Policies, media releases and ephemera kept in university archives (and 
occasionally on university websites), while offering a more sanitised perspective on 
the institution, also reveal the issues that university leaders considered to be 
significant. 
The concerns of key organisations and individuals in the system as a whole are 
reflected in published primary sources of the Australian Vice Chancellors’ Committee 
and other university and civic leaders. Divisions between those documents and the 
evidence available through the National Tertiary Education Union, alongside records 
of the staff associations scattered through personal collections, reveal controversies 
that are distinct from the institutional ones, helping to identify their differing, and 
sometimes competing interests.  
Student publications reflect their concerns, preoccupations and position in the 
university. Student engagement with the issues and questions raised throughout the 
institutional evidence, their support or opposition to university and government aims 
and decisions, are scattered through their publications: student union newspapers, 
publications of the National Union of Australian University Students and collections 
of student ephemera, which all help reveal students’ place in the system of university 
knowledge. These sources are often not the best foundation for reliable facts, but they 
display the diverse interests and perspectives of students in each era of university 
history. 
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In particular, in the 1960s and 1970s when students most challenged the university’s 
right to control knowledge, the roneoed student ‘broadsheets’ give, in stark and often 
melodramatic polemic, the claims and debates that concerned students. These are 
often difficult to navigate. While there were a few student organisations that stood 
out, maintaining a large membership over a relatively sustained period, the number of 
student organisations that formed and published their own broadsheet – sometimes in 
just a handful of editions – is staggering. Those publications often targeted their 
criticisms towards other, competing student groups, debating details of their 
ideological distinction. Rather than try to capture the grievances differing student 
organisations had with one another, I have concentrated on the issues that had broad 
support among student radicals: issues such as opposition to examinations, student 
participation in university governance and the role of the university in perpetuating 
social injustices. While many of the student radicals of the period carefully considered 
the role and importance of the university and its knowledge, individual broadsheets do 
not often bring those out clearly. Collectively, they do, however, particularly when 
used in conjunction with the records of staff radicals, and even the papers of some of 
the professors who opposed them.  
Despite the volume of these records, student sources do not offer a terribly coherent 
picture of the impact of student and staff radicalism on the subsequent right that 
society granted to the university to legitimise knowledge. Public reception of student 
radicalism was recounted in State and Federal parliaments and in the media, so that 
Hansard, newspapers and magazines, used carefully and cross-checked with other 
material, are important sources.  
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Records maintained by agents and analysts of the Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation (ASIO) provide significant insights into student and staff radicalism and 
the government’s fears and responses of student revolutionary movements as well as 
of radical academics in the earlier part of the Cold War. ASIO files are notoriously 
inaccurate: histories of ASIO recount the instances where agents made significant 
errors in identification, analysis and recording.104 What the ASIO records do provide, 
however, are an insight into the concerns that fuelled government involvement in the 
universities. 
In addition to the clandestine records of ASIO, official government records are also 
significant, for they provide the policy context and the public debates that informed 
them. The reviews, reports, recommendations, discussion papers, policy documents 
and parliamentary records all offer specific angles on university teaching and 
research, indicating the government’s evolving interests and priorities in higher 
education. I have focused on the university system nationally, so these are primarily 
Federal, not State, records. A different, and perhaps more detailed, story would 
emerge from those State-based accounts, particularly in the establishment of new 
institutions. This thesis does give an account of some new institutions: the New South 
Wales University of Technology (which became, and is referred to in this thesis, as 
the University of New South Wales), the Australian National University and, later, 
Bond University are considered rather more closely than the rest. It has not, however, 
been my task to detail all the intricacies even of those institutions except as their 
establishment pertains to changes in the regulation of knowledge.  
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Government records are comparatively narrow, but provide evidence on official 
positions, although (with the exception of confidential items, such as some Cabinet 
notes) they normally limit their expression of controversy to simplified debates. The 
‘backroom’ discussions that forged the details of key government policy changes, 
particularly the Dawkins reforms, are not normally publicly available. A small 
number of oral history interviews have been conducted, with Human Research Ethics 
Committee approval, to gain an understanding of some of the events that occurred 
‘off the record’ in the formulation of government policy. Additional details of 
political, bureaucratic and university leadership decisions, considerations and 
implications were drawn from archived oral history recordings. 
The risks of a reliance on oral history are well known. As Alistair Thomson and other 
oral historians have shown, memories can be shaped to fit with public perceptions and 
interviewer expectations. Long-nourished narratives of self, rather than memory, can 
inform oral history interviews. Moreover, such narratives, many historians have 
argued, come to shape memory itself. This is evidenced by the content of my 
interviews with former vice-chancellors and bureaucrats, as they sought to make 
sense of their roles in a complex, quarrelsome and rapidly changing segment of 
Australian university history.105 I was able in many instances to check their 
recollections against one another, and also against documentary evidence contained in 
the public record to iron out some of the effects of memory and assist in the 
development of a more verifiable historical account.  
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In the course of my research, several scholars and university administrators shared 
their experiences, giving me insights into events and issues that I have needed to 
acknowledge. Some handed me unpublished manuscripts of memoirs, speeches and 
articles, not all of which I used. The ones I have were treated in the same spirit as the 
oral history interviews; facts were checked, opinions noted while the memories of key 
disputes and their meaning for their author’s idea of the university were gleaned. Such 
items provided a helpful comparison to interviews, elucidating some of the more 
contestable issues that are difficult to raise in person. 
Archived recordings and transcripts of oral history interviews from national and 
university collections have been used less for facts than to gain a sense of the 
personalities and nuances at stake in the negotiation of change in higher education. 
Recollections were relatively easily verified against public records, but the opinions 
and players that they rounded out were unavailable in any other form. 
The ways the universities were presented and understood in the public sphere are 
diverse and difficult to gauge, though newspapers and magazines have been used for 
this purpose where needed. A systematic and detailed study of The Australian Higher 
Education Supplement was conducted to evaluate public perceptions of higher 
education in the 1980s, where such opinions had a significant impact on public policy 
decisions and university responses. The Higher Education Supplement was 
inaugurated in 1980. Within a few years, its coverage, authorship and letters to the 
editor suggest that its readership was widespread in the sector as academics, 
university administrators, union staff and politicians with responsibility for education 
contributed to it and commented on its contents. The Murdoch-owned Supplement 
arguably influenced as well as reflected opinion and policy in the 1980s. My analysis 
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therefore sought to identify the propensities of particular journalists and editors and 
the patterns of argument the Supplement presented to the higher education sector in 
the 1980s. 
In intellectual property especially, there is a significant legal angle to this thesis. 
Legislation governing academic employment, Industrial Relations Commission 
findings on academic work conditions and judgements on the ownership of patents 
are crucial sources for the structure of ownership and control in the universities. In 
addition, a sample of eight institutional intellectual property policies were selected 
and analysed for the final chapter, largely based on which universities readily made 
them available. In each case they were the first policy of the institution to use the 
phrase ‘intellectual property’ (rather than ‘patent’ or other terminology). Such policies 
do not always reveal the intentions underlying them, however, or the motives and 
catalysts for intellectual property protection. Some institutions – Monash, Macquarie 
and the Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology – also made available their 
intellectual property files, which helped overcome this issue, revealing concerns, 
priorities and uncertainties about the nature of academic work and intellectual 
property ownership that the universities confronted as the policies were formulated.106  
Some issues of terminology and scope should be clarified. This thesis considers 
changes to higher education, not tertiary education more broadly: it does not therefore 
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consider Technical and Further Education (known as TAFE) except where there was a 
direct relationship between the sectors, as there was during the Second World War 
and in the lead up to the development of technological universities. Higher education 
does, however, include the degree-awarding Institutes of Technology. From 1965 to 
1987, Australia also hosted Colleges of Advanced Education. These too are included, 
though their role is secondary and supplementary to the wider discourses on 
universities. This is partly due to the fact that I have used ‘higher education’ and 
‘universities’ somewhat interchangeably, avoiding the awkwardness of repeatedly 
specifying ‘universities and Colleges of Advanced Education’. The ending of that 
‘binary’ system is described (in Chapter Four), but, despite the fact that there were 
indeed tensions surrounding the control of research between the two sectors until the 
1987 Dawkins reforms and, arguably, beyond, I have not focused heavily on these 
debates and developments. The battle within higher education has been considered 
elsewhere and, while it is not completely absent here, if given too much attention 
would have distracted from other, less explored, themes of the period.107  
‘University knowledge’ also needs clarification. Throughout the thesis it refers to the 
types of subjects, approaches, focus and research that academic staff of Australian 
universities considered to be their task to explore, protect, teach and discover. Change 
was frequent and consensus rare, so the concept did not sit still for long enough to 
define with real precision. My position throughout has been to assume that knowledge 
of some sort, understood in uneven and transient ways, was the substance at the core 
of the university. 
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‘Knowledge’ does not only refer to research outcomes, for often university members 
saw their role as the protection and promotion of existing knowledge, without 
necessarily creating or discovering anything new. It never refers, in this thesis, to 
what might be better called ‘information’. Knowledge, unlike information, has at least 
one agent, a knower of some kind. This is not to suggest that for all scholars at all 
times the knower was the cause of knowledge: sometimes academics perceived 
knowledge to be a single body, to which every individual only has partial access. At 
other times scholars believed it to reside only within the knower, as an inalienable and 
subjective substance, acquired only through personal journey. Other approaches are 
also evident. One of the tasks of this research has been to identify its jagged and 
shifting boundaries as university members navigated the changing intellectual 
environment. 
The term ‘university’ itself turns out to be surprisingly ambiguous. It has been used 
here in three main ways. One is the university as an individual institution. To 
differentiate institutions from other ways of using the term, when a university is 
referred to specifically, it is normally capitalised as ‘the University’. A second usage 
is the concept of ‘the university’. There was, of course, never just one concept. The 
initial ‘idea of the university’ in Australia was largely derived from the British and 
Scottish traditions that informed the earliest colonial institutions. Over time, as the 
thesis will discuss, research – a practice that defined much of the American system, 
based as it was on German ideas about the university – began to infuse the concept.108 
As a result of these shifts, like knowledge, the concept of the university changed 
regularly: such changes are the subject of this study. As a concept, the university is 
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referred to throughout simply as ‘the university’, though, as its ideals played out in 
reality, this sometimes slips into a third usage, the description of the system 
collectively as ‘universities’.  
A far more difficult question, with implications for terminology, is whether ‘the 
university’ is, by definition, a collective description of its members (meaning ‘they’ 
might own or act) or whether it is proper to consider ‘the university’ as a singular 
legal and institutional entity (meaning ‘it’ would be the owner or actor). Technically, 
between the different institutions and different legal events, they are often both.109 
This leads, particularly in Chapter Five where that differentiation is in fact key to the 
issues at stake, to some inconsistencies in the use of ‘its’ intellectual property (for 
example) and objects that are ‘theirs’, in the collective sense. Not wishing to be too 
pedantic about it, it is my hope that the slippage between the two in fact helps to 
demonstrate the ambiguity in the character of Australian public universities and its 
consequences for the ownership of knowledge and academic freedom. 
Thesis structure 
Taking a broadly (but not strictly) chronological approach, this thesis is structured in 
five chapters, each focusing on key themes. Spanning a period of more than fifty 
years, it begins in 1939 with the growth of university research to support national, 
economic and military goals and concludes at 1996, with the end of the Hawke-
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Keating Labor government under which the momentous Dawkins reforms were 
instituted. 
The first chapter, ‘Knowledge and Technology 1939-1957’ begins with the Second 
World War and the influences that war work had on university members’ sense of 
responsibility to society. The chapter considers the university’s growing links with the 
economy in the ‘long boom’ that followed the war. Focusing especially on the 
establishment of the University of New South Wales, this chapter uses archival 
sources to document controversies over the growth of technological disciplines in the 
universities. While its emphasis is on changes in Australia, the international character 
of the debate is acknowledged and links are drawn with British and North American 
developments, particularly where they influenced Australian opinion and decisions. In 
so doing, the chapter explores the effects on the university in Australia as it shifted 
from observation of the world to a facilitator of innovation within it. 
Next, the changing relationship of the universities with the Federal government is 
explored. Chapter Two, ‘Knowledge and the Nation 1945-1965’ begins with the use 
of the universities in nation building and the various forms that took: it analyses the 
cultural, social, diplomatic and political concerns as well as the economic needs of the 
emerging ‘technological society’ that shaped the development of a national system of 
higher education. In particular, the chapter considers the implications of the tension 
between this nation-building project and the worries of politicians and the emerging 
academic union during the Cold War.  
Those tensions coalesced in the student revolutionary period with a new focus among 
students and junior staff on university reform. Chapter Three, ‘Knowledge and 
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Revolution 1965-1975’ considers the arguments for a revision to ways of thinking 
about and teaching university knowledge among student and staff radicals. Student 
radicalism across Western countries posed a significant threat to university claims to 
authority over knowledge by exposing the ideologies that such claims to truth 
perpetuated. In the instances in which that threat was articulated on Australian 
campuses, the ways ‘god-professors’, academic staff, politicians and the public 
responded were specific and unique, while at the same time international, general and 
even sometimes clichéd. The chapter draws out the implications of student radicalism 
for the university’s ongoing control of knowledge in Australia. The chapter concludes 
with the Whitlam government and the effects of the OPEC oil crisis, demonstrating 
that between student radicalism and the political and economic crises of the 1970s, 
the university’s reputation and role in the public sphere had irrevocably shifted. 
The consequences of the 1960s and 1970s, however, were mainly realised in the 
1980s. Chapter Four, ‘Knowledge Economy 1975-1987’ examines the influence of 
public opinion on the universities as government sought to embed higher education in 
a radically transformed Australian economy. New academic values and structural 
transformations in the ways that universities were funded and managed influenced 
their priorities, escalating fears among scholars for their intellectual and 
administrative independence. This chapter describes the growth of neoliberalism and 
its effects as government, the universities and the commercial sector debated the 
relationship between higher education, public sector regulation and the market. The 
Dawkins reforms and the universities’ response are recounted, with a view to 
considering their effects on the subsequent control of research priorities in Australia. 
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The final chapter ‘Knowledge and Property 1986-1996’ considers the attempt by 
universities to seek independence from government in the market. The patterns of 
research commercialisation that led to a re-imagining of university knowledge as a 
type of property are analysed. In intellectual property the metaphor of property and 
the reality of university policy development are simultaneously explored, in the 
context of a changing government research policy framework. This chapter’s 
conclusion also concludes the thesis. 
There are three reasons to end the thesis at 1996. Firstly, it marks the end of the 
period of new policy development for intellectual property in the universities. This is 
not to say that universities stopped using the concept, rather that the policy 
development phase was complete: they all had policies by then. Secondly, the 
emergence of the internet and the possibility for marketing online courses marks a 
new phase that would have unreasonably extended the scope of the thesis. Finally, the 
1996 election of the Howard Liberal government marks a natural end point for 
analysis of public policy implications for the issues the thesis explores. While the 
introduction of full domestic fees under Howard was a significant step in the 
commodification of higher education, it also reflected a continuation of much of the 
logic of the Dawkins reforms. In other words, post-1996 changes under Howard were 
important, but not transformational. One more recent event is potentially 
transformational, however. The case of the University of Western Australia versus 
Gray, an intellectual property case that was still unfolding as this thesis was written, is 
recounted in the Epilogue. 
The importance of understanding the dynamics of the control and regulation of 
knowledge in Australian higher education might be expected to be related to the 
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purpose of the university. Claims for the purpose of the university are often lofty, 
reflecting the very wide reach of its research and teaching areas. The university is 
made variously responsible for the health, safety, civility, prosperity and sustainability 
of the nation. Indeed, with its links into a global education and research network, it is 
increasingly deemed to be responsible for the well-being of the world and the 
longevity of the planet’s natural resources. Such goals are so enormous that 
governments despair of measuring their success, choosing instead to evaluate higher 
education in dollars or in money-equivalents: the hundreds of thousands of students 
enrolled each year in Australian higher education, the billions spent on research, the 
measures of quality and institutional efficiency that cause academics and 
administrators such angst. The value that resides in the university, however, is only 
symbolised by those measures. Regulating or owning knowledge controls the 
university’s value in ways that those numbers can only imitate. 
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Chapter One: Knowledge and Technology 1939-1957 
The Second World War called for a level of technological innovation and economic 
efficiency unknown in prior conflicts. Robert Menzies, Prime Minister throughout 
many of the changes that followed the war, later reflected: 
The Second World War brought about great social changes. In the eye of the future observer, 
the greatest may well prove to be in the field of higher education.1 
Universities had to change substantially. Their members needed to consider the 
university’s role in education and training for new segments of Australia’s workforce 
and promote research to serve national needs. All this required the negotiation of new 
relationships with government and industry. 
A number of technological developments that supported the war effort were 
afterwards utilised in peacetime: preserved food that once fed soldiers now found its 
way into family kitchens while factories that had manufactured weapons made 
household appliances.2 This ‘technological society’ brought with it new professions 
requiring new skills and a vastly increased demand for employees trained in them. For 
the universities this meant a rapid growth in the number and type of student they 
enrolled: the 31,753 enrolled in 1949 represented three times the number studying at 
university before the war.3 New employment opportunities led more Australian 
youths to aspire to a university education, making tertiary study increasingly 
common, with positive implications for career development. It was an international 
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phenomenon. In the United States Marvin Lazerson has argued that for this reason 
post-war aspirations drew a consumer-type sentiment toward college education as 
surely as it directed desire towards picket-fenced homes, fast cars and televisions.4 
The literature recounting the influence of the American university in this period is 
substantial, for American post-war affluence rested on university-produced 
innovations and readily available higher education.5 
There is a surprising absence of similar historiography in Australia. A notable 
exception is Nicholas Brown’s Governing Prosperity, which includes universities but 
focuses more on government, bureaucracy and economic policy.6 This is a significant 
neglect given the profound changes in the post-war Australian economy. In this 
period industrial chemicals, electronics, wireless, aeronautics, processed food, 
household appliances, agricultural interventions, antibiotics and new energy sources 
transformed the social and economic environment. Many of these were the result of 
research and development that had taken place in universities. Such research 
established a new connection between university-based knowledge and the success of 
the national economy. 
In grappling with this change, the universities not only had to undertake relevant 
research, they also had to negotiate their role in the development of a technologically 
skilled national workforce. This meant entry to areas and fields of education 
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traditionally the preserve of other, in some cases older, institutions. The world of 
mechanics’ schools and institutes of technology was long established. Their role and 
their relationship to the development of post-war universities in Australia had a 
substantial influence on the shape and character of higher education for the remainder 
of the twentieth century as the idea of the technological university took hold. 
Unlike those older training centres, however, universities also had to grapple with an 
emerging demand for a more vibrant research culture. Experimental scientific 
research had been expanding for some decades but blossomed through the necessity 
induced by world conflict. This inculcated the idea of research as the task of the 
university scholar in a new way, with implications for most disciplines.7 To conduct 
research, academics were required to be specialists in an area rather than scholars who 
mastered a wide range of fields.  
The specific requirements of war complicated this changing culture.  In wartime 
universities worked intimately with industry and government. Andrew Spaull has 
shown that the Commonwealth government’s first incursion in higher education was 
during the Second World War.8 But what was the universities’ stance? Their 
exceptionalism in the production and protection of knowledge was disrupted, 
certainly, but institutional histories all show that there were many observable benefits 
for both universities and for research emerging from their new connection to the 
world beyond the academy. The challenge for universities as they navigated first war 
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and then peace was not how they would maintain their distance from society, but how 
they could engage with it and still retain the sense of being a university. 
Universities and the ‘war of experts’ 
University students were a tiny minority in Australia before the war. Only around 
10,500 students were at university, less than 0.2 percent of the population. At the 
University of Melbourne in the 1930s, seventy-five percent of approximately 3,500 
students had been educated in private schools, but private schools overall only 
enrolled one quarter of school boys in Victoria.9 The proportion of public school 
students in New South Wales, however, was higher: forty-eight percent of science 
students in 1939 had attended state schools.10 Nevertheless, the preponderance of 
private school students from middle class backgrounds in universities was very 
evident. While there were always exceptions, families during the 1930s depression 
could rarely prioritise lengthy education for their children: even staying at school long 
enough to qualify for university often seemed an unaffordable indulgence.11 But 
economic conditions mask more fundamental social realities. While some poorer 
students were supported by scholarships, the majority had long tended to be from the 
middle upper classes, mostly from families who were in the top ten percent of 
earners.12 When the war started, there were 3,500 students at Sydney University, 
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slightly more at Melbourne, around 1,000 each at the Universities of Adelaide, 
Queensland and Western Australia and a few hundred at Tasmania’s university.13  
Academic staff, themselves numbering no more than a few hundred on each campus, 
made for a small, socially cohesive (although often intellectually discordant) 
community. Teaching was their primary responsibility but to be effective and 
command respect they also had to be scholars, experts and masters of their field. 
Reading, therefore, was a key task. They read published work, occasionally 
publishing research and scholarship themselves. They were members of informal 
networks of scholars that went beyond their own institutions: letters, drafts of papers 
and exchanges of ideas traversed universities in and beyond Australia.14 The oldest of 
the six Australian universities, however, had only around eighty years in which they 
had taught the youth of the former colonies, nurturing the knowledge that would 
support the emerging nation. Disciplines were small. Networks, scholarship and 
research were important, but teaching and thus developing new scholars, was 
foremost.  
The outbreak of the Second World War galvanised university campuses. Students and 
staff at the University of Sydney launched themselves into campus wartime activities 
with verve. Moral philosopher Professor Alan Stout organised rosters of ‘runners’ to 
ensure communication in an emergency, sleeping on camp beds around the university. 
They planned bomb shelters and dug trenches: ‘it was great fun’, said Stout. Medical 
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students were unable to pass their examinations unless they also fulfilled trench-
digging quotas.15 The Student Representative Council exposed other students who did 
not dig their share in the campus newspaper, Honi Soit.16 The University of 
Queensland was still building its St Lucia campus when General Sir Thomas Blamey 
took over occupation of the buildings.17 Although students and staff had not yet 
moved to the new campus, now the drills and parades of the services echoed through 
the grounds, strengthening the ever-present feel of wartime.18 Students began to enlist 
in large numbers, so that one student from the University of Melbourne described the 
campus as a ‘condemned playground’.19 
Academic staff at all Australian universities volunteered their labour to the war. 
Science was needed the most but philosophers, historians and literary academics were 
not excluded from all the activity: academic minds and bodies were recruited for 
organisation, administration, censorship and intelligence.20 Management of morale, 
which included establishing considerable social science research studies, involved a 
large number of academics.21 Self-sacrifice was common as the feeling of emergency 
escalated. One scrupulous professor at the University of Tasmania asked that his 
salary be reduced in compensation for the reading he had not done due to his war 
work.22 Anthropologist Adolphus Elkin at the University of Sydney was keen to 
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disband the entire Faculty of Arts, which he considered irrelevant to the needs of the 
war and therefore wasteful of resources.23  
Australia was, as Geoffrey Blainey has argued, the ‘arsenal of the South Pacific’ and 
its resources were all directed to the war.24 But the special thing that scholars 
possessed – academic knowledge – made their contribution unique. Weaponry, 
logistics and medical advances were the foundations of military success. Optical 
science at the University of Tasmania worked more than two hundred third-year 
undergraduate students on two shifts a day to produce gunsight components, 
competing in scientific speed with the new optical munitions laboratory at the 
University of Melbourne.25 Psychologists were required to assess those enlisting for 
combat. Entomologists battled malaria in their laboratories. Statisticians supported 
more efficient logistics. Flameproof clothing, enabled by the latest chemistry, 
protected combatants and new food preservation techniques helped to feed them 
efficiently. Radio technology advanced rapidly as did aeronautics. New gauges, 
instruments, medical equipment, new alloys and metal production, explosives and 
weapons components were all enabled by university knowledge, now redirected as 
much as possible from teaching to research and development.26  
The coordination of those research efforts for the purposes of the war was a challenge 
that required careful consideration. Cooperation between the universities, the 
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government’s Munitions Supply Laboratories and the Council for Scientific and 
Industrial Research, however, was difficult, despite well-meaning scientists and 
obvious imperatives to rapid action. The Australian National Research Council, 
established in 1919 to promote scientific research in Australia and to represent 
Australian science internationally, had around two hundred scientists by 1940, most 
based in the universities. They hoped to be able to channel university research 
towards the war effort.27 Government and military scientists, however, doubted the 
capacity of university experts to work in the applied world the war demanded.28 Eric 
Ashby, Professor of Botany at Sydney University and chair of the Research Council 
at the start of the war, disagreed, suggesting that the identification of scientific 
problems was the domain of academic science. This was, according to Ashby, a ‘war 
of experts’ and ‘experts’, he argued, ‘are often (though by no means invariably) 
academic men’.29  
This bid to assure a prominent place for academic scientists in the war was consistent 
with Ashby’s other efforts to strengthen the role of Australian universities in the 
public sphere. He had arrived in Australia from Britain in 1939 and launched himself 
into active participation in Australian research and education policy. He made 
broadcasts, wrote pamphlets and attended meetings, articulating an optimistic vision 
of the value of university knowledge to society.30 Ashby’s repeated criticisms of 
problems coordinating science for the war led Prime Minister John Curtin to appoint 
him, along with senior industrial scientist James Vernon, to investigate and report on 
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how science might be oriented to support the war effort.31 Importantly, Ashby and 
Vernon argued that it was not a simple matter of asking scientists to undertake 
research. Governments and Military authorities had to communicate more effectively 
with scientists. They pointed out that if the military would communicate how 
scientific applications were working out in practice, scientists would be better 
positioned to predict and solve problems. Moreover, with limited communication 
between the different science bodies, wasteful overlap and irrelevant research 
resulted.32  
Two of those bodies, the Munitions Supply Laboratories and the Council for 
Scientific and Industrial Research, were the key organisations responsible for wartime 
scientific research. Both reported directly to the Federal government. Their work, 
however, was oriented to working on a few large-scale projects. They lacked 
flexibility and responsiveness to urgent small-scale problems. According to Ashby 
and Vernon: 
The staffs [sic] of the Munitions Supply Laboratories and the CSIR are occupied with important 
work, and cannot be held in readiness, like scientific taxis, for any day-to-day problems which 
turn up.33 
The universities were the answer to this problem. Unlike the Council for Scientific 
and Industrial Research and the Munitions laboratory however, they were not the 
Commonwealth’s to command. Universities belonged to the states – their existence 
established by an Act of each of the six State parliaments. State funding, student fee 
income and private endowment paid for their buildings, libraries, salaries and 
equipment. The Federal government was not permitted to be involved in their 
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financial, administrative or academic affairs.34 Even State government involvement 
was problematic. While members of State parliament held positions on the governing 
body of each institution, universities were supposed to be autonomous, their 
separation from the state in administrative and academic matters a mechanism for 
ensuring their integrity. The level of autonomy, however, was more ideal than reality. 
Blainey’s short history of the University of Melbourne (1956), for example, shows 
that the university regularly complied with what it imagined might be the wishes of 
the Victorian government (its principal funding source).35  
Nevertheless, Ashby and Vernon were polite and unassuming when they wrote to 
each of the six Vice-Chancellors, inviting them to contribute the knowledge and 
labour of their academic staff to the war. Each vice-chancellor was more than eager to 
do so.36 Only one minor dissent seems to have been voiced. University of Sydney 
philosopher John Anderson, famous for his freethinking anti-authoritarian approach, 
had a profound influence on philosophy in Australia.37 While Anderson was not 
opposed to the university’s participation in activities that supported the war, he did 
think the universities were taking too ‘servile’ an approach to the Commonwealth 
government.38 Later historian Andrew Spaull seems to agree, suggesting that under 
the conditions of total war, normally autonomous institutions tended to submit to 
government control without any extrinsic compulsion.39 In hindsight, the war was the 
moment universities started to lose some of their former independence and Anderson 
was one of the few to sound a warning. 
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The war enabled the establishment of a new relationship between the Federal 
government and the universities. From 1941, John Dedman, Minister for War 
Organisation of Industry kept the universities high on his list of crucial resources. 
Dedman wanted universities to assume some of the training normally done by 
technical colleges, to open up enrolment to a wider group of students and shorten 
courses for urgently needed professions. At the end of 1941 he suggested that 
Faculties might review their courses in light of their usefulness to the war – a 
suggestion that may have prompted Elkin’s attempted sacrifice of Sydney Arts.40 
Dedman warned the universities that except for degrees leading to ‘reserved’ 
professions (those occupations listed as essential by the government, so that those 
employed in them were exempt from service) all students were eligible for military 
conscription.41 
Towards the end of 1942, however, Dedman’s priorities shifted. He proposed that: 
‘outstanding students who have enlisted or been called up should, where possible and 
desirable, be recalled to continue their university training’.42 Good students finishing 
school that did not apply for university should be actively invited to enrol rather than 
enlist. This indicates the increasing importance of knowledge and scientific research 
in the government’s thinking on the war effort and on the preparations for a post-war 
world. Dedman’s view of the universities was no longer single-minded, focused as he 
had been on recruitment and training for the war and he now considered what the 
universities might look like in peacetime. As well as fostering more egalitarian 
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institutions, Dedman believed the post-war era would require significantly more 
university-trained workers, especially in technical fields.43  
Technology and the idea of the university 
Before the war, many politicians had been optimistic about the role of technology in 
society. In the ‘hush’ before it started, British political leader Winston Churchill 
argued that science, rather than violence, created ‘true living space’, improving the 
living standards of people and enabling peace. ‘Give scientists a chance’, he said, 
contrasting science’s civilising capacity to war. ‘The barbaric method of forcibly 
imposing one population upon another and of exterminating or subjugating the 
vanquished is hopelessly inefficient and out of date.’44  
The same optimism initially applied to nuclear technology. The United States was one 
of several countries conducting atomic research, investing US$2 billion in the code-
named ‘Manhattan Project’. A media statement, prepared after the first successful 
atomic bomb test in New Mexico (but not released until after the bombing of 
Hiroshima on 6 August 1945), shows that researchers believed that this knowledge, 
like all ‘true’ science, would further civilisation: 
Mankind’s successful transition to a new age, the Atomic Age, was ushered in July 16, 1945 
before the eyes of a tense group of renowned scientists … Mounted on a steel tower, a 
revolutionary weapon destined to change war as we know it, or which may even be the 
instrumentality to end all wars, was set off with an impact which signalised man’s most 
ambitious estimates.45 
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The atomic bomb showed that scientific research could win a war. Newspapers were 
still expressing jubilance at the imminent end of the war after the initial bomb (‘The 
attack on Hiroshima was successful beyond all expectations’ read The Argus) as news 
of its horrible reality trickled through.46 ‘Japs say all living things Seared to Death’, 
read another Argus headline on the 9th August, the day of the follow-up bombing of 
Nagasaki.47 By September the Sydney Morning Herald’s war correspondent told 
Australian readers in graphic detail why ‘Hiroshima reeks of Death’.48 Democratic 
science may have won the war, and may have, by some forms of moral calculus saved 
lives by reducing the slaughter that would have ensued from an invasion of Japan, but 
it also raised moral qualms for some about the function of science – qualms that were 
to grow in later decades.  
The atom bomb was not the only scientific advance that raised doubts about the 
morality of science. Revelations of scientific experiments in Nazi concentration 
camps cut to the core of the nature of research. The Auschwitz concentration camp 
became a symbol for the ways science could be turned to corrupt ends – a corruption, 
some claimed, to which a substantial contribution had been made by false knowledge 
and ‘impure’ science.49 At Auschwitz, experiments with mass sterilisation – another 
‘scientific’ way to win a war, hoped Nazi medical leaders – had led to radiation burns, 
inflammation, infection and death among prisoners. Josef Mengele’s famous 
experiments with twins tortured young children in the name of immunology and 
genetics. Humans were starved, infected with contagions and injected with toxins as 
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part of scientific and medical experiments.50 For some these tragic events were reason 
to question the role of science more generally. For others it was a reason to argue for 
pure science and the pursuit of truth. In that regard it was vital to safeguard science 
from politics, to foster the independence of science. Closer wartime ties between 
governments and universities complicated this aspiration. 
As ethical implications for science emerged from these wartime stories, politicians’ 
views shifted. After the war, Winston Churchill’s position on science contrasted with 
the trust in it he had expressed beforehand. ‘These fearful scientific discoveries cast 
their shadow on every thoughtful mind’, he reflected.51 Political and civic leaders 
could not easily resolve the moral uncertainties that were left. In 1957 Kim Beazley 
(senior), Federal Labor politician with a lasting interest in higher education, warned: 
In Nazi Germany, science without conscience had developed. It was wholly disastrous, and it 
has been interesting to note that it ultimately became completely unscientific…I hope … 
emphasis is to be placed on pure science as well as on applied science.52 
In the system of knowledge encouraged by the war ‘pure’ inquiry was civilising but 
applied research – ‘impure’ by default – was potentially corrupting. So while science 
and technology could support economic progress, those who retained some sense that 
university knowledge was for social ideals were nervous about the emerging 
technological turn.  
The debate was vociferous and international. The phrase ‘The Two Cultures’, derived 
from C.P. Snow’s Rede Lectures in 1959, encapsulated the divide. Snow sought to 
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moderate moral opposition to technology. Technological development, he said, was in 
fact the ‘only hope of the poor’ and scientists, identifying the world’s injustices, 
tended to be impatient to ‘see if something can be done’.53 By contrast, literary 
intellectuals, Snow argued, tended to be stubbornly anti-industrialist at the expense of 
society’s poor. They were culturally elitist and intellectually narrow – ‘anxious to 
restrict both art and thought to the existential moment’.54 Likening them to 
nineteenth-century luddites, Snow earned the ire of twentieth century literary authors 
by saying, ‘Didn’t the influence of all they [literary intellectuals] represent bring 
Auschwitz that much nearer?’55 The war had disturbed the equilibrium of 
intellectualism. Knowledge had not succeeded in ensuring peace and prosperity. Old 
certainties were now unreliable. Civilisation was ‘mortal’.56  
Eric Ashby, who had by now returned to Britain, sought to resolve this conflict 
between the ‘two cultures’, hoping to enable universities to engage with a 
technological society without compromising their intellectual integrity. In Technology 
and the Academics Ashby gave a long historical overview of the problem.57 In the 
gradual adoption of science by the great centres of learning ‘pure’ scientific research, 
analogous to the humanities tradition, had been integrated into university culture with 
relative ease. Technology, with its associations of being ‘earthy’ and its susceptibility 
to pressure from industry and government, tended to be described in university 
contexts, Ashby argued, using adjectives like ‘crude’ and ‘mere’.58 In the nineteenth 
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century it had been possible to suggest that the upper class should study literature 
while the middle classes looked after science, an attitude Ashby described as 
‘puzzling’. By the twentieth century such a distinction had collapsed. This change, he 
suggested, offered hope that contemporary barriers to technological knowledge could 
be demolished.59 Ashby offered a new set of tools to achieve this. 
Technology in the university, according to Ashby, could achieve what science could 
not. Science generally needed to remove the human variable in order to be valid. 
Technology, on the other hand, was a space in which science and humanity interacted, 
enabling a unity of knowledge that was inherently humanist.60 This ‘technological 
humanism’, as he defined it, could unite knowledge in a way that would remove past 
arrogance and give a structure in which the universities could build on the economic 
relevance they had gained during the war without devaluing their academic 
principles.61  
On the surface, this contradicted Ashby’s earlier position. In Australia Ashby had 
argued for the protection of the university from interference from industry. Australia 
was particularly prone, he had claimed, to pressure from secondary industry to 
include technical skill training in university education. This was partly a result of the 
bad press to which Australian universities had been subject prior to the war.62 Widely 
seen as useless, elite, privileged and wealthy, the public commonly assumed that 
universities were committed to the unnecessary promotion of irrelevant antiquated 
knowledge.63 The result was pressure to focus on what industry needed. Ashby argued 
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that universities had to resist this pressure, or risk becoming an ‘intellectual 
department store’.64  
Ashby, however, had not changed his mind. He had always maintained that Australian 
universities needed to adapt to a changing society and should willingly assume 
obligations to industry and government. Like Kim Beazley, Ashby thought that 
university knowledge should be ‘pure’, but he argued that applied knowledge could 
be pure as well. What made knowledge pure was not that it was never applied to 
anything; rather it was that the university remained autonomous and academic inquiry 
was free and curiosity-driven: 
It is a matter of cold fact that most of the discoveries and ideas which have shaped history began 
as speculations, as disinterested curiosity, as thinking for the sheer delight of thinking.65 
It was this motive that Ashby saw as central to the unique responsibility of 
universities. He argued that university knowledge was not evaluated on whether or 
not it was useful, but rather on its potential to further knowledge itself: ‘Does the 
subject breed ideas?’66 Universities had a wide range of useful functions but the 
business of the university, he argued, was to focus on the substance, rather than the 
benefits, of knowledge. 
Academics must be free to pursue knowledge as they see fit, Ashby argued, as it was 
this freedom that would allow universities to fulfil their true function: 
Today our universities, criticize them as you will, are the trustees of Australian intellectual life; 
despite their weakness, despite their unworthiness for this high office.67 
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‘High office’ denotes the sacred duty that Ashby intended to convey, a sanctity 
related to the role of knowledge in upholding and promoting a civil society. Economic 
success was all very well but, to Ashby, more was at stake. ‘Upon the universities 
depends in large degree Australia’s future’, said Ashby, since: 
Universities are the defenders of the intellectual life, and if the intellectual life is crushed by 
prejudice and stupidity and selfishness, then it will profit us nothing to win the war against the 
Axis, for we shall still be dragged to defeat by our own ignorance.68 
For knowledge to continue to perform its social function, even ‘useful’ knowledge 
must be pursued for its own sake.  
This concern was shared by Ashby’s friend and colleague Ian Clunies Ross, chair of 
the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) and 
former Professor of Veterinary Science at the University of Sydney (where he met 
Ashby).69 Clunies Ross led Australia’s post-war science boom, earning a place on 
Australia’s fifty-dollar note from 1972 until the introduction of a polymer banknote in 
1995. Menzies called him ‘the greatest public relations man for science Australia had 
ever seen’.70 Despite that, Clunies Ross maintained a fundamental concern for 
humane democracy and civilisation, which he felt was threatened by science. With 
regret, he said, ‘Society…recognizes that it must live by science even at the risk of 
dying painfully by it.’71  
In public orations, as well as in his letters to Ashby, Ian Clunies Ross gave his 
perspective on the changes science, the war and its aftermath had made to knowledge. 
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He argued, ‘the universities have fallen from that traditional high estate in which they 
exerted a commanding influence on the ideas and ideals of their times.’ This was 
primarily a result of science’s tendency to specialise, rather than encompass universal 
knowledge: 
Science poses the major problem of education because of the very magnitude of its success, so 
that the ceaseless and bewilderingly rapid proliferation of knowledge forces its votaries into 
ever-narrowing specialisms ... what is more, they not only suffer this fate but glory in it: for are 
not specialists the new elect, the high priests of the cult whose mysteries none may share? Not 
for them 
‘To see a world in a grain of sand, 
And a heaven in a wild flower’ 
The grain of sand has become all the world and the heaven they know or seek to know.72 
Clunies Ross saw university knowledge as a singular, coherent whole, a ‘vital system 
of ideas which unites the past and present in an intelligible whole’.73 Anthony, his 
son, confirmed that his father was a romantic, a scientist of ‘quest and achievement’.74 
In that spirit, Clunies Ross idealised the university as a place for immersion in the 
vast greatness of sublime knowledge. For him, a narrowly instrumental, applied and 
simply technological approach to science actually threatened civilisation, due to its 
focus on facts rather than society, or immediate utility rather than its social or 
scientific implications. 
The dominance of science in universities was, even after the war, still relatively new. 
At the founding of the University of Sydney in the mid-nineteenth century, William 
Charles Wentworth had imagined the ‘statesmen and patriots’, ‘philanthropists and 
philosophers’, and ‘poets and heroes’ that would graduate from that institution. ‘It is 
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noteworthy’, Ian Clunies Ross pointed out, ‘that Wentworth made no mention of 
scientists ... indicative not only of the lesser place of science … but of the 
appreciation which we have now lost that there was then a unity of knowledge.’75 A 
coherent knowledge as an underpinning to civil society had the advantage of 
suggesting a similarly integrated and unified civilisation. If knowledge was 
fragmented, as science’s ‘ever-narrowing specialisms’ encouraged, what would the 
society it underpinned look like? 
Always less optimistic about universities than Ashby, Clunies Ross believed that in 
the post-war period universities were now training scientists and engineers in such a 
way that they were poorly equipped for the workplace. This was not because their 
training was insufficiently practical. On the contrary, emphasising specialised 
technological skill meant that a university education now left its graduates ‘so 
permanently mutilated that it is idle to expect anything of them’.76 In a letter to Eric 
Ashby in 1956 he expressed apprehension about the way these changing knowledge 
priorities would impact society: 
My fear is that as science and technology draw from an increasingly large proportion of those 
best endowed intellectually, we will have fewer and fewer men capable of contemplating in any 
adequate way the problems of national or international society.77 
It seems an odd conversation for two scientists to have had. But their belief in the 
unity of knowledge prompted them to assert an intellectual leadership that went 
beyond their disciplinary expertise.  
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Ian Clunies Ross and Eric Ashby were both examples of the new type of scientific 
leader required during and after the war. Thinking carefully about technological 
development and humane civilisation, both sought to connect new technological 
knowledge to pre-war intellectual values. Ashby’s focus on the substance (rather than 
the benefits) of university knowledge and Clunies Ross’s demand for a unified, 
universal knowledge amounted to the same thing – a desire to keep the pursuit of 
knowledge in its highest forms safe in the university, protecting its singularity from 
the impurities that resulted from fragmentation, outside influences, the vested 
interests of business or the political exigencies of governments. Knowledge (as Ashby 
claimed) benefited civilisation but belonged in the university. Both men suggested 
that this ideal was already under siege: universities were increasingly being compelled 
to prove their relevance to the society that financed them.  
The rise of the technological university 
Despite the warnings of Ashby and Clunies Ross, post-war Australian governments 
actively pursued the idea of technological universities, uniting utility, research and the 
tradition of university knowledge for its own sake. In doing so, advocates sought to 
bridge the traditional divide between technological and university knowledge. The 
longstanding network of mechanics’ institutes, technical colleges and universities 
denoted the widely held belief that technology did not belong in the universities.78 In 
Australia, nineteenth-century mechanics’ institutes, along with local schools of arts, 
were clubs offering lectures aimed at improving minds and cultivating taste.79 In some 
of these local businesses and employers, anxious to increase the pool of skilled 
workers, oriented the curriculum to training in specific trades. These technical 
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colleges were an integral organisation in many towns and regions by the early 
twentieth century. Civic leaders hoped to promote local economic growth and 
prosperity through investment in technical education. Boosters of Footscray, for 
example, hoped technical education might transform this poor, working-class suburb 
into the ‘Birmingham of Australia’.80  
Technical colleges, like the universities, were transformed by the war. They now had 
to meet national, not just local, needs. The Melbourne Technical College had already 
been building relationships with government by training unemployed youth during the 
1930s Great Depression. When the war started the College offered its facilities to the 
Federal government. Within a month two hundred defence personnel began their 
training as wireless-operator mechanics. Signal operators, electrical fitters, aircraft 
electricians and instrument makers were all trained as rapidly as possible. Factories 
producing munitions did not exist before the war. Now, they required hundreds of 
skilled precision-gauge and tool-and-jig workers, all trained by technical colleges.81 
The end of hostilities did not slow this development. After the war new inventions 
and infrastructure had industrial, commercial and domestic uses, but people had to be 
trained in installing, using and repairing them. The manufacturing industry expanded, 
fuelled by growing consumer expenditure, improved living standards, demand for 
new household appliances and increased use of motor cars. While skilled immigrants 
constituted around half of the extra labour needed to support this ‘long boom’, the 
other half were supplied through domestic education and training.82 This increased the 
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demands on technical colleges: they were now required to provide more specialised 
and complex training than leaders of their pre-war entities could have imagined.83  
In the context of this post-war economic boom, politicians and educators became 
interested in considering ways technical training could be connected to research. The 
scientific departments and laboratories that had been enlarged and built as part of the 
war effort were seen to have a role in post-war reconstruction. Furthermore, linking 
training and practical reality to research and discovery had benefits: seeing what went 
wrong (or right) would feed research, improve technologies and inform training. But 
there was a widespread view that the existing universities were too few to stimulate 
the required increase in technological education and research. In the 1940s, inspired 
by the success of Massachusetts Institute of Technology in the United States, 
Australian state governments began to contemplate higher education institutions with 
a focus on technological knowledge.84  
One response was to transform some of the old technical colleges into larger degree-
awarding organisations. Each state began to consider this opportunity after the war, 
but it was not until the 1960s that the capital cities converted their central technical 
colleges into Institutes of Technology. Melbourne Technical College became the 
Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology.85 Perth Technical School became the 
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Western Australian Institute of Technology and Central Technical College was 
reconstituted as Queensland Institute of Technology.86  
The New South Wales government moved more quickly and went further, 
establishing a full university of technology in 1949, focusing on technological 
research as well as teaching. The Victorian government followed around a decade 
later with a similar style institution, establishing Monash University in 1958. The 
New South Wales University of Technology (renamed the University of New South 
Wales in 1958 and referred to as such hereafter) had a substantial impact on the 
development of university-level technological training in Australia. Demonstrating 
that a technological university could grow out of a technical college, the University of 
New South Wales was oriented towards research, reinforcing the connections between 
innovation and training. Despite being called a ‘university’, the new institution’s 
operations were unlike any other university then in existence in Australia. Much of 
that character can be attributed to its second Director (and first Vice-Chancellor), Sir 
Philip Baxter. 
Baxter embodied a new type of academic. A British scientist, Baxter had a PhD in 
chemical engineering, a field so new that, when he graduated, no university anywhere 
in the world yet offered an undergraduate course in it. Working for Imperial Chemical 
Industries, Baxter had managed large teams of industrial scientists and invented and 
patented several new inventions, including the neurotoxin Lindane, used as an 
insecticide (later banned as harmful to humans). During the war he worked on ‘Tube 
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Alloys’, which was the code name for the British atomic research program. After a 
secondment to Texas to help extract uranium for the first atomic bomb, Baxter’s 
interest remained focused on nuclear research. Baxter’s science was industrial, but his 
vision political: he was persuaded that academic science, industrial development and 
defence technologies were the ‘same problem’. 87 Through collaboration between 
universities, industry and government, Baxter argued, the West would assert military 
and economic dominance over the Soviet Union. ‘Technological and industrial 
progress’, he declared, discussing scientific research and training, ‘is today the way to 
world supremacy’.88 
In Baxter’s view, universities would need to re-orient themselves, developing new 
research and teaching capacities, to support the development of this advanced 
technological society. With the aid of technology, Australia would be equipped to 
properly exploit its extensive natural resources. The only source of funding at the 
levels required, argued Baxter, was the Federal government. The investment would 
need to be substantial but government should think of it as a mechanism to assure 
national economic development. For Australia in the Cold War this was also an 
explicitly defensive act: 
The full development of Australia’s natural resources is essential if we are not to present to 
other and more powerful nations the tempting sight of rich uncultivated lands and mineral 
wealth lying idle.89 
The technological universities in this framework represented a vision where scientific 
discovery contributed to the ongoing improvement in human standards of living. The 
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‘struggle against nature itself’ was a nation-building project, resulting in cheaper, 
larger-scale food supply, new types of manufacturing and industrial processes and 
important new medical technologies: 
The outstanding characteristic of the civilisation of the twentieth century is that it is derived 
from and is almost wholly dependent upon the application of scientific knowledge to the affairs 
of man.90 
For Baxter, universities should be willing to relinquish some of their traditional 
autonomy in order to secure increased government endowment. Purposeful, strategic 
investment in the technological development of the nation, he maintained, would 
require those institutions to demonstrate efficient progress in applied research and 
technical training.91 This was more than an alignment of university activity with 
government goals; it was a shift in the direction of knowledge production. Where 
research had led to technologies that produced economic growth, under Baxter’s 
scheme this causality would be reversed: economic growth would drive research. 
This sense of purpose infused Baxter’s management style while he led the University 
of New South Wales from 1953 to 1969.92 Its origin as an offshoot of the Sydney 
Technical College in Ultimo (then an industrial area full of factories and warehouses) 
shaped the university’s administration in ways fundamentally different from other 
Australian universities of the period. For a start, the university, in its early years, fell 
under the authority of the New South Wales Public Service Board, not an independent 
government body, and academic staff worked under the same conditions as Technical 
College teachers. They rankled against the set hours and closely managed conditions, 
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having expected the autonomy traditional at other universities.93 Nevertheless, Baxter 
never allowed this new kind of university to be like the older institutions. He argued: 
The lot of those who choose to work in a new university is not a comfortable one. We cannot be 
like the professor described in Mr Rowe’s If the Gown Fits, who wanted, not an efficient 
university, but a more comfortable one. We have, we believe, achieved an efficient university.94 
Baxter consciously contrasted himself and his university to the more stately and 
aristocratic image of Adelaide University presented by the then recent 
autobiographical account of its Vice-Chancellor A.P. Rowe, who had retired two 
years earlier.95 Baxter did not want the University of New South Wales to be like 
other universities. Reflecting on his tenure as Vice-Chancellor in the 1980s, Baxter 
spoke of the influence of the ‘procedures of industry’ on his leadership style, claiming 
he understood but did ‘not identify’ with academic work practices, which he found 
inefficient.96 This was not just about his preferred work style. Baxter considered 
university research to be better when it was paired with industrial activity. 
Baxter thus brought the processes of discovery used in Imperial Chemical Industries 
to the University of New South Wales. ‘Discovery and application are not really two 
separate processes’, he argued: 
There are, of course, cases of people who, simply searching for knowledge for its own sake, 
have made discoveries of great importance but not without any thought or instruction in possible 
application ... But a vast amount of scientific knowledge comes from situations where the two 
processes are completely mixed together as a single operation.97 
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To Baxter ‘important’ knowledge was that which had significant application. For 
universities to advance important knowledge in this sense connection to industry was 
essential. This had been in place for the University of New South Wales from its 
beginnings, since the Council contained members of industry – BHP, for instance – 
but Baxter was keen for the interaction with industry to occur at the level of research, 
not just governance. 
Research was a growing concern for all the universities. It is no coincidence that 
university links to industry strengthened as research became a scholarly priority. The 
University of New South Wales’ research mission marked a shift in the idea of 
university work, an adjustment that caused uncertainty about the relationship between 
mastery and discovery. There were those in Australian universities, especially in the 
humanities where the tradition of scholarship was ingrained, who saw mastery as the 
longer, slower and more important task. They tended to resist the PhD. In 1947 at 
Sydney University, for example, when the PhD was first proposed, the Faculty of Arts 
opposed it. Partly informed by anti-American sentiments (for some humanities 
scholars, the PhD was an inferior American credential compared to the British Master 
of Arts), theirs was primarily a concern with the nature of the academic vocation. 
These critics saw discovery, rather than mastery, as a lesser, easier and largely 
serendipitous act, compared to the detailed, critical and thorough grasp that 
characterised good scholarship.98 But the value of the university to society was 
shifting. The old guardianship of existing knowledge was giving way to the discovery 
of the new. 
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This started to break down the university’s longstanding distinction from the world of 
profit. It was a multi-faceted division that had elevated the university’s authority in 
two ways. Firstly, the tradition of disinterested scholarship had separated the 
university from political, sectarian and financial gain, imbuing university knowledge 
with a special reliability unavailable to other knowledge producers.99 This resulted in 
a second source of authority. In the area of science especially, the university’s 
separation from commercial interests imbued university research with an aura of 
objective discovery.100 If it was to be deemed objective, those discoveries were not 
‘ownable’, Mario Biagioli argues, they were necessarily public.101 Academic research 
norms helped to reinforce that supposed objectivity by imposing a ‘gentlemen’s 
agreement’ not to patent or derive profit from their discoveries.102 Ironically, as 
Biagioli, Corynne McSherry and Bill Readings claim, public knowledge helped to 
enable private intellectual property: if some research was public, this meant that other 
findings could also be privately owned and traded.103 
Concerns about potential links to the commercial world fuelled controversies over the 
University of New South Wales. Some members of parliament and the public 
believed that ‘university’ referred to the kind of universal, unified education that 
preoccupied Ashby and Clunies Ross. Technology, they believed, was too narrow and 
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specialised to warrant the title.104 In the Federal parliament Kim Beazley later 
asserted, ‘There is no such thing as a “university of technology”. The term is a 
complete misnomer.’105 In the late 1940s, however, the New South Wales Labor 
government was determined to claim the title ‘university’ for industrial knowledge, 
leading Country Party member David Drummond to accuse them of ‘inverted 
snobbery’.106  
Class-based sentiment was often at work on all sides – this was the third source of 
university distinction from profit. John Anderson – philosopher at Sydney University, 
where the threat of a competing university was felt keenly – published a poem about 
the new university, when it opened in Ultimo: 
From the Railway end of Broadway 
Came a burst of mournful song 
Throbbing through the aspirations 
Of the proletarian throng 
Was a pioneer of Western Culture 
But swapped it for a mechanical sepulture.107 
The phrasing is telling: ‘proletarian’ and ‘mechanical’ undermined, according to 
Anderson, the cultural superiority of the ideal university, thus reducing some of its 
authority.  
In Australia, uncertainty about connecting the university to industrial profit was also 
informed by the sense of responsibility attached to the idea of the public university: 
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Some universities have held to the position that a public institution cannot assist in creating a 
private monopoly and have discouraged any projects whose sponsors desired patent 
protection.108 
Baxter had no such qualms. In 1959 he established Australia’s first university 
research commercialisation company, Unisearch. Unisearch produced revenue from 
industry-funded research projects, educational testing, academic consulting and from 
leasing laboratory equipment.109 Within its first three months, Unisearch showed 
receipts from Taubman’s paints, Ampol Petroleum and Besser Vibrapac Masonry.110 
For the New South Wales government, this was proof of the viability and relevance of 
their preferred model. They had asked Baxter to ‘actively seek industrial work’, the 
income from which would alleviate some of the State’s responsibility in now funding 
two universities.111  
While Baxter was happy to comply, his key interest was not profit. Unisearch was 
there, in his view, to facilitate the interaction between for-profit companies and the 
university, whose focus was knowledge. When it came to patents, some sort of 
compromise, the executive were told, could be made, as long as they had a ‘realistic 
attitude’. Indeed, the Unisearch minutes suggested that he believed patenting might 
even be the university’s responsibility: 
It is becoming increasingly recognised in the higher technological institutions that it is their duty 
to assist in accelerating the translation of scientific and technical knowledge into new processes, 
products and techniques.112 
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Baxter, however, was more interested in the benefits of collaborative research for the 
university than long-term ownership of patents. The university regulated the scheme 
with simple policies requiring the university to negotiate with inventors and sponsors. 
‘The University obviously has little to gain by being mercenary’, Baxter argued.113  
In its own small way, Unisearch demonstrates the tangible change the war had 
rendered. It was now possible, and for some highly desirable, to connect university 
knowledge to new products, techniques and industries. Universities had supported 
economic efficiency and technological innovation during the war. After it 
relationships forged between university knowledge, practical application and 
innovation were translated into industrial and commercial contexts.  
The new engagement with industry went beyond the University of New South Wales 
to include, to a lesser, but still significant degree, all of the universities. The ‘long 
boom’ had arrived and, in all fields of study, universities had a significant role to 
play. Later reflecting on science and technology, H.C. (Nugget) Coombs, economist 
and Director-General of the Department of Post-War Reconstruction, argued that this 
implied a shift in the ownership of knowledge. Technology behaved differently, when 
released into society, to other kinds of knowledge. Applied technologies did not 
necessarily convert into public good and Coombs feared that universities’ moral 
refusal – Baxter’s University of New South Wales aside – to profit from research 
would do them harm. He predicted that commercial organisations would acquire 
innovations, patent them where they could, exploiting knowledge as extensively as 
possible. Sometimes the university would even need to buy back the products of their 
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own research. As the proportion of technological knowledge increased Coombs feared 
that the ownership of knowledge – the drivers of knowledge production – would shift 
from universities to the market.114  
Universities and economic development 
As the relationship between universities and industry grew, applied university 
research became one part of the public compact of the new technology university. The 
other part, a requirement of all universities, was to multiply the supply of skilled 
labour. The booming post-war industrial economy required ever more trained 
graduates from universities and technical colleges.115 To ensure adequate supply of 
skilled labour and skill development for returned service men and women, the Federal 
government began to make inroads in higher education. The Universities Commission 
was the first instrument through which the Federal government began to undermine 
State control and assert a measure of national coordination of higher education. 
Established in 1942, Sir Richard Charles Mills chaired the Commission, deciding on 
disciplines and student numbers for reserving students from military service.116 
Minister for War Organisation of Industry, John Dedman, sought to influence 
universities, especially the numbers of students they taught, by awarding 
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Commonwealth scholarships, in particular targeting those who might, for lack of 
funds, otherwise be unable to attend university.117  
Student numbers did increase rapidly. The student body also became more 
demographically diverse once financial impediments were reduced. In 1944 Dedman 
expanded wartime financial assistance for students into a formal Commonwealth 
Reconstruction Training Scheme, which provided support for education and training 
of ex-servicewomen and men. Over the next seven years, 300,000 people were 
accepted into that scheme, more than half entering the universities (the scheme 
covered vocational training as well).118 In the years after the war Commonwealth 
Reconstruction Training Scheme students made up more than thirty percent of the 
total enrolment in Australian universities.119 Between university and technical 
education, educational opportunities for Australians grew substantially.120 
The desire to grow the higher education sector continued long after returned service 
personnel had been absorbed into the workforce. Employers, responding to the boom 
in the economy, needed skilled workers. A substantial number of skilled and unskilled 
employees were available as a result of large-scale immigration, but it was also 
necessary to train more. The universities and technical colleges provided the 
necessary growth.121 ‘The education standards of the community are high’, the 
Australia New Zealand Bank was able to tell overseas business interests by the 1950s. 
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University education, the bank informed the international community, was available 
in a wide range of fields, with part-time courses for ‘students engaged in such 
occupations as engineering or commerce’.122  
Most political and academic leaders supported this expansion, as did Nugget Coombs, 
through the Department of Post-War Reconstruction. Only later did Coombs question 
the implications of the decision to educate students for primarily economic reasons, 
producing what he called ‘capitalist fodder’ in the universities.123 Despite those 
subsequent doubts, the demands of industry at a time of substantial growth were 
considerable. From the perspective of capitalist progress, the change seemed 
inevitable. Technological innovation seemed a natural progression in Australia’s 
economic development. The evolution from an industrial to a technological society 
was a consequence, Coombs argued, of humans adjusting the tools they required to 
the economic and social pressures of the world in which they lived.124  
Even Clunies Ross, despite his ambivalence about the technological emphasis in the 
universities, saw that all this needed to happen. He later became a much-respected 
head of the CSIRO. ‘We want’, he argued, ‘not only to get through the immediate 
post-war years … but at the same time to go steadily forward to an expanding 
economy.’125 In 1939 a committee had reported an urgent need for something to be 
done to develop science in Australia that would better sustain secondary industry, 
outlining a set of changes that were mostly achieved during the war. Now what was 
needed was a refocus of technologies and their associated infrastructure to the needs 
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of peace. The requirement for consolidation and growth meant that universities could 
no longer afford to lose the labour of too many graduate students overseas (where up 
until the war postgraduate training normally occurred). This was a key reason for 
introducing and expanding the PhD in Australian universities at this stage. 
Research and research training was essential for Australian science to thrive and it 
required additional support.126 New funding was allocated to existing bodies, such as 
the Australian National Research Council, the Council for Scientific and Industrial 
Research and the Australian Council for Education Research. But that older cluster of 
organisations was found to be inadequate for the strategic task of driving a national 
research agenda. Leading scientists and public servants facilitated structural shifts to 
assure new research was pushed forward.127 The National Health and Medical 
Research Council was transformed into a research funding body in 1939. The 
Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) was 
established in 1949, a vastly expanded body from the old Council for Scientific and 
Industrial Research. In 1952 the Atomic Energy Commission was formed.128 In the 
early 1950s the Australian National Research Council was dissolved, replaced by 
bodies that research leaders believed would better support research standards: the 
Academies of Science and Social Science.129 For higher education, the Universities 
Commission, established in 1943 (becoming the Australian Universities Commission 
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in 1958), began distributing research grants, a task it retained until the establishment 
of the Australian Research Grants Committee in 1965.130 
This expansion of the nation’s research and training capacity was a source of national 
pride. The Australia New Zealand Bank boasted that the level of education in 
Australia was now such that ‘in fact there is a flow of Australian scientists and 
technicians to well-paid positions in Europe and America’.131 They overstated the 
transformation, but Australia’s ability to turn for advice to its own experts prompted 
some intellectual leaders to declare that Australia had ‘come of age’.132 It was not 
only in the commercial sector that the growing influence of university-educated 
employees was felt. Public intellectuals emerged in new and influential ways as media 
gave them a new prominence.133 The Commonwealth public service, now better 
resourced as a result of the Federal government’s income tax revenue, began 
recruiting from university graduates for its enlarged and more specialised 
workforce.134 The result was that across the spectrum of Australian professional life, 
university education and research was having a significant observable impact.135 
Conclusion 
When the war started, universities were small, elite and introspective. After it, they 
became large, more diverse and increasingly focused outwards towards their 
obligations to society. The universities’ new commitment to the public good shifted 
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their priorities away from ‘pure’ knowledge towards issues that would benefit the 
population. This was not just a matter of prioritising utility over pure ideas, however, 
it was also a move away from imagining knowledge to be singular and universal. 
Directed towards more diverse social goals, knowledge seemed increasingly 
fragmented, making it more difficult for the university to claim an authority over the 
whole. This outward focus also assured that government, industry and a growing 
intellectual class had an increased stake in segments of the university’s activity that 
related to their work. Higher education’s obligations to those groups led to a shift in 
its role. Universities after the Second World War would be less concerned with the 
protection of culture and the guardianship of existing knowledge and increasingly 
concerned with deriving their authority from the production of new knowledge 
through research. 
As technological research expanded, the objections were considerable. Some believed 
that equating the university’s purpose to the grubby world of industry and commerce 
contradicted the university’s aspirations to cultivate taste. Seeking to protect 
intellectual purity from crass pragmatism, leaders like Kim Beazley, Ian Clunies Ross 
and Nugget Coombs were an influential elite, but they were working against the tide. 
While they could hope, plead and embarrass universities and governments to try to 
persuade them of the importance of pure and humanistic knowledge, the movement 
towards applied, industrial and technological knowledge in the universities had 
momentum. 
The impetus for change was largely a result of the war and post-war reconstruction. 
University knowledge gained purchase in the public sphere as a result of its 
application beyond the university walls. Real-world problems highlighted the need for 
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new academic questions, which in turn revealed possibilities for new discoveries and 
new technologies. The war had been fought and won on the strength of scientific and 
technological development. A new economy was being built, industries grew and 
improved levels of education were needed.  
The direction of change and the focus of government policy encouraged academics to 
pursue increasingly specialised research. Specialisation supported innovation by 
aligning more directly with real-world problems, complicating the sense of what the 
university was for. ‘Universal’ knowledge, which some post-war politicians and 
academics believed was intrinsic to the idea of the university, had the singular 
purpose of maintaining the nation’s ‘intellectual health’. But as the post-war era 
unfolded, the task became more diverse. Universities now supported civil society, 
industrial and agricultural economic development and human health and welfare. 
They were multiple and divergent goals, so different from the unity of purpose 
scholars like Clunies Ross recalled from before the war. 
These changing structures encouraged university staff and national leaders to think 
about knowledge in a more atomised way. Disciplines, applications and ideas could 
be compartmentalised and streamed through research organisations, government 
bureaucracies and industry structures. Indeed, they would need to be: growing 
complexity and increased specialisation made administration of a single body of 
‘universal’ knowledge too cumbersome. This fragmentation, however, also 
encouraged members of society to claim knowledge as the right of the interests they 
represented, so that medical knowledge might belong to the profession, for instance, 
and agricultural innovation to primary industry. Fragmented knowledge could thus be 
owned: each fragment, as Nugget Coombs feared, collected for personal or 
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commercial use. When, as Lyotard has argued, ‘the relationship between science and 
technology [was] reversed’, economic requirements began to be the driver, rather than 
the beneficiary, of knowledge production.136 
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Chapter Two: Knowledge and the Nation 1945-1967 
Post-war reconstruction offered an opportunity for political and civic leaders to 
reconsider Australian society and its economic underpinnings. New knowledge in 
science, technology and the social sciences promoted the idea that Australian 
intellectuals might offer innovative solutions to the economic, political, diplomatic 
and even medical problems confronting the world. H.C. (Nugget) Coombs later 
reflected: 
We had ideas about the need for research in medicine, ideas about research in the social 
sciences so that they could be applied to the conduct of our collective affairs. There was an 
opportunity from Australia to get a view of the universe and to come to understand it which was 
unique … it came out of work that Post-War Reconstruction was doing.1 
A key priority was the effective management of employment, involving the transfer of 
sixty-eight percent of the population from war work to useful peacetime activities. 
Facilities and equipment built for war also needed to be redeployed. This involved the 
evaluation of the ongoing usefulness of material, occupations and skills. Re-orienting 
the economy ‘back to the purposes of peace’ gave focus, as the last chapter showed, 
to the growth of technological education and research in the universities.2  
Restructuring the nation’s economic priorities was just one task. As Coombs saw it, 
the other half of post-war reconstruction was to ‘give effect to those aspirations for 
which this war has been fought’.3 For intellectuals like Coombs post-war 
reconstruction offered the opportunity to put in place the infrastructure to support 
communities and bolster democracy. Coombs and other bureaucrats in the post-war 
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period assumed the task of addressing the problems society had recently faced and 
planning for a better future. To ensure they did this properly they believed they 
needed more information, which they hoped would be supplied by the nation’s 
scholarly researchers. Where the government had no prior experience or where their 
ideas were untested, new research should be funded. Economists in particular were 
needed to investigate and recommend ways of managing the national economy, 
avoiding in future the economic depression that had done so much damage in the 
1930s.4 The nation needed medical research to support population health. 
International relations would be underpinned by new studies of the Pacific region and 
social scientific research would provide for robust social policy.5 In addition, the 
nation’s energy and defence capabilities would be founded on the basis of research 
into new energy sources, particularly atomic power.6 
Social scientists such as Sol Encel, Tim Rowse, James Walter and Ann Firth have 
documented the growth of an intellectual class advising government in the post-war 
period. They focused on the growing importance of expertise to post-war democracy. 
Rowse, extending Encel’s initial observations, was concerned that these experts were 
unelected. He interrogated the implications of governing based on the particular idea 
of ‘collective good’, concocted by an elite group of intellectuals. Their influence, he 
argued, effectively undermined parliamentary representation.7 Walter questioned how 
elite those experts were, insisting that many – including Coombs – were ‘organic’ 
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intellectuals, since their advice served the interests of their class.8 Antonio Gramsci 
defined the ‘organic intellectual’ as the product of their social environment, their 
thinking informed by culture and experience that they in turn used to help address the 
financial and welfare concerns they observed.9 Deployed more commonly to 
differentiate a working-class way of knowing from a traditional elite intelligentsia, 
Walter’s use of the term to demonstrate Coombs’s promotion of middle class interests 
conceals the reality that most bureaucratic intellectuals, regardless of their social 
origins, were members of a university-trained elite: Coombs for example, had 
postgraduate qualifications earned in Great Britain.10 Their high levels of education 
were prized. Ann Firth argues that both the population and parliamentarians sought 
and valued expert opinion on the issues that would impact the collective national 
good.11 
The government’s new reliance on research and expertise offered opportunities for 
higher education. The universities now needed to negotiate their place in the 
government agenda. Opinion on this was divided. Some academics were pleased to 
put their work towards such important national goals. Others believed the universities 
should stay out of it, that their job was to pursue knowledge, not provide the tools of 
government. The government, on the other hand, was persuaded that it needed to 
ensure the universities would perform the role the nation needed and sought ways to 
compel them to do so. Their wish to put higher education to national purposes was 
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amplified by Cold War politics. An international alliance of democratic, capitalist 
nations wanted dominance in Europe against the Soviet-controlled communist Eastern 
Bloc. Their ambition translated, by the early 1950s, into fears that widespread 
domestic complicity with communist aims would destabilise their efforts.12 
Academics, influential through teaching and in the public sphere, were key subjects of 
concern: would they support or undermine the emerging post-war social order? 
Institutional and political histories recount myriad incidents where agents of the 
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO), which had been established in 
1949, were sent to watch and influence academic political and ideological 
behaviour.13 University administrators responded to the government’s intervention in 
their appointments and promotions, so that academic careers often depended on 
alignment with an official government position.14 
The fact that the university administrators were drawing on ASIO advice in managing 
their personnel represented an important development with consequences for 
institutional autonomy, but was not the only issue at stake. As the tensions in 
universities heightened, the growing importance of the emerging staff trade union, the 
Federation of Australian University Staff Association (FAUSA) raises additional 
questions. Was academic freedom itself politicised? How did tensions impact the 
place of academics in setting the university’s priorities? The decision by staff to 
comply with government values or to assert their own, had lasting implications for the 
regulation of knowledge in the universities. 
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Despite government suspicion of academic ideologies, in the 1940s and 1950s, the 
Federal government also provided unprecedented levels of financial and rhetorical 
support for higher education. Universities were presented with the opportunity, if they 
supported national goals, to enhance their importance to society and their income 
along with it. Funding was a key concern for them. After the war, despite ongoing 
Federal funding under post-war reconstruction schemes, State funding was so 
constrained that the Vice-Chancellors declared a crisis in the universities.15 The 1930s 
economic depression had left the universities weakened. They now looked to the 
Commonwealth government, whose control of income tax made it the most likely 
source of ongoing backing. University administrators hoped that the funding 
universities had received from the Federal government as a result of the war would 
continue and expand. 
Universities and the Australian Federal Government 
Federal funding was not without strings and well before government began to send 
ASIO to observe them, university staff and students feared for their autonomy. As 
early as 1943, in a conference between the Chair of the Universities Commission, 
Richard Charles Mills, and National Union of Australian University Students 
representatives, a University of Melbourne student asked the question directly: 
It seems to be certain that the Commonwealth interest in education is going to be permanent… 
The most important question seems to me to be whether the Commonwealth is going to carry 
conditions with the money it gives … The Commonwealth’s position appears to be very strong 
because of its money.16 
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At that time, Richard Mills explained that he did not know what the Commonwealth’s 
intentions were or whether ongoing funding would carry conditions.  
One year later Mills had the following exchange with the Vice-Chancellor of the 
University of Sydney, Sir Robert Wallace: 
Sir Robert Wallace: They [the ‘Federal people’] don't understand the problem. There should be 
no difficulty at all. Sydney has put in for nothing it has not absolutely needed ... .if you can get 
us some freedom from this long round about way, and expensive and stupid way of doing 
things, we can get ahead. What has the State to do with it? 
Chair [Professor RC Mills, Chair of the Universities Commission]: I don't think the universities 
have been held up because of any requirements. 
Wallace: Could you use your influence with the State government? 
Mr. Hook [Secretary of the Universities Commission]: Are you in a position to tell us what you 
want the Premier to agree to? 
Wallace: To leave us alone. 
RC Mills: The delay at the moment is that you must have some plans and you won't tell us 
about them ... We have to certify for the Prime Minister that it is essential.’ 
Wallace: What I am asking is that you give us the money and be done with it. 
RC Mills: It is a large sum of money and when the Government says ‘we gave this subsidy, did 
the universities find it all right?’ we must be able to say something more than just ‘Trust the 
Universities’. 
Wallace: I think that is the wrong attitude.17 
Wallace knew Mills well. They had for some years been colleagues at the University 
of Sydney, so such frankness may have been license derived from familiarity. But it 
also reflected a tension inherent in their positions. Government funded higher 
education to secure tangible benefits for the nation – democracy demanded an account 
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of what those tangible benefits were.18 Universities, on the other hand, negotiated 
receipt of the government’s money with one eye firmly on their simultaneous need to 
secure institutional autonomy and academic freedom. Eric Ashby had warned them:  
In Australia it is extremely important that the tradition of academic freedom should be 
preserved, and that advantage should be taken of it: for the opportunities for political and 
sectarian interference in education are greater here than in other British countries.19 
Since Ashby had argued this the situation had changed, for government interest in 
higher education was now more acute, directed towards specific outcomes. 
The government’s approach to research during the war evolved into a longstanding 
policy framework based on national priorities. It began with pragmatic problems to 
solve. Their support of war-time science had left them with substantial research 
infrastructure that now needed to be re-deployed. As Canberra’s post-war 
reconstruction bureaucrats considered the best post-war functions for facilities and 
equipment, they were persuaded that those laboratories should be used for national 
development. Coombs and his colleagues began to consider the nation’s emerging 
research needs. On reflection, government laboratories seemed insufficient for post-
war plans; broader, more encompassing research was needed. When public servants 
considered the issues at stake, they found that instead of just maintaining the network 
of government laboratories that had been used for munitions research, national 
development required consideration of the research capacity of the universities.20  
In seeking university research for nation building several influential academics, 
politicians and bureaucrats – Nugget Coombs, R.D. (Pansy) Wright, Douglas 
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Copland, also John Dedman and the Prime Minister, Ben Chifley – were convinced 
that the national capital needed a university, not just government-directed scientific 
projects like those run through the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research.21 
Many members of the growing cohort of public servants in Canberra also sought 
opportunities for further education for themselves and their children.22 Canberra 
University College, a college of the University of Melbourne, had been in place since 
1929. Attended by a very small number of students (the 1948 statistical report 
recorded only twenty-one full-course enrolments), it was staffed by part-time, though 
often distinguished, tertiary teachers.23 The loftier ambitions held by planners of the 
Australian National University, however, were not situated in the need to educate 
more students, but in establishing an elite research university in the nation’s capital. 
For this reason, the Australian National University was founded as a research-only 
institution in 1946.24 Immediate tensions with the university tradition of maintaining a 
separateness from government direction were augmented by jealousy over the new 
university’s unique access to the Federal treasury. Some members of the older, State-
funded universities mocked its research focus, describing it as the nation’s ‘PhD 
factory’, invoking the preference in the humanities for scholarship rather than 
research (discussed in the last chapter).25 Further evidence that the new institution was 
not autonomous in accordance with the university tradition was that politicians, not 
the university’s scholarly founders, selected the name. Academics hated it, saying it 
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‘smacked of nationalised knowledge, a nexus between state and university’.26 David 
Rivett, despite his own connection to industrial research as head of the Council for 
Scientific and Industrial Research, was a defender of traditional university science.27 
He believed the Federal government was treating the prospect of a research university 
as a kind of government knowledge factory. Whenever he heard ‘The Australian 
National University’ Rivett said he wanted to add ‘Pty Ltd’.28 But despite academic 
sentiments, in Canberra research was now strategically linked, in real, tangible ways, 
with the development and reconstruction of the nation. 
National development through strengthening higher education was a central concern 
of Ian Clunies Ross who, since the early 1950s, sought to persuade the Federal 
government of the need for coordinated support of the universities.29 By 1957 Prime 
Minister Robert Menzies agreed to support Commonwealth funding and organisation 
of higher education. Menzies – at that point and in later autobiographical reflections – 
described higher education as his longstanding passion and listed its re-organisation 
as amongst his greatest Prime Ministerial achievements. Historical accounts generally 
echo this acclaim. While critical of the ways Menzies sought cultural homogeneity in 
education, Bob Bessant, for example, in an important article on Menzies, gives his 
familial and educational background, revealing the influences that informed Menzies’ 
appreciation of education generally and universities in particular, a background that 
ultimately shaped Australia’s higher education system.30  
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When Menzies became Prime Minister in 1949, a review of the ongoing financial 
requirements of the universities, chaired by Richard Mills, was underway. In later 
accounts, Menzies claimed that he saw this review as just a precursor to the one that 
was needed. His statement in parliament suggests that he was considering what such a 
later body would achieve: 
If we were shaping a Universities Committee to determine the scope of the universities, the 
subjects they should teach, and how they should teach them, a somewhat more widely 
constituted body…would be appropriate.31 
This intention for government to consider academic elements of the university 
contradicted Menzies’ statement when he presented the Mills report to parliament: 
It is not the desire of the government to interfere in the internal management of the universities 
nor to attach conditions to the use of those moneys which would interfere with the traditional 
liberty of the universities to determine the courses of instruction that they wish to pursue or the 
character of the research that they wish to undertake. The Government has acknowledged the 
principle of academic freedom.32 
While on the one hand the nation needed specific and targeted education and research, 
Menzies also often articulated the view that autonomous universities were required to 
promote and protect western culture.33 Menzies later argued that he sought, for the 
nation, the ‘immeasurable and civilizing benefits which flow or should flow from the 
study of, or association with the students of, humane letters’.34  
Allan Martin and Patsy Hardy demonstrate that Menzies tended to retrospectively 
overstate his own importance in the revolutionary review that followed. In the early 
1950s Ian Clunies Ross had been unable to persuade Menzies that the Federal 
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government should permanently take a greater role in the universities. In 1954 
Menzies also rejected an appeal from the Australian Vice-Chancellors, who renewed 
their request two years later.35 In fact the Australian Vice Chancellors, through their 
chair, A.P. Rowe, were acting on the advice of Ian Clunies Ross, who worked behind 
the scenes to promote the idea of a review among politicians, bureaucrats and 
academics. This was a difficult task, for politicians tended to be unconvinced that 
Federal funding of State universities was appropriate and many academics feared 
Federal meddling would be result from a permanent scheme.36 Those misgivings 
notwithstanding, senior academics responded to Clunies Ross’s requests for names of 
potential review leaders – both Australian and British – whose views they believed 
the academic community would accept.37 Clunies Ross hoped that Eric Ashby would 
take the role.38 But once persuaded of the need for a review, it was Sir Keith Murray, 
from the British University Grants Committee, who Menzies selected. 
Martin and Hardy argue that once convinced that the Federal government should be 
involved in higher education Menzies became a ‘true believer’, seeking a political 
legacy in the Australian university system.39 His accounts of his personal role in the 
Murray review seem to affirm this. He described the shift to Federal funding of higher 
education, for example, as a personal favour by the national Treasurer: 
I spoke to the Treasurer, my colleague Arthur Fadden, and warned him that I was initiating an 
enterprise which could not fail, in the result, to be vastly expensive. Now Arthur (or ‘Artie’) 
Fadden was not a graduate of any university, nor would anybody (as he would be the first to 
concede) have taken him for an academic type. But he had a good Australian outlook; he knew 
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that this matter was almost an obsession with me; and he was my friend. So he gave me the all 
clear.40 
This was just one of many opportunities Menzies took to stress his personal passion 
for university reform.41 
Menzies’ passion was a rhetorical device that he used to manage the competing 
interests of his fellow Liberal politicians and of university leaders who sought to 
retain freedom from government control. A plan to fund higher education at Federal 
level was a significant cost and not necessarily of importance to the majority of 
Menzies’ party. At that time only a limited number of politicians held university 
degrees. Even those who did could not necessarily be counted on to restrain their wish 
to exert the power that funding might hold over university activity. In particular, 
Francis Bland, a member of Menzies’ own government, expressed the belief that, 
through funding, government earned the right to a say in the universities.42  
At the same time, for the scheme to work, university leaders needed to be reassured. 
The success of Federal involvement in the universities, as Ian Clunies Ross had 
recognised as he sought a committee leader who academics would accept, depended 
on the co-operation of the university community. Keith Murray – an outsider, 
unaffected by the competing interests between the institutions and sectors – conducted 
a heartening series of consultative visits with the universities. In three months 
Murray’s committee (whose members included Ian Clunies Ross) visited all of the 
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Australian universities, meeting with staff, vice-chancellors and registrars, collecting 
submissions from all interested parties. By now there were nine universities. The 
Australian National University and the University of New South Wales had joined the 
Universities of Melbourne, Sydney, Queensland, Adelaide, Tasmania and Western 
Australia. Formerly a college of the University of Sydney, the University of New 
England was also now an independent institution. 
These institutions, along with a wide range of community organisations, made 
submissions to the Murray Committee. All of the institutional submissions (except 
Baxter’s University of New South Wales) acknowledged the difficulty in resolving a 
debate that academics had for some time characterised as a division between ‘service 
station’ and ‘ivory tower’ universities.43 In tea rooms across Australian campuses, 
these two phrases captured a tension that was occasionally articulated in more 
scholarly debate. In 1954 for example, at a conference to consider the future of the 
New South Wales universities, philosopher John Anderson argued for the ‘ivory 
tower’ side, fearing that otherwise ‘university teaching [would become] an industry 
that has a certain product’.44 On the other hand, other scholars argued that if they 
accepted that universities were public instrumentalities their voice might have more 
weight.45 Moral philosophers Perce Partridge and Alan Stout felt there was a larger 
question about the social functions of the university, which went beyond providing 
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sufficient graduates, as they had during the war, to a philosophical question about the 
relationship of university scholarship to society.46 
Scholarly debates notwithstanding, Federal politicians expected to fund university 
teaching and research that had economic and social purposes that would benefit the 
nation. The final report of the Murray committee reflected this view, but also offered 
solace to the academic community. The report reaffirmed the importance of academic 
freedom, attempting to make it more palatable to politicians by styling academic 
inquiry in heroic terms: 
These men have no immediate practical aim or profit in view: they are simply ‘knowledge-
intoxicated’ men who love the life of intellectual effort and inquiry for its own sake, and will 
devote their lives to it if they possibly can. Though this pure pursuit of truth seems to many to 
be a rather inhuman, and to some a rather super-human, kind of life, there are fortunately far 
more of them than most people would have thought possible.47 
This impressive description, taking up precious space in Murray’s short report, served 
two purposes. One was to reassure parliament that, in granting substantial sums of 
money, the government was not feeding aristocratic greed, but intellectual vocation. 
Menzies was evidently concerned to address the widespread belief that university 
funding would give additional support to already-wealthy members of society. In 
Menzies’ presentation of the Murray report to parliament, he suggested that, contrary 
to public perceptions, wealthy citizens had long been a minority among undergraduate 
students. With increased Commonwealth funding, particularly of merit-based 
scholarships, he argued that equity would be still further improved.48 
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The Murray report’s second purpose in emphasising a heroic form of academia was a 
technique Eric Ashby also employed: an attempt to prevent government interference 
by reminding them that money could not influence academics who, according to 
Murray, had no interest in profit.49 It was to offset the fact that a pay rise for 
academics was a part of the package of government investment. The report, adopted 
by parliament, recommended a pay rise of £500 per year for professors with increases 
for all other academics too. Universities were given a ten percent increase in annual 
grants, immediate capital assistance in excess of £12 million and ‘emergency’ funding 
of more than £4.5 million, to assist them in recovering from the economic depression 
and the war.50 It was a substantial injection of funds and universities felt its impact 
immediately. 
Historians often depict the Murray review as launching a ‘golden age’ for higher 
education. Histories of universities joyfully recount the expansion of student numbers, 
the increase in staff, the building programs and the general ambience of relative 
prosperity that followed the review. 51 Positive responses by the university community 
to the Murray report in 1957 were the expression of academics who looked forward 
not only to an increase in salaries and resources but also a sense that they were 
appreciated.52 
It was in part Menzies’ evident passion for higher education that fuelled the new 
sense, in the universities, of being valued. Menzies utilised his role as a ‘university 
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man’ and his relationship with the universities to good effect. University histories 
stress the occasions on which Menzies protected them, deflecting attempts by other 
politicians to involve themselves in university affairs. The system of favours was 
mutual. Universities – particularly the Australian National University in Canberra – 
tended to respond favourably to Menzies’ requests, removing much of the 
requirement among other members of the government to use Federal control of 
funding to overtly influence higher education.53 
In the Murray reforms Menzies sought to systematise the obligations that the 
universities increasingly owed to Menzies personally, investing the same allegiance in 
the Commonwealth as the primary funding agency (though in a legislative sense they 
were still State institutions). Efficiency as a result of national unification of the sector 
was their key obligation: 
Sound university planning for expansion to meet Australian needs also requires some degree of 
co-ordination of the ideas and programmes among the ten universities.54 
Centralised government funding across all universities, Murray argued, must result in 
centrally negotiated control. The same trend was reflected internationally: 
There is no doubt that the university systems necessary to meet the future are going to make 
very exacting demands on the national economies. No country is going to be able to afford to be 
unnecessarily extravagant in duplicating expensive establishments and departments.55 
To manage those negotiations an Australian equivalent to the British Universities 
Grants Commission was to be established. Murray recommended a body that, like the 
British version, provided a buffer between government and the universities, 
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preventing a pairing of political aims with government research funding.56 The 
Menzies government was not persuaded: 
The government agreed that it [the Australian Universities Commission] should not be called a 
Grants Commission, for this might narrow its significance.57 
Australia already had a Universities Commission, established by John Dedman to 
facilitate government strategy during the war and to implement some of the 
Commonwealth’s post-war reconstruction policies.58 If the new Universities 
Commission had been created along the lines of its British counterpart, it would have 
less power than it did already. Menzies instead elected to retain the Commission’s 
wider role. The slightly-altered Australian Universities Commission was nominally 
similar to the British Grants body, but retained the possibility for government to ask 
universities to fulfil national needs.59 
Although the Murray review did not recommend this expansive role for the Australian 
Universities Commission, segments of the report helped the government obtain it. The 
report sought to appease both political and academic readers, balancing the tension 
between university autonomy and accountability to government, so that each could be 
satisfied their interests were assured: 
Each university naturally and rightly prizes its independence and every government in Australia 
will rightly desire to safeguard the independence of its own universities. In the western tradition 
it is entirely accepted that a university cannot perform its function without such independence. 
But from the point of view of government and people the national interest must be served, and 
universities must find some means, however informal, to enable a policy to be formed.60  
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It was national need that drove government investment, so universities, Murray 
argued, should be prepared to meet that need: 
The universities and individual members within them will have to give the Committee a full 
measure of trust, goodwill and patience, if, in the end, they are to gain for themselves the 
facilities which they feel that they need, and to play the part which the country expects of 
them.61 
Commonwealth funding was thus contingent on the provision of knowledge for the 
nation. 
Despite his many orations on the significance of academic freedom and his 
longstanding reputation among scholars for respecting university autonomy, Menzies 
ultimately sought a national university system that would be directly responsive to the 
demands of the Federal government. There were hints of this in the Murray report but 
it manifest in tangible ways with the establishment of the Australian Universities 
Commission. A.P. Gallagher argued that the Universities Commission mediated 
gradual but steady increases in government interference in university business.62 This 
was Menzies’ intention. His confidential Cabinet notes explaining the Universities 
Commission legislation to ministerial colleagues affirm it : 
Money is the weapon by which oversight of universities will be secured, but the intention is 
more than monetary. It is hoped that the Commission will devote itself to thought about the 
development of universities in the widest sense. It will advise precisely on the buildings which 
the Commonwealth should support at each university…as well as expenditure on other matters 
such as laboratory equipment or libraries.63 
Murray it seems had not succeeded in persuading parliamentarians that academics 
were immune to the lure of money. Menzies further acknowledged that the immediate 
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concern of the Universities Commission legislation was to avoid unnecessary 
replication of courses across the system. It was, however, also more than that: he was 
looking to the future: 
The intention of the clause is to make sure that unsuitable overlapping between universities does 
not occur; but the intent of the clause goes much beyond this. The Commission may find it 
necessary to encourage the development of new university institutions…it may wish to 
encourage the teaching of Science or the establishment of further Chairs in Government. It may 
find it necessary to encourage more money to be spent on medical care for students or to put 
pressure against undue expenditure on playing fields. The clause is designed to allow it full 
freedom to move in any direction if it feels it necessary.64 
It is difficult to comprehend how Menzies internally reconciled the tension between 
university ideals and this bid for government control. It is nevertheless evident that 
his priority lay in assuring that on the basis of legislation, future Federal governments 
would be able to compel the universities to meet government aims. 
Martin Review of Tertiary Education 
As a result of the Murray review the universities underwent a wave of expansion, the 
second since the Second World War. A changing economy had led to an increase in 
the proportion of ‘white collar’ work and a growing middle class, which underpinned 
changing community expectations of higher education. More parents aspired to the 
opportunities a university education offered for their children. A meritocratic 
discourse paralleled the widening of university education, so that in Menzies’ 
speeches and, increasingly, in reality, the ‘poor but talented student’ found their way 
to university.65 By the 1960s, however, the universities faced still further growth, 
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which they feared would strain even their newly expanded resources. In primary and 
secondary schools, the States were struggling to find sufficient teachers to educate the 
population bubble that had resulted from post-war economic optimism. Those ‘baby 
boomers’ were now about to start university.66 
University growth, however, was not just physical: with more funding and fuelled by 
connections to industry and politics, disciplines expanded rapidly. Such expansion 
had not been anticipated. By the mid-1960s, Menzies commissioned a second review 
of higher education, chaired by leading physicist, Leslie Martin. The Martin review 
noted a ‘marked increase in basic knowledge’, so that progressively more congested 
curricula were being taught.67 To cope with the student demand and disciplinary 
specialisation, new academic appointments were made regularly, from necessity 
sourced from increasingly youthful scholars. This pattern intensified the growth of 
knowledge. With each new appointment, potentially more research and new ideas 
entered departments that themselves grew and diversified. New topics were taught, 
often in electives, so that the formal and structured curricula of the past were 
becoming unrecognisable – fractured, Leslie Martin thought – and often 
unpredictable.68 Only five years after government accepted the Murray 
recommendations Menzies realised the problem. In an era of research, as universities 
grew, so did knowledge; as research expanded, so did the amount of material that 
needed to be taught. Higher education, it seemed, would keep growing, colonising the 
obligations of the Federal treasury, redirecting the flow of public money to ever-
expanding disciplines. It needed to be contained. The new review sought a 
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mechanism that would enable increased numbers of students to earn degrees and enter 
the professions, but which would restrict the pursuit of research to affordable levels.69  
The Martin review took three years to complete. After it, several more universities 
were established to cater for the increased demand. But the government also created a 
new kind of higher education institution, the Colleges of Advanced Education. In a 
system Martin described using the broader term ‘tertiary’ (rather than the qualitative 
descriptor, ‘higher’) education, the Colleges of Advanced Education were teaching-
only institutions, intended to prepare large numbers of students for pre-defined 
professional and intellectual work.70 This binary structure enabled Menzies to achieve 
growth in the education of Australian school-leavers for vocational purposes, while 
preserving the universities’ civilising role. Both the aspirations of the middle classes 
and the educated labour to support economic growth would be achieved in the 
colleges. The universities would be reserved to uphold culture.71  
The universities were to preserve a specific, government-sanctioned type of culture, 
however, and academics were noticing that the alliance with the government in the 
maintenance of the state’s social and economic goals was strengthening. By 1965 
when Ted Wheelwright convened a symposium on higher education the debate 
between ‘ivory tower’ and ‘service station’ that had dominated the 1940s and 1950s 
was declared obsolete. Perce Partridge said: 
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It is no longer a wry jest: universities are now, in considerable part, public utilities or 
instrumentalities. They are being increasingly supported by governments from public funds 
because they carry out public functions, as hospitals and public transport systems do.72 
The ‘social role of higher education in Australia’, all now admitted, was an obligation 
tied in a transactional way to the Federal funding that the universities now received.73 
National knowledge in the Atomic Age 
One key government research goal in particular connected the universities directly to 
national political goals. The pervading consciousness that Australians now lived in an 
atomic age infused the consolidation of the universities. This was an issue that 
preoccupied the government, because many political, scientific and civic leaders 
believed that, like the discoveries of steam power and electricity, atomic energy 
heralded a new epoch of technological and economic development. Australia could ill 
afford to fall behind in the research and development of a new power source. The 
efficiency and security of the power supply, proponents of nuclear energy like Philip 
Baxter argued, could be combined with a defence strategy that would support the 
allied democratic nations’ pursuit of global dominance.74 
For this reason when Nugget Coombs went to England in 1946 to recruit researchers 
for the Australian National University, among them was a leading nuclear scientist, 
Marcus Oliphant.75 Between Oliphant in Canberra, Harry Messel at the University of 
Sydney and Philip Baxter at the University of New South Wales, Australian capacity 
for atomic energy was gaining momentum. To regulate its research and development 
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Prime Minister Robert Menzies formed the Australian Atomic Energy Commission in 
1952.76 Philip Baxter was a member, becoming its Chair in 1956.77 In atomic energy, 
the tie between knowledge and national strategy was strengthened. The control of that 
knowledge, however, and the approaches surrounding the expensive research it 
entailed, remained controversial. 
Atomic energy research was inextricably linked to the potential for nuclear war. The 
bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 had demonstrated the extraordinary and 
frightening power of atomic warfare. But the successful testing of a nuclear bomb by 
the Soviet Union in August 1949 brought home with terrible force that underpinning 
the Cold War would be a nuclear arms race and that atomic research was going to be 
the key to military superiority, even the survival of democracy. In this way research 
was linked not just to economic prosperity but to the health and well being of 
capitalism, a key part of the struggle between democracy and totalitarianism. 
Superiority in the nuclear arms race was vital.78 
Some scientists, however, feared the potential of a nuclear arms race. Superiority 
might result in mutual annihilation. Marcus Oliphant argued that research should be 
for peaceful purposes and that Hiroshima and Nagasaki never be repeated. He was 
persuaded that the potential in atomic energy should be directed towards economic 
development – though he later argued that even nuclear power was too dangerous. 
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Oliphant’s position was widely reported and respected.79 On the basis of the public 
debate to which he contributed, atomic energy as a means to support industry, but not 
defence, had cautious, but widespread support. Nevertheless, despite the focus in 
public discussion on atomic power, for government, defence remained paramount.80 
Philip Baxter’s belief that nuclear energy and weapons should be the centrepiece of a 
‘courageous’ government approach to nuclear development remained government 
policy.81 Australia had to be in this research race or be left behind economically and 
be left exposed to military threats. 
The defence of the British Commonwealth, Wayne Reynolds has shown, was from as 
early as 1947 deemed to lie in the security of the power supply across the member 
nations in the event of a nuclear attack. The Snowy Mountains Scheme, he argues, 
was intended to be a first step towards atomic power for Australia (the development 
of a nuclear industry required a vast amount of power in the first place), a move that 
political and defence leaders believed to be necessary to assure national security. It 
was part of a larger strategy, negotiated with other western nations, especially Britain. 
Uranium mining was commenced in the Northern Territory to assure supply for the 
United Kingdom, which in turn shared the latest nuclear research findings, research 
that would be extended in Australian universities.82  
Seeking to secure the place of universities in that strategy, Baxter convened an atomic 
energy symposium at the University of New South Wales in 1954. At the top of the 
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agenda, for the nation’s atomic scientists assembled there, was a very expensive piece 
of research infrastructure: they needed a nuclear reactor. At the University of Sydney 
the Professor of Physics, Harry Messel, was keen to install a small nuclear reactor for 
research purposes on campus.83 Baxter ridiculed Messel’s proposals: 
I think we should build a reactor very soon but not a low-powered toy reactor for use in the 
Universities. We want a real reactor from which we can study and learn.84 
Baxter described small reactors as a waste of money, a ‘fetish’ amongst universities 
wishing to show off to guests.85 A reflection of Baxter’s revulsion to rarefied 
scholarship, atomic research, he argued, needed to be conducted in a ‘real reactor’ 
that had tangible implications for industry and defence.86 Sydney University 
academics suggested that they could build both. A university-based reactor would 
offer the opportunity to train students without exposing them, at the larger plant, to 
national secrets.87 The existence of national secrets in the universities was still quite 
new, a legacy of academic war work. Oliphant, whose influence in the scientific 
community was waning, despite his considerable presence in the public sphere, 
believed no science should be done in secret. Secrecy, he argued, was the opposite of 
knowledge.88 
Despite the impediments for teaching that the need for secrecy presented, Baxter was 
keen that the nexus between university science and national defence be maintained. 
Winning the battle for the large, industrial nuclear reactor at Lucas Heights in Sydney, 
Baxter continued to fight to ensure that, in the nature of its construction, the option for 
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Australia to develop nuclear weaponry was never excluded. Yet there were 
complications, political and practical, in realising Baxter’s dream of an Australian 
nuclear reactor. Conditions attached to the purchase of parts under international 
nuclear non-proliferation rules limited the types of reactor that could be built. There 
were other limitations, too. Avoiding non-proliferation restrictions was complicated 
by disputes within the Commission about the technical specifications of the reactor. 
These debates were informed by questions about whether Australia had the relevant 
resources – for example, sufficient long-term supply of beryllium – to sustain the 
types of reactor favoured by different parties.89 
Baxter’s determination to align university knowledge to Australian defensive and 
industrial capacity was grounded in his conservative political persuasions.90 Baxter 
argued that Australian research and development needed to be directed to economic 
and military progress as its contribution to the dominance of western democracy over 
communism. Soviet technological success was a ‘rude awakening’ he said, from the 
‘comforting belief’ that democracy produced better science, or that the west ‘had a 
kind of natural aptitude for this sort of work’.91 It was for this reason that Baxter 
placed his hope in atomic research. With just one technology he believed, and on the 
basis of its own natural resources, Australia could assure the type of economic and 
military security that nations internationally were battling to attain. 
Despite this belief and its centrality to Australia’s Cold War aims in the 1950s, Baxter 
was never successful in persuading the government to implement an integrated 
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research, energy and defence strategy in atomic power. Evidence was mounted 
against Baxter’s position early in the process. Economic analysis failed to affirm the 
widespread belief that atomic energy would support Australian economic 
development. In fact at the 1954 symposium, a group of economists (drawn from 
Coombs’s Keynesian group in Canberra) demonstrated that there was no economic 
necessity – or even benefit – for Australia to invest in nuclear energy.92  
Economic analysis was just the start. The dangers of mutual annihilation influenced 
popular movements opposed to nuclear arms. Political opposition to nuclear weapons 
grew in the mid-1950s and public support for the atomic energy scheme declined. By 
the 1960s, when the ‘ban the bomb’ movement had gained momentum worldwide, 
there was vastly diminished support for the idea.93 The result for Baxter was that his 
‘backroom machinations’ had little effect.94 It did not stop Baxter from pressing his 
point, however and he resorted to joining the Australian Association for Cultural 
Freedom, a movement he had formerly opposed. He used their networks to seek more 
opportunities to make his case among influential thinkers and in the media.95 This 
effort also failed. The public opposition to the nuclear program grew to a point where 
politicians could no longer afford to support Baxter’s views. In fact in the early 1970s 
when Baxter maintained, on ABC radio, that Australia needed to produce nuclear 
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weapons, ASIO depicted him in their correspondence to Canberra politicians as an 
embarrassment and a political liability.96  
Academic Freedom in the Cold War 
University research had become politicised. It was linked to the future of democracy 
and capitalism and was increasingly the focus of political anxiety. The effect was to 
put academic staff on alert. On individual campuses staff solidarity had been fuelled 
by low wages for university teachers in the decade after the war and the growing 
tendency for academics to look outwards to the social needs of the community. Some 
more radical and disenchanted scholars sought to unite with university leaders and use 
collegial action on a range of academic, moral and political issues.97 In 1952 they 
formed a Federal Council of University Staff Associations, later (and more 
memorably) named the Federation of Australian University Staff Associations 
(FAUSA).98 Among this group of scholars there were those who, according to one 
prominent FAUSA leader, Ken Buckley, were becoming more ‘bolshie’. Political and 
ideological conflicts were growing on campuses across Australia. One incident at the 
University of Sydney, known as the ‘Knopfelmacher case’ highlights the potency of 
those divisions.99  
The Knopfelmacher case began in 1965 with the decision by David Malet Armstrong, 
Challis Professor of Philosophy at Sydney University from 1964 until 1992, to seek to 
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employ fellow anti-communist Frank Knopfelmacher. Some decades later, Armstrong 
mused: ‘I was a pretty innocent young professor. I didn’t understand much about 
university politics anyway. I certainly didn’t foresee the row’.100 Nevertheless, he was 
well prepared for one. The three folders of material he kept on the Knopfelmacher 
dispute are testament not only to Armstrong’s fastidious filing habits, but also to the 
amount of political preparation Armstrong undertook to give Knopfelmacher the 
greatest chance of being appointed to the position. His letters show that he colluded 
with colleagues to ensure Sydney University was currently short of competent 
logicians, for instance, elevating the necessity of Knopfelmacher’s skills.101 Unsigned 
letters from colleagues attest to the presence of known enemies in the process: 
Dick either has written or will do so very soon re. S’s latest ploy (very transparent) re. trying to 
make sure, without appearing to do so, that K has no chance.102 
‘S’ refers to Wal Suchting, a junior member of staff in the Sydney philosophy 
department. Clearly, Armstrong and those around him did foresee a conflict.  
By the time the university selection committee met, student and staff radicals had 
vocalised their significant reservations about appointing Knopfelmacher.103 Leading 
FAUSA figure and editor of the union journal Vestes, Ted Wheelwright, lobbied 
members of the committee to vote against the appointment. When Armstrong returned 
from overseas the wavering committee then voted in Knopfelmacher’s favour. 
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Despite that, the Professorial Board rejected their recommendation.104 Confidential 
discussions at the Board were leaked to the press leading to fears of a communist 
conspiracy in the University, raised in question time in the New South Wales State 
parliament.105 The official Sydney University history suggests that Knopfelmacher’s 
weak resume was the real impediment to his appointment.106 Staff of ASIO, who were 
watching the case closely, clearly did not believe that to be the reason.107 
A second appointments committee was created and ASIO files show that the Director-
general of ASIO, Colonel Charles Spry, reported every few days to the Attorney 
General and Prime Minister on progress towards having Knopfelmacher appointed.108 
The position was re-advertised and Knopfelmacher applied again. ASIO reported on 
the number of eligible voters on the Professorial Board, suggesting that if a greater 
number attended than in the first consideration of his application, it would ‘reverse 
the Board’s previous decision and appoint Dr Knopfelmacher to the position’.109 
Wheelwright lobbied members of this second committee too, which rejected 
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Knopfelmacher’s application. Some members of that committee told the press that 
they considered Knopfelmacher to have been excluded on political grounds.110  Harry 
Eddy, adult education tutor for the Worker’s Education Association and author of an 
exposé of another case (discussed shortly), wrote to the staff association, suggesting 
that rejection of Knopfelmacher’s application was a violation of academic freedom. 
Wheelwright and Buckley, representing the staff association but both closely involved 
in preventing Knopfelmacher’s appointment, replied that they were convinced that all 
was right in this instance.111  
The Knopfelmacher case may have been unique to the Sydney Philosophy 
Department, which experienced significant divisions along political lines (further 
discussed in the next chapter). But the case also highlights the extent to which, in the 
Cold War context, the control of academic appointments had become an ideological 
battleground. Armstrong’s wish to appoint a fellow anti-communist, the staff 
association’s desire to prevent it, ASIO’s involvement in the case and Menzies’ close 
observation of it demonstrate that key players considered the stakes to be high. The 
role of the Professorial Board in making political, as well as academic, judgements 
along with discussion of the case in the New South Wales and Federal parliaments, 
attest to widespread participation in the battle for political regulation of knowledge 
through controlling the presence or absence of particular university scholars. 
This was a battle ASIO took seriously, fearing the effect of ‘bolshie’ academics 
teaching and presenting their ideas in the public sphere. Colonel Spry persuaded 
Menzies that university-based intellectuals represented a threat, suggesting they be 
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subject to widespread investigation.112 In Canberra especially ASIO kept academics 
that they believed had communist inclinations under regular observation.113 Marcus 
Oliphant believed that his career was stunted as a result of a negative security report, 
and he was not alone.114 Spry’s suggestion that academic appointments be vetted was 
passed along by Menzies to the Australian National University in the form of a 
request that the university assure ‘the right type of man’ (his emphasis) be appointed 
to each role.115 Vice-chancellor Douglas Copland replied that they were 
uncomfortable with a political test for staff appointments, but nevertheless agreed that 
no ‘suspect’ staff member would be promoted to positions of authority.116  
In order to influence the political climate on university campuses, ASIO regularly 
informed university administrators of ‘suspect’ activities, based on their widespread 
surveillance. The effect of ASIO reporting was often significant. ASIO’s analysis of 
the content of lectures and course notes on Russian history, for example, led to a 
report that prevented Melbourne academic, Max Crawford, from taking up a 
Rockefeller fellowship. Crawford’s security file described him as a risk and, while 
awarded the fellowship, he was not permitted to enter the United States to take up the 
position.117 While ASIO was focused on the political left and university intellectuals, 
they had other targets too. Their scrutiny extended to research that might be put to 
political and defensive use, even if its researchers were above suspicion. They kept 
watch on Philip Baxter, as an atomic researcher, for example, despite his anti-
                                                
112 Anderson, A Historian’s Life, 1. 
113 Foster and Varghese, The Making of the Australian National University, 121. 
114 Phillip Deery, ‘Political Activism, Academic Freedom and the Cold War: An American 
Experience.’ Labour History 98, 2010, 183–205. 
115 Foster and Varghese, The Making of the Australian National University, 125. 
116 Anderson, A Historian’s Life, 236–7. 
117 Ibid. 
 127 
communist stance: many metres of still-unavailable records of his activities are stored 
in the Australian National Archives.118  
Academics were aware that the government was watching them. Many became 
increasingly anxious. Suspicion of the government, rumoured collusion of their 
academic leaders with ASIO and the growing overt politicisation of university work 
was making the university environment an uneasy one. Apprehension had additional 
international sources. In the United States some politicians expressed fears that 
influential members of society were secretly pushing a communist agenda. United 
States Senator Joseph McCarthy implemented a range of well-known policies 
designed to root out the communist threat. In universities the effect was severe. In the 
early 1950s academics with known or suspected communist links were ‘blacklisted’, 
unable to find employment in institutions across the United States, as almost every 
university implemented the government’s anti-communist policy. The environment of 
suspicion and accusation became known as ‘McCarthyism’, as intellectuals, including 
university academics, were accused with little recourse to defend themselves, posing a 
significant threat to their careers and livelihood.119 Fears that the United States 
experience could be replicated in Australia undermined any residual trust academics 
had in the government and university administrators.120 The emerging ideological 
battle forged considerable change in the universities, in the ways staff related to the 
institution and its leadership. Those transformations were important, for it would 
begin to set one part of the university against another, significantly influencing 
disputes over the regulation of knowledge in subsequent decades. 
                                                
118 ASIO, File on Sir Philip Baxter, NAA/A463 (Canberra: National Archives of Australia, 1956-1973). 
119 Ellen W. Schrecker, No Ivory Tower: Mccarthyism and the Universities (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1986).  
120 Anderson, A Historian’s Life, 225. 
 128 
The concerns of State and Federal governments, fuelled by Cold War anxieties and 
heightened fears about the role of academics in educating future generations, was no 
more evident than in the controversy over the appointment of historian Russel Ward. 
In late 1955 Ward had finished his PhD and, while negotiating a contract for 
publication of his thesis, later the classic, The Australian Legend, he applied for a job 
at the University of New South Wales. The selection committee, chaired by economic 
historian Max Hartwell, recommended his appointment in early 1956. Philip Baxter, 
however, refused to sign off on their recommendation. When Hartwell queried 
Baxter’s reasons, he was told that a security report on Ward found him to have 
participated in ‘seditious circles’.121 Hartwell protested to the University Council, 
eventually resigning over the issue.122  
For Ward, Baxter’s veto was a serious blow. He was reluctant to return to school 
teaching and keen to secure a university job. Moreover, as he told Hartwell, his family 
was running out of money: ‘the water will be cut off 16 March’, he explained.123 
When the appointment was unsuccessful, Ward blamed the university’s Chancellor, 
Wallace Wurth, who he had encountered before. In 1952, Ward had been offered a 
job at Wagga Wagga Teachers’ College. He and his family had already moved there 
when the New South Wales Public Service Board, then chaired by Wallace Wurth, 
refused to confirm his appointment, compelling them to pack up and leave again. 
Ward was not given an explanation, though the New South Wales Teachers’ 
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Federation asked for one on his behalf.124 The minutes of the Wagga Wagga 
Teachers’ College expressed the embarrassment felt by its staff, but did not give a 
reason for the incident.125 Nor is an explanation available from the minutes of the 
Public Service Board, which are missing from that period. Nevertheless, Ward was 
persuaded that his appointment was rejected due to his past membership of the 
Communist Party.126 
Subsequent accounts of the Ward case point to the involvement of ASIO, though once 
the case reached the press and questions were asked of Menzies in parliament, ASIO 
denied any involvement.127 Nevertheless, Wayne Reynolds claims that on the day that 
Baxter was asked to sign off on Ward’s appointment, he was attending a meeting of 
the Atomic Weapons Test Committee, a meeting protected by ASIO staff. While 
ASIO may not have provided Baxter with a formal evaluation of Ward, they could 
well have spoken of him informally on that day.128 Ward’s ASIO file does not suggest 
this, however, for, while they had certainly been following his movements, even in 
handwritten notes between agents they fail to recall ever discussing Ward with 
anyone from the University of New South Wales.129 In a letter to Menzies, ASIO staff 
speculated that ‘the appointing authorities may have got information from any of a 
number of sources. They commonly cast their nets as widely as possible’.130  
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Years later, Frank Crowley, prominent historian and former Dean of Arts at the 
University of New South Wales contradicted the received version of the Ward case, 
claiming that the radical outrage at the treatment of Ward distorted the reasoning 
behind Baxter’s decision. In 1965, ten years after the initial incident, Crowley was 
appointed Professor of history at the University of New South Wales, and claimed 
that he was asked to see Baxter almost straight away. Baxter wanted to confide in a 
historian the real reason for his exclusion of Ward. Waving a file before Crowley, 
Baxter told him that Russel Ward’s public service record (from his time as a school 
teacher in New South Wales) contained unsubstantiated reports gleaned from fellow 
teachers that Ward had a tendency to behave inappropriately with female students. 
This confidential information, Baxter told Crowley, was not something Baxter was 
able to reveal publicly. Crowley declared the Ward case ‘a godsend for left wing 
activists’ in the late 1950s and early 1960s, suggesting that the left had exaggerated 
the politics associated with Ward’s exclusion in order to enhance their own 
position.131 
Given the ten years between Ward’s application and the meeting with Crowley it is 
more likely that Baxter was making up a new denial of the political test, a pattern of 
changing stories he continued into the 1980s.132 If Baxter was willing to 
confidentially share this information with Crowley, he would surely have done so ten 
years earlier with Hartwell, as chair of the appointments committee, undoubtedly 
preventing the subsequent media coverage and damage to the reputation of the 
University of New South Wales that resulted from Hartwell speaking to the press.133 
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What Crowley’s account does highlight is the significance of incidents like the Ward 
case to the growth of radicalism among university staff and the changing nature of 
academic interaction with their institutions as a result of the mistrust infecting 
universities. To elucidate this, it is necessary to look to the way Cold War politics in 
the universities strengthened the emerging academic union, FAUSA.  
The most prominent incident for FAUSA was the Orr case, which was a frequent 
topic for discussion in university corridors, at academic dinner parties and in 
libertarian ‘push’ pubs from 1956 through to the mid-1960s.134 It had all the elements 
of a delicious scandal. An already controversial professor, Sydney Orr, had seduced 
one of his students and been summarily dismissed from his professorship. After his 
unsuccessful appeal, Orr persuaded some of his colleagues that he had been set up, 
that in fact his dismissal was for political reasons. Orr’s supporters, R.D. ‘Panzee’ 
Wright (more often ‘Pansy’ in the primary sources), Professor of Physiology at 
Melbourne University and Harry Eddy, at the Worker’s Education Association in 
Sydney, promoted his cause.135 Eddy published (with substantial contributions from 
Orr himself) a lengthy and inscrutable book, simply entitled Orr.136  
In response to the Orr case, FAUSA put a black ban on the University of Tasmania, 
agreeing that no philosopher would take a position at Tasmania and that no university 
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would later employ a philosopher who did.137 FAUSA published a censure of the 
University of Tasmania in every issue of Vestes for the duration of the ban, 
considerably disrupting the capacity of that university to attract staff.138 Many 
academics across Australia – especially the philosophical disciples of John Anderson, 
who took a close interest in the case – were convinced that seducing a young woman 
was unlikely to be the real reason to lay off a philosopher.139 It was widely believed 
that the dismissal of Orr represented a violation of academic freedom and that the 
censure of the University of Tasmania was just.140  
More than thirty years later, Cassandra Pybus made a compelling case opposing that 
orthodoxy. The assumption that seducing a student was not sufficient reason for 
dismissal, she suggested, was grounded more in misogyny than fact. Orr’s attempt to 
shroud his misconduct with the trappings of a Cold War conspiracy, Pybus suggested, 
was part of a long habit of self-serving academic fraudulence, concealing his 
scholarly incompetence.141  
The importance of Orr for this thesis is not in Orr’s dismissal, but rather the 
implications of the legal case that followed for the structure of relationships between 
universities and their leaders on one hand, and academic staff on the other. When Orr 
took legal action against the University of Tasmania, the university’s defence was 
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grounded in their claim that, as Orr’s employer, they had the right to dismiss him.142 
The Master and Servant Act 1856 in Tasmania defined the contractual obligations 
between employers and their staff until 1976, a structure that required employees to 
perform duties as detailed by their employer.143 The university maintained that the 
master-servant structure applied to Orr as to any other employee in Tasmania. Orr’s 
lawyer argued that a professor was not subject to the Master and Servant Act, for if 
they were, it would violate academic freedom. It was a convoluted and awkward 
argument, added to the end of the evidence as if Orr’s lawyer himself was 
embarrassed to present it.144 Justice Green, presiding in the case of Orr v University of 
Tasmania found for the university, specifically concurring that Orr was in a servant 
relationship to the institution as master. Justice Green could not see, he stated in his 
judgement, why academic freedom should put a professor outside the boundaries of 
employment law.145 Justice Green was not the only one to be unimpressed. The 
general community, Pybus claimed, ‘did not care for the suggestion that academics 
were superior to the legal obligations which govern contracts of employment’. 
Academic freedom did not place academics supra legen, above the law, she 
maintained.146 
Cassandra Pybus drew on Justice Green’s dismissal of the idea that a professor was 
not subject to the master-servant structure to conclude that FAUSA was less 
interested in academic freedom than they were in promoting their own political 
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agenda. ‘No matter how some people attempted to dress it up’, she argued, ‘the 
concern with the master-servant relationship was a trade-union issue, to do with the 
protection of academic tenure and the terms and conditions of academic 
appointments’.147 The FAUSA files on the case, however, demonstrate that while 
FAUSA was certainly interested in promoting their political position, academic 
freedom was nevertheless a key concern. 
The issue of the master-servant relationship was central even before FAUSA became 
involved in the case. Indeed FAUSA did not do so until 1958, two years after Orr’s 
dismissal. Their minutes demonstrate that they were not initially convinced that the 
University of Tasmania was wrong to dismiss Sydney Orr. Despite pressure from 
concerned colleagues, particularly John Anderson, they felt compelled to wait until 
the local university staff association invited them to step in.148 When that happened, 
FAUSA leaders visited the University of Tasmania. For FAUSA, it was not only that 
the court found that Orr was indeed a servant of the university. Primarily, their focus 
was that the University of Tasmania itself maintained that he was. Ken Buckley and 
Roland Thorp wrote: 
Just as disturbing as the actual Court ruling (that the relationship of the University to a professor 
is that of master to servant) is the fact that the University itself, through the lawyers it briefed, 
propounded this false concept long before the Court so ruled – and the University has not since 
disavowed it.149 
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Unlike the court’s failure to understand academic freedom, the fact that the University 
of Tasmania continued to systematically ignore the structures that assured it was a 
problem that FAUSA considered their responsibility to address.150 
FAUSA sought legal counsel on the master-servant issue. In 1958 James Montrose, 
Dean of Law at Queen’s Belfast, advised them that in his view a professor could not 
be an employee. Under the structure of the University of Tasmania, he argued, they 
were designated a ‘member’. Unlike a professor, a servant, Montrose contended, 
occupied a ‘subordinate position’.151 This was not about the professor’s social status, 
it was a freedom from the master’s authority that was necessary to assure an 
academic’s intellectual autonomy and integrity. Nor was it to suggest that an 
academic was not subject to contractual obligation, or that a professor could not be 
properly dismissed for misconduct or illegal activity. Indeed, he argued, the Orr 
dismissal may have been just and correct. The university’s claim to the master-servant 
structure was the key problem, for under that type of relationship every aspect of a 
professor’s work, including the content of their teaching and research, could 
theoretically be subject to the will of the university’s leaders. The case set a precedent 
therefore that carried structural implications for academic freedom throughout 
Australia.152  
                                                
150 Ibid. 
151 J.L. Montrose, ‘The Legal Relation between a University and Its Professors’, in FAUSA Records: 
Orr Case NBA/E194/1/FAUSA (Canberra: Noel Butlin Archives, Australian National University, 
1956). 
152 Ibid. 
 136 
 
Conclusion 
In 1961 Robert Menzies wrote a short, terse letter to Max Hartwell: 
The extent of government interference in university matters in Australia has been grossly 
exaggerated … much time is being wasted in defending something which is not in danger in 
Australia – academic freedom’.153 
It is unclear whether Menzies really believed this. He certainly sought mechanisms 
that would enhance the Commonwealth’s control through the Universities 
Commission as well as by using ASIO officers to monitor and regulate academic and 
political ideologies. Nevertheless, members of the universities believed that his aim in 
implementing the Murray review was to augment the authority and significance of 
Australian universities, maintaining their independence and intellectual freedom. As 
higher education expanded, Menzies sought in the Martin review to protect their 
traditional culture and purpose by sequestering growth in the Colleges of Advanced 
Education. Institutional histories in general suggest that university administrators 
widely viewed Menzies as their ardent supporter.  
And yet when ASIO sent agents to investigate and  influence academic staff in 
Australian universities, that disrupted the alliance that had grown during the Second 
World War between academic pursuits and government goals. While some vice-
chancellors evaded the government’s requests that the appointment of academic staff 
be determined by their political ideologies and associations, other academics 
nevertheless found that their careers were stunted as a result of adverse security files. 
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It was no longer clear to many university scholars that the government was on their 
side. In fact, for some academics, ASIO positioned them in an explicitly adversarial 
relationship to government and their own university leadership. The master-servant 
structure that was determined in the Orr case affirmed, for leaders of the emerging 
union, that university administrators were in a position to assert power over 
academics in ways that could disrupt their control of teaching and research. 
Moreover, in opposing particular political persuasions on campus, the government 
exposed its own ideological stamp in this Cold War context. In so doing the alliance 
of universities with the state revealed that universities themselves were in fact serving 
an ideological and political master. 
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Chapter Three: Knowledge and Revolution 1967-1975 
In July 1969, Louis Matheson, the Vice-Chancellor at Monash University, entertained 
Clark Kerr, President of the University of California, adjourning to the staff club for 
lunch. Before they could finish, hundreds of students invaded their lunch party, 
outraged about disciplinary action against students who had conducted a sit-in at a 
recent University council meeting. This sit-in was one of five major on-campus 
student protests that occurred that year.1 For Clark Kerr, this must have all seemed 
very familiar. The University of California’s Berkeley campus was an infamous site 
for student uprisings.  
University student radicalism is a historical icon – a cliché, even – of the 1960s and 
1970s. To many who were there and to some who wished they were, the era defines 
the way university students in some way ought to be. For Bill Readings, the ideal 
embodies more than mere nostalgia. The ‘1968 generation’ Readings argues, 
represents the moment when the university internationally was exposed for what it 
was: a hegemonic instrument, empowered by the university’s claim to have a special 
authority over truth.2 In Australia, that claim was attached to lofty ideals. Truth, 
civility and prosperity were the values embodied in Australian higher education, now 
nationalised under Menzies, as a tribute to his government’s ideal nation, economy 
and culture. A new generation of radical students, however – just like some of the 
academic staff his government had sent ASIO agents to watch from the 1950s – 
increasingly viewed those government ideals with suspicion and even contempt. 
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Much of the literature on 1960s and 1970s protest movements – such as Verity 
Burgmann’s Power and Protest – focus on the New Left and youth protest broadly, 
rather than their impact on the universities specifically.3 Others give even greater 
breadth, and consider the social and political milieu of the 1960s and 1970s. Donald 
Horne’s Time of Hope, captured the social and political mood, while Terry Irving, 
David Maunders and Geoffrey Sherington in sections of Youth in Australia analysed 
the youth culture that emerged from the significant demographic, social and political 
changes that accompanied the ‘baby boomer’ generation’s growth to adulthood.4 But 
few of these discuss higher education, except in passing. Ann Curthoys’s Freedom 
Ride begins at a university, but is focused on the movement to support indigenous 
rights in Australia.5 John Docker’s 1988 chapter ‘Those Halcyon Days’ describes 
university activities but its focus, like Burgmann’s, is the emergence (and later 
demise) of the New Left.6 The small number of studies that do focus on universities 
tend to concentrate on specific institutions. They are typically memoirs and 
reminiscences rather than broader analytic studies. These are important, since the 
official record commonly consists of university disciplinary reports and haphazard 
caches of roneoed broadsheets, but their specificity prevents consideration of the 
wider impact of student radicalism.7 A recent article by C.A. Rootes gives a useful 
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analysis of the political implications of the movement nation wide, as well as its 
international linkages.8 In that paper, however, as in other accounts, student 
radicalism is seen as an important part of Australian political history, rather than as a 
major turning point in the history of Australian educational thinking. Alan Barcan has 
recently expanded earlier work on the ‘Old Left’ at Sydney University to produce a 
new study of 1960s and 1970s radicalism at Sydney. While drawing out the 
implications for later political changes that he believes resulted from shifts in those 
student approaches, Barcan suggests that the period where students sought 
transformations to the university itself was a time in which they lost focus, distracted 
by lesser, ‘intramural’ issues.9 This emphasis on its consequences for high politics 
obscures the reality that student radicalism had implications for the place of university 
knowledge in Australia and its subsequent regulation that were also profound and 
lasting. 
Even though student revolutionaries were in fact a very small minority of the student 
body on all Australian campuses, they nevertheless succeeded in disrupting the 
dominant vision of higher education, held by government and university management. 
As a result of student radicalism, the internal structures and functions of the 
universities were transformed. This is a familiar story, but there are dimensions, or 
perhaps little understood consequences of this period of upheaval, that have largely 
escaped scholarly attention. In challenging the legitimacy of university authority – 
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indeed, in questioning the very basis of western knowledge – radical critics cast doubt 
on the idea of the university.  
The university survived nevertheless, but its legitimacy, for some, was called into 
question. By questioning the ideal of the production of truth through university 
research and teaching, radicals raised uncertainties among other sections of society. 
When research was produced for the ‘public good’, to which members of ‘the public’ 
did this refer? In questioning the authority of elite scholars, students planted doubts 
about the authority and value of the university. In so doing, they also instigated 
misgivings about the use of public funds to support higher education. The consequent 
legitimation crisis for universities had far reaching consequences not only for the 
future public policy environment for universities, but also for the university’s own 
relationship to the knowledge it produced. 
Universities and Class Power 
With the growth of university enrolments after the 1957 Murray Review and the new 
opportunities offered to school leavers with the expansion allowed by the Martin 
Review, in 1965 there were more than 110,000 students enrolled in universities and 
Colleges of Advanced Education – nearly three times as many as in 1957. The ‘baby 
boomer’ generation, as it entered the universities, causing much of this increase in 
enrolment, encountered a system on the brink of change. Expansion in student 
numbers had been coupled with a growth in staff numbers and the new generation of 
academics were bringing novel and sometimes, as Chapter Two discussed, ‘bolshie’ 
ideas to their university work. Cold War politicisation of university knowledge did 
not fail to influence the students entering higher education, who looked at the 
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university itself, and began to question its impact on Australia’s social and economic 
environment. 
University student radicalism was an international phenomenon that came to the 
public’s attention during the Free Speech movement at the University of California 
Berkeley in 1965.10 The political and cultural mood of the era was then immortalised 
in May 1968 when a student barricade uprising in Paris spread to the working 
community, nearly collapsing the French government. Student radicalism on 
university campuses in Australia and internationally, however, had a longer history. 
At the University of Melbourne in 1917, Communist student Guido Baracchi was 
censured by the university’s administration for his opposition to the Great War.11 
Student radicalism grew through the 1930s and particularly in the 1940s with the 
influx of students through the Commonwealth Reconstruction Training Scheme. 
Those students were later designated as the ‘Old Left’. A shift from ‘old’ to ‘new’ 
left-wing politics occurred when the Soviet suppression of the 1956 Hungarian 
Revolution shocked western communists, causing many to move their allegiance 
away from traditional Communist Party structures. Many radicals, particularly in 
universities, began to consider new ideas and approaches to their politics. A ‘New 
Left’ emerged.12 
One focus of the emerging student New Left in Australian universities was the 
university’s role in perpetuating class distinctions. A university degree, student 
radicals argued, acted as a class barrier. In the 1960s, when (despite recent growth) 
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relatively few went to university, a degree enabled better paid jobs and elevated 
graduates to membership of an educated class, conferring social capital. The 
university’s right to choose who they would enrol and who they would graduate made 
those institutions key sponsors of class power in Australia.  In 1968, Monash students 
protested: 
I am burning this degree as an expression of opposition to the belief that this piece of paper 
should make me a privileged person … that because I have met certain formal requirements set 
by the establishment, I should earn $60 per week while the broad masses should subsist on a 
basic wage or a pension. I dispute the belief that this degree makes me more human, more 
intelligent, more moral.13 
In the same spirit, the previous year’s students had awarded a Monash degree to a 
pig.14  
In opposing the university’s association with social hierarchy, students also opposed 
the stratified structures that governed each campus. In hindsight some of these 
incidents seem remarkably trivial. At the time, however, they were symptomatic of 
growing disaffection and a sustained critique of the illegitimate and oppressive power 
in almost every administrative gesture of the university. At Monash University, with 
its Maoist-dominated Labor Club, this found expression in a long battle over the 
university car park. To facilitate a new fee for student parking, Monash had separated 
student from staff areas in the car park. Students protested not only against the 
imposition of fees, but also against the structure of the car park as a reflection of the 
university’s hierarchy and society’s class distinctions. ‘No longer is the issue simply 
one of car parking,’ claimed one issue of Print, the ‘broadsheet’ of the Monash Labor 
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Club, ‘the issue is the place of students in the university’.15 They likened the lesser 
status of students among university members to the lower position, in economic and 
cultural standing, granted to less educated citizens in society. Red, green and yellow 
signage designated different categories of car parking spaces and students temporarily 
painted all the signs red to indicate their protest against such signifiers of inequality.16 
Student opposition to social hierarchy led them to crusade for a reform of university 
governance structures. As a result, Australian universities all faced demands for 
increased student participation on bodies responsible for running the university. This, 
students argued, would demonstrate that the university valued them as socially equal. 
Odd things sometimes prompted such insistence. Overdue library books – a topic at 
least as banal as the Monash car park – was the issue at the University of Sydney in 
April 1967. Students held mass meetings, more than one thousand signed a petition, 
and more than two hundred people conducted several sit-ins (sometimes overnight) of 
the University of Sydney’s Fisher library as a protest against increased fines.17 Fines, 
they proclaimed, harmed poorer students and failed to deter richer ones, perpetuating 
social disadvantage. ‘The chief librarian and his nebulous associates’, students 
complained, ‘treated students as morons – not worthy of consultation or consideration 
in what is essentially their own problem.’18 The lesser standing of students in the 
university hierarchy, they argued, reflected a lack of respect for their right to have a 
say in decisions that impacted them. This seemed exploitative, asserting power that 
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only hierarchy could supply. The university’s failure to consult and communicate 
with students was an expression of that division in status. 
Other incidents sharpened the critique of university administration. Victoria Lee was 
given some bad advice when she was at school, when her careers advisor told her that 
completing maths for her high school matriculation was unnecessary, since she 
wanted to study anthropology and archaeology. Upon application to the University of 
Sydney in 1969, however, she found that, although she had the required grades, she 
did not have the required maths. Victoria Lee then enrolled at Macquarie University 
and took the anthropology and archaeology she needed at Sydney, having them 
credited to her Macquarie degree. She did this on the understanding that Sydney 
accepted students who had successfully completed a year at another New South 
Wales university. After that year, she reapplied to Sydney in 1970, only to find that 
the Professorial Board had changed the rules and students from other universities 
were no longer eligible for admission. Victoria Lee’s letter to the University’s Senate 
explaining all this was reprinted in the student newspaper, Honi Soit. Students were 
deeply concerned about the fact that the Professorial Board had decided to change 
admission requirements but forgotten to publish the change in the University Calendar 
or anywhere else.19 
Students were horrified, although limiting access to the university was not necessarily 
their concern. Writing for Honi Soit, one student agreed with the Board’s plan, which 
was to ‘keep out inferior students…to ensure that there is not a flood of applicants to 
enter Sydney University from people who have completed first year at New South 
Wales and Macquarie. The resolution was not passed to exclude a student like 
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Victoria Lee who had easily made the quota for this university’.20 Their main concern, 
however, was not the unfair exclusion of Victoria Lee, but that the Professorial Board 
had implemented unpublished decisions. The Student Representative Council asked 
politely that student representatives be elected to the Board so they could keep abreast 
of events.21 When they were refused, politeness was cast aside. Students occupied the 
administrative offices in Sydney’s Main Quadrangle for three days in support of 
increased participation in University governance.22 
The Victoria Lee case was not an isolated incident. Students on all campuses 
demanded increased representation. Their demands often succeeded. At the Australian 
National University there was a sit-in at the university administrative offices, seeking 
student participation in university governance, a change made by the early 1970s.23 
Student radicals at the University of New England set aside divisions between student 
groups and the university to work with administrators to restructure academic 
governance to include students.24 At Melbourne University, a formal Planning Group 
was established to investigate university governance, on which representatives of all 
types of staff and students served, with students elected by the student body. Simon 
Marginson, then Arts II (Hons), in his policy speech seeking election (successfully) 
for a position in the Planning Group, said that such participation should enhance 
student control over their education and learning environment.25 In all universities, the 
argument was made and re-made, that students should have a more active say in the 
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aspects of university life that impacted them as a matter of inclusion in the university 
community.  
The Australian Vice-Chancellors Committee took a detailed interest in the trend as it 
emerged. In 1970 they reported on a survey of student participation in all Australian 
universities, noting the number of representatives at all levels, from Council and 
Academic Board to departmental staff-student liaison groups.26 The Vice-Chancellors 
colluded on desirable levels of participation. ‘If one university put twenty students on 
its Council’, Louis Matheson pointed out, ‘all universities would be under pressure to 
do the same’.27 
While they attempted to limit the levels of student participation, universities were 
ready to change. The level of power and authority granted to academics at 
professorial level was already making many academic staff uncomfortable. A.P. 
Rowe’s description of professorial power in If the Gown Fits, published in 1960, had 
prompted Perce Partridge to critique the authority of the ‘professor-god’.28 In the 
same spirit, Geoffrey Serle, observing changes in the character of university 
departments, wrote an article about ‘god-professors’ in 1963, which included 
suggestions about ways to democratise academic governance.29  
While for junior staff, overly powerful professors might be powerful patrons in 
increasingly large departments, more often they were seen as antiquated obstacles to 
their right to explore and teach their own courses. For students, respect for 
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professorial standing seemed to grant an authority over knowledge that was based on 
nothing more than social rank. University leaders were conscious that they were 
maintaining an indefensible position by excluding most members from decision 
making structures. Student protest provided the push universities needed for reform. 
By the mid-1970s, university Professorial Boards were replaced with more egalitarian 
structures that included representatives of sub-professorial academic staff and 
students.30 By restructuring authority within the university on a (slightly) more 
egalitarian basis, academics and administrators began to diminish the special status of 
the professor.  
Universities and the ‘establishment’ 
Student opposition to professorial authority, however, went beyond immediate and 
local objections to hierarchy. When Monash students declared that ‘the University is 
an instrument of the ruling class’, they did not just mean that its internal structure 
mirrored unfair social differentiation.31 They were referring to the function of the 
university in perpetuating forms of social and economic advantage in society broadly. 
Many were increasingly persuaded that the modern university was complicit in the 
goals of what they broadly dubbed ‘the establishment’.32 The ‘mass university’, 
according to Terry Irving, radical lecturer in politics at Sydney University, promoted 
knowledge that legitimised the nation-state, capitalism, elitism – structures that all 
relied on the subjugation of some members of society for the benefit of others.33 The 
university relied on power, enacted through its function in legitimising certain forms 
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of hegemonic knowledge. Linear historical narratives, scientific progress, 
technological superiority, political, philosophical and economic theory all propagated 
by the universities had nourished and justified imperial dominance, state authority 
over individuals and exploitation of indigenous people. Beyond producing graduates 
and professors who would continually replenish society’s elite, university knowledge 
itself was foundational to political, social and financial inequalities.  
In addition to those ideas and narratives, as they were presented in lectures, courses 
and publications, the ways the university effected its mission also perpetuated 
established ideas and social structures. ‘Just as the university serves the nation’, 
claimed Terry Irving, ‘so the “good” teacher serves the university by instructing his 
students efficiently in those skills whose acquisition the nation has already made a 
condition of his entry to the university’.34 The use of university admissions to restrict 
access to knowledge was an issue of concern to a new generation of educators. Ideas 
were floated about ways to extend university knowledge to those who had been 
unable to gain admission. Some of these radical critiques gained political traction. In 
the United Kingdom, an Open University was established in 1969, making higher 
education available to a much wider spectrum of citizens.35  
In Australia, student-driven grassroots initiatives, like the ‘Learning Exchange’ in 
Canberra, made learning resources available to people not enrolled at university.36 
The most radical of these experiments was based near the University of Sydney. Bob 
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Connell, Terry Irving and Rowan Cahill established a Free University (known as the 
Free U – a local articulation of an international movement) in a terrace house near 
Sydney’s Darlington campus.37 Launched in 1968 with 150 students, at its peak the 
Free U had approximately three hundred participants, of which around twenty were 
University of Sydney staff.38  
This experiment had the dual mission of widening knowledge to be inclusive and 
connecting study to the real problems of society. To achieve this, it was an important 
principle of the Free U that course content not be fixed.39 Study groups were 
immersive and experiential, blurring the boundaries between theory and practice, 
ideas and emotions:  
When you walk in the front door of the Free U, you leave outside the formal distinction between 
students and teachers … The group studies what the people in it decide they want to study… 
The way they tackle it is decided by themselves on the spot: not by someone else beforehand. 
The ‘course’ is what the people in the course group make of themselves.40 
At the Free U, staff and students were equal. Course leaders were ‘convenors’, not 
lecturers, and there was no assessment.41 This was in stark contrast to normal learning 
and teaching. The ‘mass university’, as Terry Irving had called it, encouraged staff-
student ratios that positioned teachers in an elevated relationship to their students.42 
This gave students the false impression that they were lacking in knowledge, that they 
required instruction and should submit to the authority of a scholarly master.  
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This power structure was famously criticised by Brazilian theorist Paulo Freire. For 
Freire, this traditional pedagogical formulation not only reflected society’s oppressive 
structures but also reinforced them. By assuring students assented to established ideas, 
and by granting them no space in which to question them, society’s norms would be 
continually maintained.43 Free knowledge, as in the Free U, was the opposite: here, 
the distinctions between instructor and instructed were blurred and everyone was 
accorded the status of knowledge producer. Instead of submitting to knowledge that 
conformed, students would produce their own knowledge for the purposes of social 
reform.44 
Despite these inclusive ideals, some participants considered the Free U more clique 
than community.45 Its structure, they felt, had freed knowledge from one kind of 
establishment but enclosed it in another. Women and feminist knowledge, for 
example, had limited expression in what some female members considered still a 
male-dominated institution.46 The Free U closed in 1972, a temporary experiment 
with pedagogies that explicitly supported social justice and, in so doing, also made 
adjustments to the idea of university knowledge.47 Its values were not lost, however, 
and were expressed in the teach-ins that were a feature of every campus throughout 
the student revolutionary period.48  
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In addition to radical student and staff criticisms of university teaching practices, 
university admissions processes were a source of concern. Just as the Russel Ward 
case (see Chapter Two) demonstrated that universities might exclude academic staff 
on the basis of their political persuasions, so might students be similarly excluded. 
Enrolment and, if need be, university disciplinary procedures, could be deployed to 
quell student critics. This issue came to a head in Melbourne when high profile 
student activist Albert Langer attempted to enrol for a postgraduate degree. Applying 
first at Monash, the university’s administration made it clear that, despite being a 
graduate, he would not be welcome in any course – or indeed in any classroom.49 The 
university held out against the inevitable student protests until Langer shifted his 
application to Melbourne University.  
At the University of Melbourne, the regulation used to refuse Langer’s admission – 
regulation 3.3.18 – was subject to intense internal criticism, staff and students 
maintaining that it was a form of political test for admission.50 Students occupied a 
Professorial Board meeting in protest. Under pressure, the Board formed an 
‘unofficial subcommittee’ to review 3.3.18.51 Unfortunately for the committee, a draft 
of a new regulation was leaked. Since it still contained provisions for excluding 
potential students on political grounds, students organised a general meeting.52 On 6th 
May 1971, one thousand students marched from their mass meeting to the 
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administration building to protest against the political test implied in the admissions 
clause.53 They locked in the Vice-Chancellor and around two hundred staff for more 
than five hours by bricking up the entrance to the building and creating other types of 
barricades.54 Staff attempting to leave were repelled with streams of water from fire 
hoses. One angry staff member threw a brick at students.55 The incident attracted the 
attention of politicians and was reported throughout the media.56 Despite all this, 
Langer was never admitted. He later applied to Sydney University, where, after 
checking the university’s statutes, his application was summarily (but quietly) 
rejected.57  
The highly visible presence of student radicals in the 1960s and 1970s was testament, 
however, to the fact that admissions did not universally succeed in excluding those 
that the university might deem politically undesirable. Those who were admitted but 
did not conform, students repeatedly argued, were subjected to university discipline. 
Disciplinary procedures, a young Geoffrey Robertson (later a human rights lawyer, 
famous in the 1980s for his television ‘hypotheticals’) argued, were deployed in ways 
that failed to reflect the values normally embodied in modern systems of justice.58 In 
response to such criticisms, universities began to reform their older in loco parentis 
traditions of discipline, often incorporating forms of student representation. But 
student rebellion had momentum and changes – even ones that to university 
administrators seemed quite radical – did not always solve the problem. At Sydney 
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University in 1970, the students who had recently stood before the disciplinary 
committee (known as the Proctorial Board) were among the earliest to be elected to it. 
Their first act was to call a Proctorial Board meeting on their own authority. The 
student proctors formed a quorum, though they were ‘forced’ to eject the (only) 
Professor who was acting as the Board’s secretary for ‘offensive interruption of 
student proctors’.59 Their aim was to instate a joint Student Representative Council 
and Staff Association Standing Committee on Discipline, transferring the 
responsibility for re-thinking discipline to the broader university membership.60  
On the rare occasion like this that students did obtain control over aspects of the 
university – most often by force and thus temporarily – they attempted to redirect the 
effort of the institution away from ‘the establishment’. La Trobe University students 
in Victoria took over the university’s Careers and Appointments office that had been 
used for military recruitment and redirected its resources to ‘the revolution’ – most 
likely meaning they used its stationary and stencil duplicator to add to the copious 
roneoed ‘broadsheets’ student radicals produced.61 
Those La Trobe students were responding to the most pressing issue confronting 
university age youth in Australia – the Vietnam War. By 1970, radical students were 
an integral part of the growing movement that opposed the war.62 To them, the 
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Vietnam War represented a great deal that was wrong with established ideas.63 Even 
on this issue, the university displayed complicity. University knowledge was not 
independent and objective but inextricably linked to propagating the war effort. At 
South Australia’s University of Adelaide, students found that university equipment 
was being used to pursue weapons research.64 What had been a virtue in the Second 
World War was certainly not during the conflict in Vietnam. The Adelaide Students 
for Democratic Action group were prompted to declare that they stood for ‘the 
destruction of this university [and] the destruction of the social system to which the 
university is a willing bootlicker’.65 Science was marshalled to kill more efficiently. 
Research was tied to the success of the ‘military-industrial complex’. It was a means 
of perpetuating western dominance over the ‘Third World’.66 Over the past twenty 
years, as the Cold War had taken hold, activity in the universities had been repeatedly 
revealed as having political consequences. But for the new generation of students, it 
was university support of military action that demonstrated that university knowledge 
was ideological, not objective. 
University authority over knowledge 
Radical students increasingly saw that the university’s power lay in its control of 
truth.67 The University of Queensland Society for Democratic Action described: 
[the] crucial role of the University in a neo-capitalist society, both as a defender of the status 
quo and as a producer of specialists for its technology. Staff lecture with no obvious viewpoint 
in the name of spurious objectivity.68  
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Through the university’s educational apparatus, ideologically-loaded knowledge was 
passed on to the next generation of tertiary educated Australians as if it were 
unquestionable. University power was assured through curricula and teaching. 
Compliance with established forms of knowledge was enforced through 
examination.69  
‘God is an exam’, was the headline for one student article, arguing for rebellion 
against the tyranny of examination.70 On 8th November 1973 more than three hundred 
students at the University of New England in the regional New South Wales town of 
Armidale held a ‘Peasants’ Revolt’ against exams. They felt that parroting their 
teachers’ knowledge affirmed it – that through examination ‘professors would 
expropriate people’s work and use it in a very feudal way’.71 Their protest became a 
violent struggle, followed by a twenty-four hour occupation of the university’s 
administrative offices.72  Melbourne University students formed an ‘SRC Exam 
Reform Group’ and published articles with titles like ‘Abolish Exams’.73 They 
distributed protest stickers that students could put in their exam booklets, saying: ‘I 
consider this exam to serve no educational purpose as all. I sit it under duress, because 
no creative alternative has been offered.’74 
                                                                                                                                      
68 Society for Democratic Action, University of Queensland, ‘Lecturing on Navigation While the Ship 
Goes Down’, Student Guerilla, 11 April 1969. 
69 Beer, A Serious Attempt to Change Society, 12. 
70 Phil O'Carrol, ‘God Is an Exam’, Woroni Undated (1974). 
71 Beer, A Serious Attempt to Change Society, 12. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Melbourne University SRC Exam Reform Group, ‘Abolish Exams’, Andrew Reeves Papers 
NL/MS8076/2/16 (Canberra: National Library of Australia, c.1970). 
74 Ibid. 
 157 
Students at the Australian National University campaigned for four years to reduce 
the quantity of marks assigned to examination.75 By 1973 students there were 
boycotting exams. Portrayed as analogous to Vietnam War draft resistance, they 
published an ‘Exam Resister’s Manifesto’.76 In 1974 Australian National University 
students occupied university buildings to protest against exams, as did students in the 
History Department at Flinders University in South Australia.77  
University protest groups were supported by research, conducted and distributed by 
the Australian Union of Students.78 They argued that exams failed to fulfil a role in 
the educating mission, and had a negative impact on students. Higher stress levels 
were attached to a single exam when it was the only means of assessment, resulting in 
unfortunate suicides.79 The stress of exams, they claimed, was evidence of its power 
to mould a student’s intellectual self according to an established canon, granting 
control over the propagation and perpetuation of particular forms of knowledge to the 
exam-setters.80 Moreover, students questioned the validity of exams as assessment 
given the types of preparation they promoted – memorisation and cramming. Rather 
than inspiring learning, exams killed it.81 Assessment, it was increasingly felt, should 
support learning by individuals, instead of sorting and categorising them. It was 
hoped that, if any assessment was used at all (only a minority felt that there should be 
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none), then it should support individual empowerment rather than function as an 
instrument of obedience to norms dictated by universities.82 A key goal was to 
increase the sense of power over one’s own world, freeing students from authoritarian 
control: ‘Most students do not feel that they are able to control their own destiny’, 
read the Educational Policy of the Australian Union of Students.83  
At the University of New England, during the Peasant’s Revolt campaign, students 
claimed some ownership over knowledge: 
It was an incredible, creative time with people writing poetry. For the first time students had 
control of something that was ours. Actually it is incredible what creativity comes out of people 
when they’re in control of even a small part of their destiny.84 
The possibilities for claiming knowledge as a kind of communal wealth and creative 
realisation prompted students taking Classical Marxism to draw their chairs together 
to complete the exam collaboratively, ‘in the true spirit of Marxism’. The university 
called the police. The students who participated spent the remainder of the exam 
period dodging officials trying to serve them legal injunctions. Challenges to 
examination posed a threat to the university’s authority and mission and the university 
took it seriously.85  
The idea of changing assessment, however, had the support of a growing cohort of 
academic staff. Indeed, an overall reduction of the proportion of examination in 
university assessment is one of the lasting legacies of the student revolutionary 
period. Universities, reviewing their assessment practices, were progressively 
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persuaded that other forms of assessment would better support student learning. If it 
did that, they believed it would also offer a more valid evaluation of student 
performance.86 Regarding student desire for independent thinking, however, 
University of Sydney philosopher Professor David Armstrong considered the shift to 
continuous assessment a Pyrrhic victory: 
Exams enable students to put off their work until the end of the year and that strikes me as an 
immensely valuable thing ... if you [have] a system of continuous assessment ... you have a 
pretty hard life. I like for the Faculty of Arts the idea that you sit around for a long time 
discussing things in coffee shops and pubs and quadrangles and anywhere else that you can get 
some seating and, finally, towards the end of the year you've got to get some work done ...  
That's a good way, I think, to conduct an Arts education; students educate each other in the 
course of this.87 
New methods that reduced the old-fashioned examination but continued to assess a 
set curriculum – indeed to do so continuously – ultimately failed to reduce the 
university’s authority over knowledge. 
Some students also turned to curriculum reform to press their case. Their focus was 
student choice. A prescribed curriculum, some students argued, could be likened to 
military conscription: 
The university has … [an] obligation to go out and speak as honestly, persuasively and precisely 
as it can to prospective members, offer an invitation and not rely on educational conscription.88 
Junior staff often agreed with the emerging ethic of student choice.89 Expanding 
opportunities for students to design part of their own curriculum by choosing more of 
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their subjects was extended, in some more radical quarters, to allowing absolute 
choice for students, removing any core requirements for study at all.90  
Arguments for curriculum choice drew on German enlightenment claims to 
lernfreiheit: the notion that students should be able to choose what they studied as a 
matter of academic freedom.91 What was new was that this type of academic freedom 
became connected in student rhetoric to participatory democracy.92 Participatory, 
rather than parliamentary, democracy was a powerful theme in radical discourse, 
informed by contemporary local literature like Carole Pateman’s 1970 book 
Participation and Democratic Theory.93 If knowledge was power, as students argued, 
curriculum choice reflected the hope that it would be distributed more evenly.94 But if 
universities clung to established curricula, students felt they needed to wrest control 
forcefully from the professorial grip. 
The struggle between an alliance of staff and student radicals and professorial control 
of knowledge was nowhere more melodramatically enacted than the Sydney 
philosophy department. A sequence of conflicts had emerged there, beginning with 
the Knopfelmacher dispute in 1965 (discussed in Chapter Two). Soon afterwards, a 
staff proposal to teach a course on Marxism-Leninism was vetoed by the department’s 
senior professor, David Armstrong. The relative power of professorial and sub-
professorial staff was the subject of ongoing tension, which escalated when a majority 
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of junior staff voted to allow all students to attend and vote at department meetings, 
despite professorial objections. A division in the department over whether there 
should be a core curriculum at all finally led the university to give permission for the 
department to split, so that for more than two decades the university hosted two 
separate philosophy departments.95 While it was most obviously divided along 
political lines, the schism was also epistemological: was knowledge constructed on 
the basis of foundational truths protected by professors or was it ideological and 
political, amenable to critique by sub-professorial staff and students?96 
Professorial authority was a vexed question for some staff and students. Professors 
had traditionally had a special status in their departments, often with sole authority 
over curriculum and appointments – what Geoffrey Serle and now student radicals 
called the ‘god-professor’.97 As departments grew with the fuel of government 
funding after the Murray report, many now had more than one professor. According 
to some students and staff this seemed a nonsense, rather like having two 
monotheistic gods. When the question was considered at Sydney University, the 
Professorial Board determined that in multi-professor departments, the most senior 
professor carried responsibility for all courses.98 It is significant that they thought 
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someone must have sole authority. And for some professors, in particular David 
Armstrong, this was a cherished responsibility.  
Armstrong’s authority – and indeed professorial authority in general – was challenged 
in 1973 when postgraduate students Liz Jacka and Jean Curthoys proposed a senior 
elective course in feminist philosophy. Although the Head of Department role had 
rotated away from him and the Sydney philosophy department had recently elected to 
experiment with participatory democracy, Armstrong still felt (as the Professorial 
Board had affirmed) that all courses were his ultimate responsibility.99 So when the 
department and then the Faculty of Arts approved ‘Philosophical Aspects of Feminist 
Thought’ he did not hesitate to call the Deputy Vice-Chancellor, William O’Neil, to 
discuss the problem. In response, O’Neil refused to sign over funding for the course. 
When members of the department protested, O’Neil referred the matter to the 
Professorial Board.100   
Once in the hands of the Professorial Board there was a problem: what did this almost 
all male body of professors know about feminism? By what authority did they 
evaluate it? In an open letter, Jacka and Curthoys argued, ‘Professor O’Neil has made 
it clear that he believes the best decisions can only be made by those with the highest 
rank.’101 They informed the Professorial Board, ‘in our case at least, your high rank in 
no way qualified you to judge the issue’, since feminist thinking was ‘an area which is 
entirely new’: 
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It is the nature of the case that we don’t have a long history in the subject. There are no 
established, recognised authorities to whom we can appeal.102 
Feminist philosophy challenged university-based knowledge. Instead of building upon 
the expertise of academic masters, it undermined the very idea of mastery itself. 
Feminism revealed, according to Readings, that ‘no individual professor can embody 
the university’, for each body was gendered and therefore not universal.103 It exposed 
the self-justifying structure of the professorial system, demonstrating that university 
professors were both creators and arbiters of knowledge.104 Collectively, professors 
need answer to no academic authority but their own and it was their own ideas that 
they were often asked to defend. In this way, professorial authority was exposed as a 
kind of mastery understood in its other sense, as dominance, rather than as command 
of expertise. For this reason, Jacka and Curthoys argued, professors constituted an 
illegitimate authority: 
The kinds of things that bodies like yours usually consider, don’t apply in this case. This, of 
course is not to argue that whether or not we are competent is unimportant or undecidable, but 
rather that you aren’t the proper people to decide it.105 
What they announced next was revolutionary. Referring to the women students of the 
Faculty of Arts and the students and staff of the philosophy department, they said: 
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We feel, then, that those who are in a position to judge our competence have already done so. 
This week we will be asking these people to demand of Professor O’Neil that we are 
immediately appointed.106 
Students, not professors, they claimed, were the legitimate adjudicators of university 
knowledge. They were, as Lyotard put it in a different context, ‘sounding the knell of 
the age of the Professor’, as the connection between the recognition universities 
granted and authority over knowledge was drawn into question.107 
This threatened more than the Professorial Board. The role of the university itself was 
to protect and validate reliable knowledge – the Professorial Board, along with 
examination, was the instrument by which reliability was authenticated. The Board 
took its job seriously. Despite approval at Faculty and department level, professors 
felt no compulsion to rubber-stamp such a decision. Vociferous debate ensued, with 
professors discussing the intellectual validity of feminism and the correctness of it 
being taught by two postgraduate students.108  
In the end it was the question of objectivity that swayed the group. Jacka and 
Curthoys had been interviewed on ABC radio. Having heard this broadcast, David 
Armstrong requested the transcript, assuring the ABC that despite its contents he was 
opposed to the very idea of libel laws and would not sue.109 But the copy in 
Armstrong’s papers in Canberra, especially prepared by him for reading to the 
Professorial Board, show that his interest was not in insults. The ABC interviewer had 
asked if the course was ‘propaganda’. The women, laughing, confirmed that they 
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were not ‘unbiased’.110 This gave a ‘different complexion’ to the course, Armstrong 
argued to his fellow professors, than the one conveyed in the course proposal.111 The 
Professorial Board agreed. They rejected employment of Jacka and Curthoys by 
thirty-nine votes to seven with the explicit goal of preventing them from teaching 
feminist philosophy.112 
The month-long strike that resulted attracted the attention of the unions and the media 
as the Sydney left flocked to support feminism. A ‘women’s tent embassy’ became a 
fixture in the Main Quad, the Builders Labourers Federation put a ‘green ban’ on the 
university (refusing to participate in any building) and the media turned its gaze to the 
issue.113 Under pressure, the University Senate appointed Justice R.M. Hope to 
investigate and make a recommendation about whether the course should proceed. He 
interviewed all interested parties and collected submissions from many members of 
the university.114 When he recommended that Jean Curthoys and Liz Jacka be 
appointed and that the course go ahead, students celebrated.115 But for universities 
across Australia, such events drew the public’s attention to the widespread changes to 
higher education that were a consequence of student radicalism. Conservative critics 
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were assembling: Peter Wetmore wrote in Quadrant that radical influences in the 
universities ‘will have serious adverse consequences for the nation’.116 
Leonie Kramer acted to alert the public, hoping to garner support to oppose the 
growing strength of the student voice. She was the only female professor at Sydney 
University at that time, Professor of Australian Literature and a close friend of both 
David Armstrong and the Vice-Chancellor, Bruce Williams. Kramer insisted that, in 
the Senate’s minutes on the outcome of the philosophy dispute, her own position on 
the philosophy strike be recorded.117 She stated that while a majority of philosophy 
academics employed at Sydney University had supported the course, a majority of 
those of professorial rank were opposed to it. The authority of professors, she argued, 
was being ignored in the university.118 The message this sent to the public was that 
the university habitually acquiesced to the demands of student ‘ratbags’. One 
newspaper opinion piece read: 
How absurd to give such a course, how presumptuous of two women graduates to suggest that 
they could give it! That’s what you get if you allow professors to have no more than one vote 
among many.119 
There were members of the public who still respected the rank of professor, believing 
it to reflect significant expertise. To them, the claims of students seemed spurious. 
More importantly, if the public could not rely upon the very people the university 
itself declared to be their most expert members, then what did this say about the 
quality and value of what the university taught and claimed?  
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Twenty-five years after the philosophy strike, just as John Howard’s government was 
introducing full fees for domestic students in the Australian higher education market, 
Jean Curthoys expressed sorrow: 
This liberal conception of the university no longer has currency…I have no time here to defend 
this liberal conception and so I shall simply say that my deep regrets about the strike concern 
the extent to which it opened the floodgates for its rejection.120 
In exposing the ideological foundation of university knowledge, students destabilized 
the structure that enabled society to trust professorial – and thus university – 
authority. ‘Clearly’, stated a News Weekly journalist, ‘standards in certain areas within 
universities are declining’.121 
Students and Society 
Student protest may have horrified many, but it also earned the admiration of others. 
Some sought to capitalise on this campus ferment. The New Left voice could be 
increasingly heard in the rhetoric of Labor politicians in State and Federal 
parliaments.122 In Federal parliament in 1969, then leader of the opposition, Gough 
Whitlam said: 
Many organised and orderly student demonstrations have been highly effective. The Australian 
conscience would not have been so stirred over Aboriginal conditions and the discreditable 
White Australia policy if it had not been for our students.123 
Student protest suggested to the left that university students might occupy a new and 
valuable civic function. 
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In Britain, Eric Ashby and Mary Anderson called them the ‘student estate’, an effort 
to legitimise young university scholars as a valuable part of any vibrant democracy.124 
This role separated students from the institutional protectionism and pragmatic 
preoccupations of the first and second estates and even from the adult worries of the 
third.125 ‘The universities’, argued Hannah Arendt, ‘make it possible for young people 
over a number of years to stand outside all social groups and obligations, to be truly 
free’.126 In university students, such approaches suggested, a new relationship 
between education and democracy was forged. Rather than preparing the informed 
citizen and the useful expert, a university education was increasingly seen as 
providing a group of dissenting voices: democracy, it was argued, needed dissent to 
assure the diversity of opinion that would offer the public sufficient political choice. 
The tendency of education to reproduce sameness would be offset, proponents of the 
student estate argued, by this tertiary educated class.127 
Emerging as a self-conscious, separate class of the Australian population, university 
students gained the support of the new Prime Minister, Gough Whitlam, elected in 
1972. In that election the age of majority and the right to vote was lowered from 
twenty-one to eighteen, literally granting a new civic role for many university-age 
people.128 The idea that universal primary and secondary education was necessary for 
citizenship was augmented, in 1970s Labor policy, by a commitment to equality of 
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educational opportunity. Many in Labor saw education as a way to engineer greater 
social and cultural, as well as economic, egalitarianism. Despite that, as Simon 
Marginson points out, there were also some on the left who saw meritocratic rule as 
the better of two evils: educational elitism was an improvement on elitism constructed 
by birth and wealth.129  
Whitlam focused on equality of choice: equal citizens in a democratic nation should 
have equal access to choices in education. This was different from Dedman’s 
population-based view in the 1940s. His approach was to slowly but systematically 
restructure access to education, prioritising merit over wealth. Whitlam’s vision was 
more focused on the individual. Citizens held an inalienable right to vote for whom 
they wished. Consumers possessed individual freedom to purchase the products they 
chose. So Australian youth should be free to choose from a suite of educational 
products. For this to be a genuine choice, education had to be free.130  
Free education was the cornerstone of an accessible and increasingly equitable 
system, according to Whitlam’s Labor government. This would ensure more active 
and vocal – but fundamentally individual – democratic participation. As Peter Karmel 
pointed out, the discourse informing higher education policy in the 1970s was that 
every citizen held the right to an education that matched her or his capability.131 
Gough Whitlam announced: 
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Everybody in Australia is entitled, without cost to the individual, to the same educational 
facilities, whether it be in respect of education at the kindergarten or tertiary stage or the post-
graduate stage.132 
In the three years of Whitlam’s short term in government, participation in higher 
education increased by nearly thirty percent, from 211,045 to 273,137 students, two-
thirds of whom received income support while none paid fees.133  
In reality, free education did not assist as many students as might be imagined, for it 
replaced a very substantial Commonwealth scholarship scheme that had enabled 
many to enter university in effect without paying fees. The increase was in part 
carried by the substantial growth in funding for universities that allowed them to take 
more students and soak up even more of the baby boomer demographic bubble.134 
Whitlam’s impact was less in what actually happened in universities than in a 
significant change in the idea of accessible higher education, symbolically (as well as 
actually) expressed in the absence of fees. It was not the mass higher education that 
was to come, but it opened that possibility.  
While Whitlam fostered the student estate, conservative citizens and politicians were 
increasingly dissatisfied with the behaviour of university students and the responses 
of the universities that hosted them. Student radicalism was often portrayed in the 
press and parliament as the shenanigans of a spoiled, ungrateful youth culture. Sydney 
Vice Chancellor Bruce Williams was not alone in blaming the misbehaviour of 
members the youthful baby boomer generation on their indulged upbringing, 
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informed, he claimed, by Dr Spock’s famous book on childrearing.135 In the Victorian 
parliament, when the resources of La Trobe University had been redirected to ‘the 
revolution’, Liberal member Max Crellin said: 
I, and no doubt every other responsible person, am wondering how long the State must put up 
with this type of occurrence. It is fair to say that the rank and file population of the State who 
are not blessed with the opportunity to attend a university are wondering what type of person – 
[interrupted].136 
His attitude was indeed representative of many. Court judges described university 
student behaviour as ‘contemptible’.137 Newspapers reported ‘riots’ in the universities 
and said that students were ‘baiting’ university administrations with frivolous 
misbehaviour.138 Parliaments noted that it was in the humanities that students rebelled 
the most, less so in science or engineering.139 Despite that, protests on campus, for 
many, tainted the sense of all students’ usefulness to society. ‘I am getting sick and 
tired’, said Victorian Premier Henry Bolte in 1971, ‘of the taxpayer carrying a lot of 
no-hopers’.140 What was the good of higher education when its students – and 
therefore graduates – were useless, spoiled and took the education society funded for 
granted? 
Resentment over the public’s contribution to the education of these students 
heightened when public money became scarce. The effects of global inflation as a 
result of the 1973 Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil 
crisis were felt from 1974. The Whitlam government, along with its support of the 
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student estate, was dismissed at the end of 1975.141 Despite the former strength and 
appeal of student life, participation in higher education began to decline. This was 
partly demographic: the last of the baby boomers trickled through the universities and 
colleges. Some decline in student supply was inevitable. This, however, did not fully 
explain it. As unemployment increased in the second half of the 1970s, the desire for 
tertiary qualifications declined, even though it was free. Universities (more than 
Colleges of Advanced Education) had acquired a reputation for irrelevance during the 
period of student radicalism.142 But this irrelevance was no longer that of a rarefied 
knowledge. In public discourse, it was irrelevance for the workplace.143 
When students started to graduate in larger numbers in a period of high 
unemployment, they could not all secure the prestigious jobs that university-educated 
employees had previously enjoyed. In the 1970s, technological development 
continued but a new economy requiring quantities of tertiary educated labour had not 
yet fully formed. Graduates were left feeling that they had studied for, but been 
denied, the right to elite employment. To those graduates, their university or college 
degree seemed as irrelevant as radical student protesters had declared, though it was a 
different kind of irrelevance.144 Educationalists and university administrators, led by 
the University of California’s Clark Kerr, started to discuss ways to demonstrate that 
tertiary degrees would be useful in a wider range of occupations. 
‘There can no longer be’, argued Kerr, ‘a one-to-one relationship between university 
attendance and employment in a “university-type” job. The job market will need to be 
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democratised’.145 He claimed that society needed to encourage more workplaces to 
consider the benefits of university-educated staff who would think differently about 
their business. The knowledge-based economy would emerge in this iterative way: as 
tertiary educated young people entered workplaces, they would change the nature of 
the work – and vice-versa.146 In the mid-1970s, this transformation was only just 
beginning, but it led Kerr to anticipate that universities would soon be even more 
fundamental to society.  
Despite the later emergence of the ‘knowledge economy’ that Kerr predicted, his 
optimism that universities would grow in importance was not borne out in the late 
1970s. Complaints about the irrelevance of higher education were not confined to 
those who graduated and had difficulty securing a good job. Despite the close 
connections between universities, government and industry since the Second World 
War, employers declared, as they would repeatedly over the next two decades, ‘our 
educational systems have developed out of touch with the requirements of industry 
and the community’.147 Pessimism about the tertiary sector set in: perhaps the age of 
the university was past? ‘I do not see’, proclaimed Ian Spicer, then director of 
Victorian Employers’ Federation, ‘the future of higher education in Australia holding 
the dominant position in education that it has had in the past’.148 
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Conclusion 
The past to which Ian Spicer referred was not that long ago. In the mid-1960s, in the 
aftermath of the Murray and Martin reports, the universities and Colleges of 
Advanced Education seemed to embody the best of what a democracy could offer its 
people. Researchers explored ideas that would benefit Australia’s technological 
development, underpin its social and economic progress and assure its political 
stability. With scholarships aplenty, higher education was open to talented students, 
regardless of their social background, although such a conclusion masked the 
inequalities built into the school system, which favoured the academic results 
purchased through access to private schools. Colleges of Advanced Education, 
however, offered a cost-effective way of making education available to more students, 
with a focus on professional skills that would assure economic prosperity for the 
nation as well as for graduates.   
Radical students and academics, however, argued that an ideological apparatus 
underpinned this utopia, destabilising the public’s faith in the inherent goodness of 
higher education and the absolute reliability of university research. They claimed that 
university knowledge was controlled and deployed for the benefit of an elite. They 
showed knowledge to be a kind of power and that teaching and examination gave 
academic staff an authority that could be exploitative. Education in its established 
form encouraged conformity, bolstering social structures that privileged some 
sections of society over others. Student revolutionary movements encouraged new 
ways of thinking about those structures, so that universities became sites for the 
growth of feminism, indigenous rights and other movements for social reform. As 
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well as transforming many aspects of university life, however, they also encouraged 
the public to question and challenge the university’s right to control knowledge.  
Those unconvinced by student radicalism – often people who also broadly derided the 
youth movement, with its ‘outlandish’ fashion, politics and new ways of speaking – 
felt that the universities were mistaken in capitulating to student demands. And yet, 
issue by issue, capitulate they did, often in very public arenas. Professorial authority 
was diminished, raising questions about the value of the expertise the university itself 
proclaimed. Vocal and disruptive students, on the other hand, were granted a respect 
and responsibility that they denied their seniors. What sort of employees would they 
one day make? 
Hopes that a new generation of students and a restructured higher education sector 
would develop into a source of social and economic reform proved illusive. 
Ironically, despite radical opposition to the financial inequalities that resulted from 
higher degrees, this was because education that made students, through their 
dissenting views, useful citizens did not, in the new economic environment, secure for 
them the level of financial success they had been led to expect. A university education 
seemed less useful and relevant than it had a decade earlier. Despite the popularity of 
Whitlam’s education reforms, by the time of the dismissal, public sentiment was 
turning. If higher education was not there to support social and economic progress, 
what was its purpose?  
 
 
 
 
 176 
Chapter Four: Knowledge Economy 1975 - 1989   
Higher education delegates from all of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) countries gathered in Paris in October 1981. They 
pondered what they felt to be their most perplexing question: what had happened to 
the respect academics used to command? New values derived from 1960s and 1970s 
radicalism had undermined many aspects of the old stratified structure within the 
universities, reducing the prominence and status of the professoriate. It was a change 
most considered to be appropriate. But the welcome inclusivity was transforming into 
something new. The delegates struggled to put their collective finger on it. Perhaps 
the expansion of the 1960s was to blame: 
It may be that with so many admitted into the temple, the mystery is gone, the secrets are out 
and former respect and awe have given way to a more cynical view of the virtues and vices of 
the priesthood.1 
Certainly, student movements of the 1960s and 1970s had exposed the characteristics 
of the academic ‘priesthood.’ Universities were no longer places in which 
unquestioned respect and awe were automatically associated with expertise. This was 
creating difficulties, however, for those academic leaders who still relied on 
established hierarchies to assert the university’s authority and importance in society. 
The OECD delegates admitted that the late 1970s had been challenging in other ways 
as well. Demographic changes (in Australia, for instance, they had finished educating 
the last of the baby boomers) led to an income plateau for universities that, over the 
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previous two decades had become accustomed to growth.2 Moreover, when the 
Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) cut production and tripled the 
price of oil, high inflation globally meant government financial resources, essential 
for funding public institutions such as universities, were severely straitened.3 
Delegates from many member countries reported that their governments, forced to 
make ruthless decisions about funding priorities, publicly questioned if higher 
education had genuine value to the nation. There was a ‘real danger’, they agreed, that 
if the current crisis in public confidence in higher education continued, the university 
‘could be seriously and perhaps irretrievably compromised’.4  
In Australia, the OPEC oil crisis and the 1975 dismissal of the Whitlam government 
prompted a re-evaluation of traditional economic strategies – Keynesian economics 
seemed to offer no solution to the then unique combination of high inflation (leading 
to high wages) and low productivity (leading to high unemployment), a situation that 
became known as ‘stagflation’.5 Liberal Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser, who had 
long believed that Australia needed to be weaned from its ‘handout mentality’, argued 
that government could not spend its way out of recession.6 Lowering inflation, Fraser 
maintained, was the government’s key economic target. His priority, then, was to cut 
public expenditure, particularly where it was not currently contributing to the nation’s 
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economic productivity.7 As a result, higher education investment under Fraser was 
contingent, he announced, on its positive contribution to the Australian economy.8  
The Liberal Fraser government’s actions to align higher education to economic goals 
had a lasting impact in setting the terms of the debate that would follow, even though 
Fraser struggled to implement the full set of his proposed reforms. The election of the 
Labor Hawke government in 1983, however, did not turn back the tide of liberal 
economic reform. In fact, it accelerated it, with profound consequences for 
universities. Keen to shed their association with Whitlam’s reputation for poor 
economic management, members of the Hawke government concentrated on fiscal 
responsibility and economic reform. In December 1983, Hawke floated the dollar, 
formally connecting, through international market evaluation of Australian currency, 
domestic industry to the global economy. It was essential to Hawke’s plans that 
structural transformations in the Australian economy be achieved rapidly to ensure 
that Australia adapted to changes in international trade. Australia, Labor argued, 
needed to diversify exports and protect itself from international price fluctuations in 
agricultural products and minerals. Increased productivity was required to lower both 
inflation and unemployment. Australian industry and commerce needed to adapt to an 
international marketplace. In this context, the Hawke government sought changes to 
higher education that would support Australian businesses to modernise and flourish 
in a global economy.9  
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In this environment of economic reform, university leaders were confronted with 
significant challenges. Sustaining their sense of independence and protecting 
cherished academic traditions were increasingly difficult when higher education was 
becoming a subject for scrutiny and debate, with conclusions that were often far from 
favourable. Public criticisms found a new vehicle in Rupert Murdoch’s Higher 
Education Supplement, added weekly to The Australian newspaper in 1980.10 ‘More 
scholar for the dollar’ was the headline emblazoned in that publication, a catch-phrase 
for the decade that captured a widespread belief that universities should increase their 
efficiency and their worth to the public.11 
Staff in universities, Colleges of Advanced Education and Institutes of Technology 
were not immune to this public debate. While higher education’s connections to 
economic growth had been mounting for decades, now was the time, academics and 
institutional administrators found, to settle on the appropriate type of relationship 
universities and these other institutions should have to the national economy. Opinion 
across the academic community, however, was divergent. While an increasing 
number were persuaded that universities needed to take a more market-oriented 
approach, teaching and producing research that had tangible commercial value, others 
sought to retain Whitlam’s policies of free education and academic and institutional 
autonomy.12 The issues were debated and published by university leaders, staff and 
students in the media and in a growing number of scholarly works that focused on 
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higher education. Libraries bulge with their reports, reviews, comments and responses 
as all segments of the tertiary sector grappled with an era of reform.  
Subsequent reflections and analyses of university and political decisions in 
transforming higher education in the 1980s focus on the growth of market values in 
university decision structures. Peter Karmel – a ‘godfather’ of higher education 
policy, contributing to every review between Murray’s in 1957 and Bradley’s in 2008, 
the last submission just months before his death – considered, on reflection, the 
installation of market forces did not go far enough to justify the loss of institutional 
autonomy. Karmel strongly criticised increased government control of higher 
education, but on the other hand, he thought that the university system would improve 
if it was regulated by student choice in a market, though he hoped student fees would 
be paid in the form of government-subsidised vouchers.13  
Simon Marginson is one of the most prominent scholarly critics of the shift towards 
the market that occurred in this period. During the 1980s he was employed as a 
research officer for the Federation of Australian University Staff Associations 
(FAUSA) and his submissions and letters appeared regularly in the Higher Education 
Supplement.14 In the 1990s, Marginson published several critiques of education policy 
in Australia, particularly focused on the reforms of the 1980s. He described structural 
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transformations, resulting from new government policy, which shifted higher 
education’s perceived value away from public good towards private gain.15 
Government priorities increasingly influenced university structures, he later argued 
with Mark Considine. In response to the Labor government’s economic liberalism, 
senior administrators sought to mirror the values that government expounded by 
making changes to their management and decision systems, establishing small 
executive teams that were more flexible and responsive to change.16  This approach, 
Marginson and Considine argue, undermined the collegial constitution of the 
academic community.17 Instead, academic staff behaviour was increasingly regulated 
by executive and budgetary power.18   
Marginson and Considine attribute the entry of market values into the universities to 
the growing influence of neoliberalism in public policy and debate.19 A small number 
of neoliberal thinkers such as Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman had for decades, 
in the face of Keynesian orthodoxy, promoted the market as the ideal basis for the 
economy and society, provided it was unimpeded by government regulation.20 
Friedman embarked on an active mission of political and economic reform through 
public relations, political networking and through the reputedly substantial influence 
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of the many hundreds of free market economists who graduated from the University 
of Chicago’s School of Economics, where Friedman taught.21  
In particular, Friedman attacked the notion of the ‘public interest’, challenging claims 
that politicians and public servants could act in any but their own interest. Since the 
public interest was a myth, according to Friedman, the assertion of self-interest, 
through the market, must be the foundation of a politically and economically free 
society.22 The failure of Keynesian economics to address the consequences of the 
1970s oil ‘shocks’ gave Friedman’s ideas a new relevance, leading to their rapid 
acceptance in government policy internationally.23 Embraced by Margaret Thatcher’s 
British government in 1979 and by United States President Ronald Reagan in 1980, 
neoliberalism was also propagated through the growing number of ‘think-tanks’ in 
Australia and around the world.24 Friedman’s book Free to Choose, published in 
1980, was highly influential in popular debate, followed as it was by the opportunity, 
as his wife described it, to ‘preach the doctrine of human freedom’ in a ten-episode 
television series.25 
In this environment – where old ideas of public good seemed to offer few 
contributions of value to the new suite of economic problems –  universities became 
increasingly focused on their own self-interest. The ‘entrepreneurial university’, 
Michael Gallagher argued from his position in the Department of Education, Training 
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and Youth Affairs, was only partly a result of government policy. Market ‘pull’ also 
lured university leaders who saw advantages in a shift in priorities towards the 
market.26 There is some question, Gallagher’s analysis suggests, about whether 
university leaders were pushed into an entrepreneurial world, or whether they jumped 
into it voluntarily. The question is paralleled by ambivalence among scholarly 
accounts about the role of government in forcing economic deregulation and market 
responsiveness, for the reforms of the period also resulted in a considerable, indeed 
often meticulously detailed, increase in government control of higher education.27 To 
a number of scholars, this seemed contradictory. For both Anthony Welch and Simon 
Marginson, for example, government ‘centrism’, or the centralised and increasingly 
close regulation of higher education that resulted from Labor policy, was not 
commensurate with the government’s apparent desire, informed by free market 
economics, for a deregulated ‘market’ for education and research.28 The confluence of 
government control and market deregulation points to a potential distinction in 
government policy between the university and knowledge in which government 
sought increased control over institutions and their research priorities, but at the same 
time encouraged them to trade the products of their work in a free and open 
marketplace. 
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1975-1983: The Fraser Response 
After the 1975 election of the Liberal-National coalition led by Malcolm Fraser, a 
review of higher education was commissioned to consider how the government might 
reform universities to encourage research and teaching of greater economic utility. 
University of Sydney Vice-Chancellor and academic economist Bruce Williams 
chaired the committee, which reported in 1979. Minister for Education John Carrick 
praised this review, declaring: 
The comprehensive report of the Committee will be a source of substantial influence over 
developments in education and its interaction with the world of work for the remainder of the 
20th century.29 
Despite this claim, the Williams report is hardly remembered, neglected even in its 
author’s autobiography.30 This bulky, two-volume review of Australian education was 
nevertheless influential for, while it did not advocate radical change, instead 
reinforcing many of the conclusions of the 1965 Martin Report, it provided the 
government with the data and analysis it needed to address connections between 
higher education and the economy.31  
The most urgent issue, given the economic environment, was that higher education 
seemed too costly. Student demand had plummeted. Growth of eight to nine percent 
had been the norm, but in 1979 it had dropped to just over two percent and was to fall 
even further in the 1980s.32 In response, many believed there to be too many 
universities. Some critics argued that Griffith, Murdoch and Deakin universities 
should never have been established, but Williams pointed out that there had been no 
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way of knowing that, soon after they were built, both the economy and student 
demand would fall. Williams’s evaluation of the need for constraint was offset by his 
long-term vision – Australia might have too many universities right now, he argued, 
but with projected growth in student participation in the 1980s and 1990s they would 
soon be required.33 His approach demonstrates a shift in the government’s way of 
evaluating educational need. Policy, even after the Martin Review, had for the 
previous fifteen years considered higher education to be a right possessed by the 
individual citizen. Williams, by contrast, made it a question of economic and 
demographic trends. This tightening of the connection between higher education and 
the economy initiated a new type of public debate about universities. Increasingly, 
Australian politicians began to argue that higher education had two primary purposes: 
workforce planning and economic growth. While thus reflecting the government’s 
desire for instrumentalism, in relying on the category of growing student demand, the 
Williams report nevertheless still considered higher education an investment in 
nation-building. 
The Liberal Fraser government agreed with Williams that higher education was 
central to national development. John Carrick applauded Williams’s vision:  
[It is] the most comprehensive examination ever undertaken in Australia into the provision of 
education facilities and services for individual development and into the relationship between 
the education system and the labour market.34  
Despite the powerful argument for linking universities to economic growth, Prime 
Minister Malcolm Fraser discussed the Williams report in language that demonstrated 
a preoccupation, in the immediate post-Whitlam period, with short-term financial 
thrift. Government would not support broad increased participation in higher 
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education, Fraser suggested, declaring that ‘plans for growth in the number of 
students should be related to prospective growth in gross domestic product’.35  
Growth, however, needed to be balanced against other trends in the employment 
market, according to the Williams Report. High unemployment and large numbers of 
graduates had led to ‘credentialism’: jobs that did not ‘really’ need tertiary 
qualifications now required them.36 Clark Kerr, President of the University of 
California and author of the widely read The Uses of the University had argued that 
this needed to happen, that society and economies would be transformed (producing 
the ‘knowledge economy’) as degree-holders moved into previously less educated 
fields.37 But with less public money on hand, now such change seemed wasteful. Free 
education should be made more sparingly available. Students, Williams argued, 
should receive only socially necessary education, not the surplus education possible in 
times of affluence.38 Nevertheless, a modest increase in student participation would be 
necessary to assure economic growth.39 New students should be recruited only to skill 
areas required by the struggling economy, not in traditional disciplines like Arts and 
Science.40  
From this perspective, efficiency was key. Fraser’s strategy was to plan for 
constrained growth, using Menzies’ binary framework to this end: 
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Most of the expansion in numbers in the Committee's projection - which is based on an assumed 
two per cent annual growth in productivity - should be accommodated in colleges of advanced 
education and technical and further education.41 
The critical question, given the overall Federal budget situation, was how to fund 
even small increases in enrolments. Fraser intended to offset that expansion, to the 
consternation of many members of the public, by reintroducing student fees.42 
In addition to increased efficiency, Fraser also sought to cut expenditure. Reducing 
operating costs would, alongside new student fees, facilitate the modest expansion the 
Williams report predicted without straining the government’s financial resources. The 
government reduced recurrent funding and restructured the Colleges of Advanced 
Education, forcing them to amalgamate, believing a smaller number of larger 
institutions would be more efficient.43 
This complemented Fraser’s third approach, which was to seek new efficiencies in the 
system. Tenure (the security of continuing academic employment) was now a target 
for reform. New employment structures, free of tenure, dozens of conservative voices 
thundered, would encourage increased efficiencies.44 Three separate inquiries into 
tenure took place between 1979 and 1983. Rational choice theory, one of the key 
tenets of neoliberalism, was growing in popularity as a means for explaining both 
human behaviour and economic patterns.45 This theory insisted that when 
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employment was secure, the only rational choice was to do as little as possible.46 
None of the enquiries, however, affirmed the theory. Abolishing tenure would ‘not 
solve the problems of incompetent, lazy or disaffected staff’, found the 1982 Standing 
Committee on the Tenure of Academics. Its members were impressed with 
academics, despite rumours: 
The one point I would like to make is that the various accusations that were made that a lot of 
academics are bludgers was not proved to my satisfaction in any form.47 
Belief in rational choice theory, however, was taking such hold that another inquiry 
was initiated within the year. 
The academic staff associations, goaded by the threat to Whitlam’s education policies, 
took action. As a result of the expansion in higher education in the 1960s, staff unions 
now had many more members than when they had tackled the Ward and Orr cases. 
Now, large numbers of academics protested the ‘razor rule’ of Fraser’s forced 
amalgamations and funding cuts, threatening that universities would refuse to collect 
fees if government imposed them.48 Student unions joined staff to demonstrate. Vice-
Chancellors (‘among the least militant members of the community’, Labor politician 
Peter Milton pointed out in parliament) actively supported these demonstrations.49 
Protest was effective. Whitlam was gone, but for many in the community the 
principles of free education were now considered sacrosanct, fuelling resistance to 
Fraser’s reform attempts. 
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1983-1987: Susan Ryan’s Approach 
In 1983 Australians elected a new Federal Labor government, led by Prime Minister 
Bob Hawke. Hawke sought immediately to assure the nation of his credentials as an 
economic manager and to depict his party as reformers, with a focus on economic 
adjustment.50 Hawke and his Treasurer, Paul Keating, presented themselves as 
modernisers, bringing economic policy to the forefront of government business to 
reassure the public, particularly the business community, that their economic 
management would lead to tangible financial benefits. To achieve this, they were 
convinced that they needed to distance themselves from the public perception of fiscal 
irresponsibility associated with the Whitlam period. As most of Hawke’s ministry had 
been in parliament during the Whitlam years, the ‘dismissal’ was an ever present scar 
they were desperate to heal. ‘As a matter of style as well as substance’, explained the 
new Minister for Education, Senator Susan Ryan, ‘Cabinet was determined to reject 
anything that smacked of Whitlamism’.51  
Fiscal restraint was thus a priority, but for Ryan and her Labor colleagues the greater 
concern was the long-term economic challenge.52 Refocusing universities towards 
national priorities, Labor believed, was crucial. Higher education could only expect 
growth, warned Ryan, if it helped support government goals.53 In seeking to direct the 
attention of universities to the nation, Ryan commissioned a review of Australian-
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focused content across all institutions.54 This was a radical step, given the traditional 
character of Australian university education. Australian universities, until the 1970s, 
had been ‘oriented to Britain’.55 Many staff had originated or been trained there. This, 
and earlier tendencies to identify England as the source of culture, had led Australian 
academics to see British universities as the benchmark for quality curricula.56 It was 
time, Ryan’s review argued, for Australian universities to teach what was relevant to 
Australia.57 The fact that this aligned with Ryan’s personal interest in Australian 
literature was, for her, a bonus.58 There was indeed a boom – in hindsight short-lived 
– in Australian Studies in the 1980s and 1990s, although as Ann Curthoys noted, it is 
difficult to evaluate how much of that change is attributable to the report itself.59 
Demands for increased relevance in universities, however, could not be met just by 
Australianising existing curricula. Since Australian industry and commerce needed to 
adjust to the demands of its connection to the global economy, critics argued that it 
was more important for the system to address the needs of Australian business.60 
Business and economics graduates would be needed to do the analysis and planning 
structural adjustment required. Science and technology would assure industrial 
competiveness.61 Research was the substance that would underpin the needed 
productivity increases, though university research was not the only answer. Senator 
John Button, the Federal Minister for Industry and Commerce, put in place incentives 
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for industrial research and development, which helped quell the critics of Australian 
universities who argued that higher education was ill-equipped for research that 
would support economic goals.62 The sector’s irrelevance to business, argued its 
would-be reformers, was a result of the kind of staff the system supported: elite 
scholars pursuing useless topics. The Higher Education Supplement focused on 
rumours of lazy, layabout dons who spent now scarce public funds conducting 
‘hobby’ research.63   
‘Hobby’ research became the subject of political scrutiny. In 1986 the Federal 
opposition enacted a ‘waste watch committee’ that among other things targeted 
apparently profligate research projects approved under the Australian Research Grants 
Scheme. In parliament, academic research became the object of ridicule: 
The Waste Watch Committee… pointed out last week a large number of grants which it 
suggested may well be inappropriate at a time when Australia is in such an economic crisis. 
These grants [included] matters of immediate moment such as motherhood in ancient  
Rome.64 
The academic response sometimes reinforced suspicions held by politicians that 
scholars looked down on them, claiming public money as a right rather than a 
privilege to be repaid through advances in knowledge and useful inventions. As the 
committee explained: 
Members of the Waste Watch Committee were attacked as being philistines for daring to 
suggest that the academic community might well have imposed upon it the same restraint in 
financial terms that the rest of society is being obliged to bear.65 
                                                
62 Jane Ford, ‘Science No Panacea to Industry: Button’, HES, 29 November 1985. Senator John Button 
‘Industry Research and Development Bill’, CPD (Senate),  6 June 1986. 
63 For example, Hamilton, ‘The Challenge Is to Do Better with Less’ HES, 2 April 1980. ‘A Bigger 
Bang out of Every Buck’ HES, 25 June 1980. Bremer, ‘Britain Facing an End to Enlightenment’, HES, 
17 February 1982. Johnson, ‘Academics Far Too “Selfish'”’, HES, 12 May 1982.  
64 Senator Michael Baume, ‘Australian Research Grants Scheme: Report on Grants Approved for 
1987.’ CPD (Senate), 18 March 1987. 
 192 
Both sides of parliament agreed that government funding should no longer be a blank 
cheque to support whatever research academics felt inclined to pursue. Research, they 
believed, should have an observable impact. Even if academics were doing more than 
pursuing ‘hobbies’, in straitened circumstances they should be willing to prioritise 
their work for the benefit of the nation and if not, funding bodies should clearly do so. 
‘There is no reason at all’, said one Liberal Senator, ‘why…the academic community 
should be in any way exempt from bearing its share of the burden…[of] restraint in 
government expenditure. That restraint is accepted by the Government and the 
Opposition alike.’66 
Financial restraint was not, at that time, commensurate with universities’ reputations. 
Academics had become associated with the worst of public service inefficiencies.67 
This struck a chord with a deeper public disaffection with those whose livelihood was 
funded through the public purse. Disdain for the performance of the public service, 
derived from Milton Friedman’s criticisms internationally, was affirmed in popular 
culture through such media as the BBC series Yes, Minister, which exposed a public 
service that was self-serving, inward looking and wasteful.68  
The public needed to be reassured that government would take such apparent 
wastefulness seriously. Susan Ryan was pressured, she later recounted, to make 
widespread market-based reforms to higher education, but she remained ambivalent.69 
Nonetheless, the pressure was mounting and she asked Hugh Hudson, then chair of 
the Commonwealth Tertiary Education Commission, to conduct a review of 
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efficiency and effectiveness in higher education. Released at the end of 1986, for 
would-be reformers, the report was a disappointment.70 Instead of affirming their 
conviction that Whitlam’s policies had made the universities fat and indolent, the 
report said: 
There have been substantial improvements in the efficiency and effectiveness of higher 
education over the last decade. On the other hand, the scale and rate of change, coupled with the 
pressure on resources have also had its effect. To some extent, morale has been affected and 
standards reduced.71 
The report seemed a symptom of the system’s disease, not a diagnosis. Susan Ryan 
and the Commonwealth Tertiary Education Commission, it was whispered in the 
corridors of public service buildings across Canberra, were altogether too cosy with 
the universities.72  
These approaches led Labor powerbrokers to identify Ryan as an ‘unreconstructed 
Whitlam supporter’, an indication of her too-soft approach to the universities and her 
unwillingness to move on to the harder, economic-rationalist policies of the 
government.73 Struggling to sustain her position, she joined then Minister for Trade, 
John Dawkins, in implementing a recommendation recently released by the 
Department of Foreign Affairs: the universities were invited to offer fee-paying 
courses to international students.74 The goal was to convert higher education from a 
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public liability to a publicly owned asset by establishing an export market for 
university education. If higher education could become a key exporter, argued 
Australian National University economist Helen Hughes, a prominent supporter of the 
scheme, it would improve both the national balance of trade and the perceived 
economic contribution of Australian universities.75 As well as supporting the 
economy through relevant teaching and research, higher education would help 
diversify exports by becoming one themselves.76 Moreover, by tying university 
income to international student demand, universities would become more responsive 
to global economic trends.77  
Helen Trinca, editor of the Higher Education Supplement, reflected widespread 
opinion within the universities by describing the policy as an ‘experiment in 
privatisation’: 
It is something of an off shore coup for the free-marketeers in higher education, a dry-run for 
deregulation, if you like, that could well spill over to the domestic system.78 
Susan Ryan was uncomfortable with the proposal, but hoped it was a compromise that 
would prevent fees spreading like a contagion through the rest of the system.79 What 
she found especially irksome about discussion around establishing an international 
export market was that it added volume to the privatisation lobby. Privatisation was 
becoming a popular preoccupation: ‘It seemed that the tag ‘private’ could justify 
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almost any inefficiency’, Ryan reflected in the 1990s, ‘publicly funded had to mean 
inefficient, unaffordable, low standard’.80 
Free Market Critics 
Don Watts, Director of the Western Australian Institute for Technology, 
enthusiastically advocated privatisation in higher education. ‘Education in Australia, 
in the absence of even a modest fee, provides no real contractor-customer 
relationship’, he argued.81 ‘The institutions simply are not accountable to a market. 
Students, the real market, have no incentive to question institutional performance.’82  
Watts was the most prominent of the neoliberal lobby in higher education. His 
position was based on his belief in a connection between exchange value and the 
public value of education: 
In commercially-minded societies almost everything has a price and thus a value. There is clear 
evidence that the Australian society does not understand the value of education. This is not 
surprising. Goods obtained by gift are difficult to place in an ordered system of values.83 
In enhancing public perception of the value of higher education by equating it to a 
personal financial cost, its actual value would also be enhanced, according to Watts. 
Competition between institutions for fee income would compel them to produce 
courses that were higher in quality and more relevant to the workforce.84 
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He was not alone in believing that a lack of competition was no good for university 
quality. ‘The universities are essentially large-scale worker-cooperatives funded by 
the state’, proclaimed prominent free market advocates Richard Blandy and Judith 
Sloane at the Monash Centre for Policy Studies: ‘sheltered workshops for 
intellectuals.’ 85 An increasing number of voices like Blandy’s and Sloane’s, both 
inside and outside the universities were at the forefront of new ideas, caught up in the 
global momentum of neoliberal thinking. On the basis of Friedman’s claim that public 
institutions would always behave in self-interested ways, neoliberal theory claimed 
that quality and efficiency would only result from their widespread deregulation, 
subjecting them to the rigours of competition and consumer demand.86 Rather than 
centralised government planning, neoliberals argued that the public would be better to 
put their trust in private property, open markets and free trade, securing higher 
productivity and assuring the best possible performance in the economy.87 Higher 
education might be good for the public, they argued, but public subsidisation 
interfered with the value system that a market economy would supply, a system they 
believed would better regulate quality.88  
Stories highlighted in the Higher Education Supplement drew sustenance from 
neoliberal theory. The Supplement idealised a more entrepreneurial academic, a new 
breed that would meet the challenges of the late twentieth century. ‘Professor Michael 
Porter’, for example, ‘sees himself as very much outside the mould of your average 
academic. He adopts the entrepreneur’s approach to research and seems to revel in the 
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pursuit of commissioned research funds’.89 In the Supplement’s pages, a contrast was 
subtly evoked between the staid, aristocratic bumbling of an antique, cloistered and 
(perhaps worst of all) British tradition of scholarship and the fast-paced, can-do 
innovation deemed to be characteristic of the American universities.90 This new-world 
scholar actively sought links to (and funding from) industry, focusing their research to 
the needs of markets.91 In the United States, Supplement articles repeatedly argued, 
less tenure made academics ‘more competitive and aggressive’, attributes not 
traditionally associated with scholarship, but necessary, the Murdoch press contended, 
for the next phase of university history.92  
In the pages of the Higher Education Supplement, the entrepreneurial academic was 
shown battling against the bureaucratic traditionalism of universities. Science 
journalist Jane Ford wrote of one ‘rebel professor’ who was leaving the university 
system for a ‘lucrative’ position in pharmaceuticals – though not, she wrote, because 
it paid better: 
‘The system is dead’, he says, ‘there is no vision, no management competence, no measure of 
performance, no original thought and no realisation of the needs of the real world.’ The basic 
problems were a lack of reward for performance, the destructive effect of the tenure system, the 
lack of interest in technology transfer and an aversion to becoming involved with industry.93 
Like that rebel professor, neoliberal economists felt that they struggled to have their 
arguments heard. Frustrated, academic economist Jon Stanford declared in 1986 that 
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‘education is an economic commodity and should be treated as such’.94 Helen Hughes 
considered hers to be a campaign against organised resistance. She was convinced 
that using the market to regulate universities would enhance quality, but that it would 
do so by compelling academics to work harder: 
Those whose interests were at risk were mobilising their defences [she said], because they were 
protecting past privilege. They were well organised, highly articulate and literate.95 
Cosseted by tenure, a shift toward an educational free market was a hard reality she 
believed academics resisted out of self-interest. 
A willingness to embrace the market thus demonstrated confidence in one’s academic 
and institutional performance, according to neoliberal logic. Accepting financial 
incentives rather than government control, argued Don Watts, was to commit to a 
more efficient university. Under such a system, universities would engage more 
effectively with society and address urgent economic imperatives. To this end, Watts 
lobbied for the creation of a private sector in higher education. The success of 
Australia’s private schools in attracting the children of parents willing to pay for 
quality schooling convinced him that such a strategy would also succeed at tertiary 
level.96 
Susan Ryan was opposed to privatisation on the basis of her commitment to equity.97 
Furthermore, along with her Labor colleagues, she also believed privatisation added 
no new value to the tertiary system. If private funding was to enter higher education, 
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she argued, it should go to public universities, relieving the treasury.98 For this reason, 
Labor did not support Australia’s first private university, named after notorious 1980s 
entrepreneur, Alan Bond.99 Bond Corporation proposed the university in mid-1986, 
committing $125 million to stage one, with a view to enrolling 800 to 1000 students 
in 1989. Don Watts was to be its first vice-chancellor.100 Susan Ryan spoke against it:  
The stated aims of the Bond proposal are to attract private money in higher education, to bring 
industry and education into a profitable partnership and to tap the market for wealthy overseas 
students. All of these things can be done, and are being done, by our public institutions….The 
Bond proposal offers nothing new or constructive in these areas.101 
Bond, however, like every other university outside Canberra, was created by an Act 
of the State government (in this case Queensland), and the objections of Federal 
politicians did not prevent its existence.102 
The practice of privatisation, however, was more troubled than it was in theory. 
Commercial income did not easily offset the expense of establishing a world-class 
university overnight. Bond’s poorly stocked library would scrape by on interlibrary 
loan agreements, but undergraduate science had to be cancelled at the last minute, due 
to insufficient equipment.103 Attracting students, amidst talk that Bond was for the 
rich and stupid, proved difficult. Watts was placed in the awkward position of 
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claiming that student income support, even in a private university, was a civic right. 
This position, at least on the surface, seemed to contradict his vocal stance on tuition 
fees.104 Despite the struggles, Bond University managed to open its doors in May 
1989, with around three hundred students. 
Simultaneously, Watts announced that the university was having short-term 
difficulties meeting its operating costs. He arranged an $80 million bridging loan in 
anticipation of a $200 million, fourteen-year loan, relinquishing the original plan to 
break even within four years. In August 1989 Bond University ‘promised to pay its 
bills’.105 This was more than its patron would achieve. By October, Alan Bond’s $1.6 
billion of debt was exposed, a portent of Bond Corporation’s collapse and Alan 
Bond’s eventual imprisonment.106 While the university did better than the man, it was 
some time before Bond University could extricate itself from difficulties.107 Shortly 
after being labelled ‘Captain of the Titanic’ – he was still saying that everything was 
fine – Watts resigned from Bond University, in 1990.108  
Bond University had been unable to live up to its own fanfare.109 Watts had certainly 
talked it up. ‘A degree from Harvard opens doors. In just a few years a degree from 
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Bond University will do the same’, read the university’s first advertisements.110 Never 
again would Bond use this strategy, based as it was on Watts’s faith that the cost of 
education would be universally associated with its worth. The public university 
tradition in Australia was strongly ingrained. Potential students who did not think of 
themselves as consumers had not yet learned to connect price to value.  
Other privatisation initiatives met with mixed success. Competition from the partially 
privatised Melbourne business school under Vice-Chancellor David Penington led to 
the failure of the private Tasman University.111 Melbourne University Private, an 
initiative of a later Vice-Chancellor, lasted only seven years after inflicting substantial 
financial losses on its public parent.112 An Australian version of the large American 
private Catholic university, Notre Dame, was given a grant of land in the 1980s, but it 
struggled financially through the 1990s, finally succeeding through the generosity of 
the Catholic community and, like Bond University, receiving Commonwealth-
subsidised enrolments. This removed its reliance on tuition fees – and much of its 
financial distinction from public universities.113 Other private initiatives in the 1980s, 
such as William E. Simon University, failed, or struggled to the point of failure or 
near-failure in subsequent decades.114 
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Privatisation was still in its early stages when government policy changed direction. 
Susan Ryan had repeatedly showed herself unwilling to fully embrace calls for 
student fees, deregulation, managerial reform or competitive funding. While the 
system had been opened to fee-paying international students, Ryan’s reluctance to 
implement full-scale reform cost her politically. After the 1987 election she was 
moved sideways. The new minister, John Dawkins, took over an expanded portfolio 
that included education, training and industrial relations.  
The Dawkins Revolution 
Seven people received phone calls or visits from Dawkins or one of his senior staff 
members shortly after he was made minister, seeking their opinion on higher 
education reform. ‘I knew every one of them’, political scientist Don Aitkin said: they 
had a lot in common. Dawkins was keen to by-pass traditional avenues of advice. ‘If 
he’d asked for advice on research’ in the normal way, according to Aitkin, ‘he’d get it 
from eight different areas and they’d all disagree. What’s the use of that?’115  
Hugh Hudson, suddenly finding that he and his efficiency and effectiveness report 
had been marginalised in Canberra, ‘outed them’, scoffing at Dawkins’s ‘Purple 
Circle’: a name that stuck.116 Helen Hughes and Don Watts joined Don Aitkin from 
the Australian National University, Robert H.T. Smith from the University of Western 
Australia, Mal Logan from Monash, Jack Barker from Ballarat College of Advanced 
Education and Brian Smith from the Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology over 
dinner to plan the reform of Australia’s higher education sector.117 Red wine flowed, 
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fuelling conversation. Don Watts – still yet to suffer the launch of Bond University – 
was as irrepressible in person as he had long been on paper: discussion was lively in 
any room he inhabited. Dawkins’s staff member Paul Hickey abstained, taking the 
notes that would become the Green Paper. Drafts of it were circulated on more sober 
days, when there was time to reflect. When everyone agreed, it was released.118 
The publication of the Dawkins Green and White papers and their reception by the 
universities, Colleges of Advanced Education, Institutes of Technology and the staff 
associations is well known.119 The moment of the Dawkins reforms and their 
consequences are recounted and memorialised by the higher education sector like a 
kind of perverted Bastille Day. The key reforms were designed to facilitate a shift in 
Australia’s economic foundations towards ‘human resources and labour force skills’, 
assuring success in the international marketplace.120 Only then would Australia be a 
‘clever country’, an aspiration that Dawkins claimed he fed to Bob Hawke.121 
To achieve this, Dawkins initiated development of a much larger sector, educating 
many more undergraduate students in a model that resembled Clark Kerr’s anticipated 
foundation for the knowledge economy.122 To make this expansion towards a mass 
system of higher education affordable, he also compelled institutions to pursue 
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economies of scale.123 Ending the binary system, Dawkins forced smaller institutions 
to amalgamate, creating the capacity for expansion in participation while at the same 
time increasing the number of universities in Australia by sixteen, to a total of thirty-
four.124 Student growth was rapid. Whereas in 1987 higher education institutions 
enrolled 393,734 students (less than 4,000 more than in the previous year), in 1988 
there were 420,850 growing to 534,510 by 1991 and 634,094 by 1996.125 
Such expansion, according to the government’s funding priorities, could not be 
supplied solely from the public purse. A new system of tertiary fees was created, 
known as the Higher Education Contribution Scheme. The scheme, designed by 
Bruce Chapman for the Wran Committee on higher education funding, was 
essentially a graduate tax. The fee was Commonwealth-subsidised and state regulated 
and would only be repaid at a rate deemed reasonable to a graduate’s earnings – and 
never at all if they did not reach the income threshold or if they moved permanently 
overseas.126 The staff associations were disappointed for, unlike Labor, they had 
retained an insistence on free education.127 Many in Labor, by contrast, had for some 
time been concerned that public funding of university degrees drew on the taxes of all 
to systematise financial and social privilege for the university educated. In 1988 they 
removed free tertiary education from the party platform, supporting the 
implementation of tuition fees, moderated by equity measures.128 Despite having 
lobbied for tuition fees for some time, Don Watts was disappointed with the scheme: 
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Thinking parents will surely make sacrifices now rather than allow their children to inherit a tax 
liability.129 
Even without the contractor-customer relationship that Watts sought, Dawkins 
nevertheless anticipated that in a more competitive environment, institutions would 
diversify their course offerings and escalate their efforts to attract students. After the 
end of the binary system, they would do so, he hoped, on a level playing field, 
responding to market signals derived from student perception of the job market, 
improving their performance in providing quality, relevant and useful education.130 
Further incentives to respond to market signals were embedded in the deregulation of 
postgraduate coursework. Universities were already increasingly responsive to 
international trends through their growing reliance on international fee income.131  
But in seeking new fee income from postgraduate coursework, universities would 
expand their professional training, upgrading the skills of the existing educated 
workforce.132 In so doing, they would assist in the restructure of the Australian 
economy towards a system based on innovation and resourcefulness. This would lead 
to a more flexible workforce, Dawkins argued, augmenting the nation’s capacity to 
respond creatively to global economic changes, rather than being paralysed by its 
threat.133  
Structuring universities’ responsiveness by connecting their viability to market trends 
would, according to neoliberal philosophy, also require that higher education be 
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separated from government regulation.134 It seemed consistent with the dissolution of 
the Commonwealth Tertiary Education Commission, which had been established by 
Whitlam to facilitate the expanded role of the Federal government in tertiary 
funding.135 The Tertiary Education Commission, however, like the Australian 
Universities Commission that it replaced, was seen by those in higher education 
(particularly Peter Karmel) as a buffer between government and higher education, 
assuring the universities’ relative autonomy.136 The new National Board of 
Employment, Education and Training was instead explicitly minister-controlled.137 It 
was this that Peter Karmel most decried, describing the government’s act to take 
control of higher education as nothing short of a revolution.138   
The final reform of the Dawkins scheme was a realignment of university research to 
government and market priorities. A system of allocating government research funds 
on a competitive basis was developed in the hope that competition would also 
encourage higher quality research.139 This competitive research funding was obtained 
through a clawback of $65 million of recurrent university income, reallocating it to 
the whole system (now including the former colleges) on a competitive basis, 
evaluated by their relevance to ‘national needs’. The Australian Research Council was 
established to administer it, led by Don Aitkin, Purple Circle member who had for 
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some years advocated research funding reform.140 It had started with his ‘road to 
Damascus’ moment: 
I was beginning to react as a political scientist to the notion that I found everywhere in the 
universities that this was their money. It’s not. It actually comes from taxpayers. There has been 
an agreement that some of the taxpayer’s money will go to research because - we’re excellent? 
No! Because it is in their interest…it will lead to, in some tangible, definable way, a better 
Australia, a better society for them.141 
Aitkin’s belief in the specific and tangible civic role of university research shaped his 
contributions to the Dawkins green paper. National priorities to inform research 
decisions were related to his idea that academic work should become more 
professionalised and less dependent on the vagaries of the independent scholar.142 
Some years working with the Australian Research Grants Committee had led Aitkin 
to believe that research funding was ‘spread too far, too thinly’.143 Competitive 
allocation, he was certain, would enable the ‘best people’ to be funded ‘properly’.144 
This addressed the concerns of a number of leading researchers. One was Professor 
Ivan Oliver at the University of Western Australia. He was a biochemist and a 
member of the University’s research committee. He was quoted in the Higher 
Education Supplement: 
                                                
140 CPD (HoR), ‘Ministerial Statement John Dawkins’ (22 September 1987). National Board of 
Employment Education and Training, The Transfer of Operating Grant Funds to Competitive Schemes 
after 1991: Advice of the NBEET and its ARC and HEC, National Board of Employment Education and 
Training (Canberra: Government Publishing 1990). Don Aitkin, ‘The Australian Research Grants 
Committee: An Account of the Way Things Were’, Prometheus 14 (2), 1996, 179–94. 
141 Don Aitkin, Interview. 
142 CPD (HoR), ‘Ministerial Statement John Dawkins’ (22 September 1987). Aitkin, ‘The Australian 
Research Grants Committee: An Account of the Way Things Were.’ 179–83. Don Aitkin, ‘Axioms for 
the Academic Profession’, in Peter Chapman (ed.), 40 Years of FAUSA: 1952-1992 Four Decades of 
Representing University Staff (Melbourne: National Tertiary Education Union, 1993), 12–3. 
143 Jane Ford, ‘Frittered Funding Could Leave Us in Backwater’, HES, 25 July 1984. William West, 
‘Research: Balancing the Baskets’, HES, 27 January 1988. 
144 Don Aitkin, ‘Trends in Funding Arrangements’, Higher Education Quarterly 42 (2), 1988, 144–51. 
Aitkin, ‘The Australian Research Grants Committee: An Account of the Way Things Were.’ 
 208 
‘When I tell them [US-based academics] we fund 65 per cent of all applications they say we 
didn’t realise Australian scientists were so good’, Professor Oliver says. ‘But they have a grin 
on their faces when they say it, because in America you have to be in the top 25 per cent to get 
your money.’145 
Of the sixty-five percent of grants awarded, Oliver simply said, ‘we’re not that good’, 
referring to Australian scientists collectively. Funding levels were starting to function 
as a signifier of the quality and value of university research. Fewer grants at a higher 
value, he felt, would ensure Australia could ‘search out excellence’.146  
It was an idea that resonated with the place of financial worth in free market 
economics as the measure of other kinds of value. How could you tell which research 
was ‘best’ if everyone was funded equally? Excellent research must have a higher 
exchange value, according to the emerging logic. For government, this suggested that 
funding fewer projects at a higher monetary value exhibited a system dedicated to 
quality.147 Those who opposed increasing the stakes in competitive research funding 
were simply, according to free market commentators like Richard Blandy and Judith 
Sloan, ‘not confident of their capacity to compete’.148 Scholars like Oliver who were 
willing to suggest funding fewer projects was evidence, the article implied, of 
confidence in the quality of their research. This placed a bind on university and 
government responses alike. Universities – particularly the former Colleges of 
Advanced Education, compelled to prove their worth to their peers in the older and 
more esteemed institutions – would be reluctant to describe their research as anything 
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less than ‘excellent’.149 Government too would wish to avoid the implication that, in 
funding a larger number of projects, they fostered mediocrity. Moreover, it was a 
useful development for a government obliged to exercise fiscal constraint, for 
competition pushed the problem of scarcity from government to individual academics, 
so that policies leading to financial shortages were internalised, in the academic 
community, as inadequacy.150 
The University Response 
For universities, the not-so-secret Purple Circle signalled that change was on its way. 
‘I deliberately made it a bit mysterious’, Dawkins later said.151 Releasing 
revolutionary plans after a nervous wait set Dawkins up as higher education’s 
bogeyman, triggering widespread, and at times rushed reforms.152 They were changes 
that, as Dawkins himself observed, went a long way beyond what was in his power to 
instate.153 Although some vice-chancellors made Dawkins a scapegoat for problems 
within their institutions, there were others who eagerly took the opportunities reform 
offered.154 Whether it was because they agreed with Dawkins or they felt they had 
little choice, few vice-chancellors opposed the new reforms.155 Peter Karmel was 
shocked by their complicity, particularly their willingness to relinquish their 
autonomy, allowing Canberra to make them ‘agents of government policy’.156 
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The context for this complicity is revealing. Faced with growing salary bills and 
diminishing income, vice-chancellors confronted some difficult choices. Stemming 
the decline in student numbers was a priority that had led the University of Sydney, 
for example, around 1980, to start advertising. With so many new universities to 
compete with, it highlighted its advantages of age and reputation.157 Members of other 
universities across the sector were outraged: it was a breach of faith, a betrayal of 
principles. University members warned that ‘selling themselves like soap powder’ 
would devalue the work universities did.158 Once advertising was employed to attract 
students, it was openly acknowledged that a marketplace was established, positioning 
students as consumers.159 One year later most universities were doing it. By 1982, 
advertising to attract students was described by the press as ‘commonplace’.160 It 
symbolised a shift in focus. University leaders were now making unprecedented 
compromises to shore up their seemingly shaky financial situation. 
In addition to seeking new income sources, university leaders looked for ways to 
produce more research and teach more students with fewer resources. The imperative 
of ‘more scholar for the dollar’ led vice-chancellors to seek productivity growth by 
increasing institutional oversight of academic staff workloads and implementing 
corporate-style performance management schemes.161 Despite adjustments to the style 
and substance of university leadership towards more corporate, market-focused 
techniques, change had not gone far enough for John Dawkins. ‘Ossified bodies 
incapable of adaptation’ was how Dawkins saw the universities, especially the older 
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institutions.162 The Green and White papers demonstrated that Dawkins was prepared 
to use government funding to force the institutions to change.163 Melbourne Vice-
Chancellor David Penington, who opposed the Dawkins reforms, believed that, for 
this reason, other vice-chancellors considered outright opposition to be unwise.164  
Penington’s perception of the fearfulness of vice-chancellors may have been a result 
of a conversation he had early in the process. Attempting to garner support for his 
opposition to government reform, Penington approached his counterpart at Sydney, 
John Manning Ward. He suggested that together the two universities politely reject 
Dawkins’s invitation to join his National Unified System.165 Ward refused, however, 
since membership was requisite to research funding.166 Penington still believes that 
had they done so, the Dawkins reforms would have collapsed even before they were 
implemented.167 With the instatement of the National Unified System, he also 
believes that the University of Melbourne suffered as a consequence of his outspoken 
stance.168 
The unwillingness of vice-chancellors to oppose Dawkins was not the only effect of 
government use of funding to assert influence over university decisions. Marginson 
and Considine found that it also led university leaders to take active steps to change 
key aspects of the university. One of the primary targets, for Dawkins, was university 
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management, although it was technically beyond his control.169 He offered the 
universities additional funding to review their management practices.170 Penington 
declared that offer to be ‘thirty pieces of silver’ that he hoped universities would 
never touch, arguing that their traditional collegial approach was better.171 
Penington’s actual position on management reform was less clear than his determined 
opposition to Dawkins might suggest, however: he had in fact already conducted a 
review of management at Melbourne and implemented a corporate-style staff 
performance and development scheme.172  
In response to criticisms from Dawkins and others, collegial mechanisms of decision 
making were broadly out of favour among vice-chancellors and indeed, many other 
staff (especially women academics) who had in the past been excluded from the 
‘networks of god-professors dispensing grace and favour’ that collegiality had 
sometimes fostered.173 Older collegial structures gave way to smaller, semi-official 
executive teams who could respond more decisively and flexibly to government and 
commercial demands. In Marginson and Considine’s study, all administrators they 
interviewed contrasted the transparency and good organisation of the changes to the 
inefficiencies they had replaced.174  
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Marginson and Considine argue that the shift away from collegial decision-making 
was a direct response to the new relationship of universities to government.175 Each 
university’s standing with the government and its probable level of funding seemed to 
be based on how successfully its leaders persuaded Dawkins of their capacity to 
modernise. So when, for example, Dawkins made a sarcastic remark about the 
practice of electing Deans, universities scrambled to put a stop to it, seeking instead to 
select senior Faculty leaders in a manner that more closely resembled corporate 
recruitment practices.176 After the Dawkins reforms, Marginson and Considine found, 
the corporate sector – or, more accurately, an imagined corporate ideal – was the 
benchmark against which university decision structures were evaluated.177 By the end 
of the 1980s, most would agree that ‘universities  are now being expected to take a 
more business-like approach to their operations’.178  
This drift away from collegial decision-making slowly widened the gap between vice-
chancellors and their staff. One symbol of this shift was union membership. Early in 
the 1980s, most vice-chancellors were members of the staff associations, according to 
Robert Smith, Vice-Chancellor of the University of Western Australia and member of 
Dawkins’s Purple Circle: 
John Scott, who was a lovely man, Chair of the AVCC at the time, used to proudly say he was a 
member of FAUSA. I remember one of my earlier meetings of AVCC, they had a show of 
hands for who is a member of the union. Everyone put their hands up.179 
The membership-based collectivity of the FAUSA functioned as a signifier for the 
community of scholars. Membership enabled the vice-chancellors to identify 
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themselves as primus inter pares – first among equals, but fundamentally inseparable 
from their staff. Robert Smith had returned to Australia from Canada where, he said, 
things were different. He thought they were mad: ‘now I know I am in cloud cuckoo-
land…I mean, you’re either management or you’re union’. Towards the end of the 
decade he was right: vice-chancellors were management and few were able to 
maintain that sense of membership.180 
Even though David Penington was as keen as Dawkins to modernise the management 
of his university, he did not see that he should also accept Dawkins’s plans for 
research. Penington agreed with many aspects of the Dawkins proposals, but 
considered the government’s proposed adjustments to research funding to be a 
fundamental assault on the idea of the university.181 Since 1965, the key distinction of 
the universities from the Colleges of Advanced Education was that government 
funded them to conduct research. In the twenty years since the Martin review, the idea 
of the university in Australia had become attached to that research enterprise. As a 
result, research funding now seemed central to the identity of the oldest of Australian 
universities, whose standing in the community, their leaders believed, was based on 
their high profile discoveries.182 Penington’s experience of the impact of medical 
discoveries in particular informed his sense of the importance of research: in fact, in 
his autobiography Penington argues that the reason John Ward rejected his proposal 
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that the two universities opt out of the Dawkins system was that ‘as a historian, he 
[Ward] had no real interest in my concerns over research’.183  
In an attempt to protect Melbourne’s research capacity, Penington targeted his 
criticisms at the Australian Research Council. Articulate witticisms, cutting remarks 
and damning speeches were Penington’s weapons, wielded in every forum he could 
find, often targeting Don Aitkin, as head of the Council, personally.184 A media war 
between the two men resulted, leading to pressures on each that they continue to 
feel.185 Their conflict mirrored fissures opening across the higher education sector. 
Penington’s argument that research funding should remain concentrated in the older 
institutions was met, by leaders and staff in the former colleges, with anger and 
disbelief. Describing his arguments as elitist, Penington’s position appeared to 
demean their newly won status as universities, suggesting that they were lower in 
quality, a view they were anxious to rebut.186 This conflict between older and newer 
universities was augmented by a growing unease about the priorities that would result 
from competitive funding. Some, like Penington, saw the implementation of national 
priorities as short-term vision: 
Research policies controlled from Canberra, he [Penington] says, run the risk of being short-
term and politically motivated. Had the Dawkins policies been in place during the polio 
epidemics, research funds would have gone into creating better iron lungs. The discovery of the 
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Salk and Sabine vaccines which eradicated polio were the result of simple curiosity. It is 
impossible, he says, to dictate creativity.187 
The Australian Research Council, according to Penington, would fundamentally 
change the kinds of things society would know. It would encourage a focus on 
research that would have outcomes achievable in a designated, fundable, period of 
time.188 This meant that scholars would be more likely to work towards outcomes that 
they already knew they could achieve. The unknowableness of curiosity-based 
research, he argued, was central to the mission of the university and the quality of 
science. Politicians, both Labor and Liberal, were nevertheless persuaded that 
research funding needed to be spent more strategically. Public money was tight and 
curiosity seemed idle. 
Scholars in the humanities and social sciences were particularly concerned.189 Given 
Labor’s rhetoric and policy focus on skill development rather than liberal education, 
evident throughout Dawkins’s approach to the universities, many felt that support for 
the humanities and social sciences would be severely restricted.190 It seemed 
reasonable to expect that the government’s research priorities would focus on 
disciplines that government narrowly understood to be ‘useful’, like applied science 
and engineering. These fears appeared to be confirmed at a strained public meeting in 
1988. A beleaguered Don Aitkin, asked why science was getting a better deal, replied 
that it was because they had ‘fewer wankers’.191 Aitkin regretted the comment, which 
was held up across the sector as evidence – supported by earlier ‘waste-watch’ jibes – 
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of the disdain Canberra held for the humanities.192 Old divisions between science and 
the humanities re-surfaced: ‘Science claims victory in the battle for ARC’, read the 
Higher Education Supplement headline.193 Given disciplinary competition for control 
of research funding priorities and tensions between older universities and the former 
colleges, the academic community was far from united. Penington described it as 
Dawkins’s ‘Henry VIII’ strategy: conquer the system while it squabbles amongst 
itself, scrambling for scraps.194 
It was in this context that the National Tertiary Education Union was formed. It grew 
out of the academic staff associations of the universities and former colleges.195 It also 
resolved a longstanding tension in the staff associations, which had for decades 
embodied a contradiction. On the one hand, they operated in the tradition of trade 
unions, battling university leadership for employee rights. On the other, they were 
also gentlemen’s clubs, a vehicle for the voice and activities of the university’s 
collegial membership. The tension was more than a matter of class allegiance, though 
‘gentlemanly’ rightly signifies the tenor and tone of the early associations. Indeed, the 
word ‘association’ itself betrays the ambivalence of ‘gentlemen’ academics in 
forming a group to press collective claims.196 FAUSA had gained power at Federal 
level by its objection in the Orr case to the master-servant relationship (discussed in 
Chapter Two). But the staff associations had changed since the 1950s.  
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Since 1973, when an academic salaries tribunal was established, staff association 
leaders sought formal union registration, hoping to strengthen their voice in arguing 
for pay and conditions.197 This move became urgent in 1978 when they found that 
since they were not registered as a union, they were not permitted to lodge the 
objections that would prevent university staff from moving to rival unions.198 To the 
frustration of its leaders, the majority of staff association members were not 
persuaded, voting against the proposal in 1981.199 Advocates of unionisation tried to 
argue that the industrial relations model was not as adversarial as its opponents 
maintained: 
A move into the industrial arena does not imply any radical change in universities. Despite what 
the scare-mongers say, staff and university representatives can still sit down together and work 
things out. The existence of such an option may of itself encourage greater consultation in the 
future – indeed we believe the art of industrial relations is to avoid rather than encourage 
confrontation-arbitration.200 
It was the structural relationship that was at stake, however, not just a spirit of 
conciliation and co-operation. Even when it was civil and co-operative, the 
‘gentlemanly’ camp argued, the industrial relations model required negotiation by 
opposing parties, forging a transactional, rather than collegial relationship: salary in 
exchange for academic services.201  
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Between 1987 and 1989, however, several changes converged, making the debate 
obsolete. Bolstered by the Dawkins reforms, executive authority in the universities 
strengthened, posing new threats to the collective power of staff in the institutions.202 
Added to that, the Australian Council of Trade Unions restructured. A decline in 
union membership across all Australian industries prompted them to reorganise, 
amalgamating smaller unions into larger bodies that would represent whole sectors.203 
An education union was a part of that plan.204 Academics insisted that their problems 
were sufficiently unique to be differentiated from school teachers.205 In this context, 
FAUSA merged with its counterpart from the Colleges of Advanced Education to 
become the National Tertiary Education Union.206 As scholars unionised formally, 
however, they also solidified the widening gap between academic staff and their 
institutional leaders. This helped fix them into the very master and servant, employer 
and employee relationship which, in the 1950s, FAUSA had resisted.  
As a result of the structural changes to the university and the increased unionised 
structure of staff organisations, Don Aitkin saw academics, as they entered the 1990s, 
finally professionalising. In exchange for their salaries, they were beginning to offer a 
more tangible, definable service, as was appropriate, he argued.207 The old approaches 
were disintegrating so that universities resembled less antique colleges of peers 
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accountable only to themselves and were inching closer to the modern, streamlined 
organisations Dawkins anticipated they would become.208  
Conclusion 
What the government sought from higher education in the 1980s was, on the surface, 
not vastly different from its goals in earlier decades. The Commonwealth had funded 
higher education and research since the 1940s, for the purpose of supporting 
economic growth and workforce planning. In the 1980s, however, those aims seemed 
particularly urgent and specific. Australian industry and manufacturing needed 
inventors and skilled workers to design, manage, maintain and organise the 
technologies and techniques that would make the nation competitive internationally, 
based on research and education conducted in Australian universities. Businesses 
needed tertiary educated, creative thinkers who would plan, analyse, calculate and 
enact strategies that were flexible enough to cope with new economic challenges now 
that Australia’s economy was more directly connected to global trends.  In the 
government’s view, the ‘modernisation’ of the economy that Hawke sought when 
Labor floated the dollar needed to be coupled with the renewal of Australian higher 
education. 
The modernisation of the universities tended, in the 1980s, to be measured by their 
similarity to the commercial sector. The influence of neoliberalism on debates 
surrounding the public university in Australia led to a large number of previously 
unimaginable transformations. Collegial structures, where hierarchical power was 
associated with academic standing, gave way to more executive control, so that 
authority instead lay more often with those who controlled the budget. Approaches to 
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students changed, too. Instead of considering admission a privilege to be conferred on 
worthy applicants, potential students were now sought through advertising. Research 
performance, in addition to the traditional peer evaluation, could now also be 
evaluated in dollars as the universities began to self-identify with commercial 
language and corporate techniques. 
What all these reforms had in common was their restructuring of agency in relation to 
funding. Universities had been relatively passive recipients of Federal funding since 
the Murray review of 1957 and, to an even larger degree, since 1974 when they were 
fully funded under Whitlam. Now, universities were discouraged from placing the 
blame for insufficient income on any agency other than themselves. Declining student 
numbers were to be met with new marketing techniques. Reduced government 
funding was to be offset by active measures to attract fee-paying international and 
postgraduate students. More and more government funding was now allocated 
competitively according to merit, so that the quality of universities could, in a real and 
tangible way, be measured by their financial worth. 
Ironically, this partial deregulation gave government more influence. Now that 
funding was less certain and potentially changeable within short timeframes, 
university compliance to government priorities was the key to assuring financial 
viability and standing in the community. The university’s capacity to adapt to the 
combination of government demands and international market forces was evidence, 
according to the new market-efficiency political rhetoric, of its effectiveness. Failure 
to change – in fact, failure even to agree with the propounded benefits of reforms – 
exposed universities and their staff to accusations of inefficiency and public-service 
laziness. Claims for older university values that encouraged government to consider 
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higher education to be protecting more than the nation’s financial wealth were easily 
dismissed. What Ian Clunies Ross would have called ‘civilisation’, economists had 
started to call ‘positive externalities’.209 Knowledge as a public good had lost its 
persuasive power in Canberra. 
By positioning itself as the key supplier of competitive and sometimes uncertain 
funding, government relinquished its former benign patronage of the universities, 
instead selecting more forceful instruments of control. The Hawke government 
believed that universities could not be trusted to offer their services to the nation 
voluntarily, as they had during the Second World War. The radical demonstrations of 
the 1960s and 1970s had undermined any faith that universities would naturally serve 
the nation. Abolishing the structures that university leaders believed protected the 
universities from state interference, Dawkins tightened government control over 
funding to compel a shift in the priorities of the nation’s scholarly experts. No longer 
guardians of an independent body of knowledge, for Dawkins, universities would 
become public instrumentalities, controlled by the state.  
University leaders were, to Peter Karmel’s dismay, for the most part Dawkins’s 
compatriots in this revolution. And yet they did not entirely relinquish their 
autonomy. In adapting to changing expectations, universities had developed a taste for 
entrepreneurship. Increasing their body of customers, university leaders started to see, 
might also force government into a consumer role – and ideally, they would be just 
one customer among many. 
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Chapter Five: Knowledge and Property 1986-1996  
In 1979, the University of Wollongong approved a Patent Policy, which claimed: 
Although university research is not directed specifically towards patentable inventions, there 
can arise in the course of research, inventions which in the interests of the public, the University 
and the inventor/s, should be patented.1 
Sometimes a patent was the best way of making research available. A decade later, 
however, Wollongong University replaced that policy. Their new Intellectual Property 
Policy expressed a different set of values: 
Council has an obligation, under government policy, to seek reimbursement for costs which 
have been incurred in research and development leading to a discovery from which profit may 
be derived, and also to direct some of the profit (if any) to purposes for which the University has 
been established.2 
From the mid-1980s, using policies like this, leaders of Australian universities chose 
to move from protecting a limited portfolio of patents to claiming ownership over all 
aspects of academic work. This chapter traces the growing interest in establishing and 
regulating intellectual property rights over the work of staff and students and conflicts 
around this effort. 
The focus of universities had shifted from fulfilling the potential of research to its 
exploitation for profit. Across higher education the idea of ‘intellectual property’ was 
deployed in a new way to try to capture the imperative to commercial exchange. 
Intellectual property, by the late 1980s and early 1990s, expressed an ideal for 
university administrators: funding that reflected, in financial terms, the worth of what 
universities taught and discovered. They were told this might be substantial. In 1993, 
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the Prime Minister’s Science and Engineering Council informed government and the 
universities that the ‘world intellectual property market represents $600 billion of 
industrial products and processes annually’.3 
The worth of the global intellectual property market was the subject of scrutiny as 
economists and businesses shifted their attention to the ‘knowledge economy’. They 
developed strategies that would nurture innovation and creative thinking, activities 
that were increasingly underpinning competitive advantage.4 In the ‘post-Fordist’ 
global economy that had emerged since the 1970s, many believed that the efficiency 
of mass production had reached its limit in fuelling growth. Profitability was now 
more reliant on flexible responsiveness to the market – a system that depended on 
constant analysis, innovation and knowledge development.5  
The universities were far from excluded from this, as political and university leaders 
sought a place for higher education in the global shift towards an economic reliance 
on knowledge. Intellectual property, the key commodity of the knowledge economy, 
refers to a set of monopoly rights temporarily granted to enable commercial 
exploitation of particular kinds of products of intellectual labour. There are several 
types of intellectual property, each quite different. Copyright in literary works differs 
to that invested in computer software, works of art or pieces of music, and in turn 
these are considerably different from patented inventions, registered trademarks and 
trade secrets. Unlike other forms of intellectual property, ownership of copyright 
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offers more than mere financial exploitation: it also grants the right to decide where 
(and if) a work should be published, the right to edit or transform it, or to use it to 
create something new.6 
What the different types have in common is the metaphor of property. Jill McKeogh 
and Andrew Stewart point out that this has often led to a widespread conceptual error: 
The principal danger…lies in forgetting that the term ‘property’ is merely a conclusory 
statement and in falling into the trap of assuming that any identifiable ‘thing’ must belong to 
someone. In the present context this translates into the erroneous belief that all fruits of 
intellectual activity have some intrinsic claim to be treated as property.7 
For McKeogh and Stewart, not everything could be turned into intellectual property. 
In the 1990s, however, university leaders tried to stretch the concept further than they 
had before in order to address the challenge of creating new revenue streams for the 
sector. In the process, universities also struggled to retain their superiority in the 
world of knowledge production, for they were not alone in seeking a prominent place 
in the changing economy. 
The emergence of intellectual property 
The decision by universities in the late 1980s to use the category of ‘property’ 
indicates a shift in their way of thinking about knowledge ownership and regulation. 
It was informed by a long history. The character of modern intellectual property was 
shaped, in seventeenth century Britain, by the conceptual landscape around the 
emergence of the idea of copyright, notably in the work of philosopher John Locke. 
Locke’s claim that labour – and therefore its product – was ‘naturally’ the property of 
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the labourer was used to resolve a longstanding dispute between authors and 
booksellers, investing copyright in the author.8 According to Mark Rose, in that 
period, the heroic individual author was constructed as a parallel to the individual 
political subject as a means of asserting economic dominance.9 Contemporary 
structures of intellectual property, Ramon Lobato claims, also assert economic 
dominance, since they tend to privilege certain types of cultural and technological 
production – and thus certain national economies – in the global marketplace.10 
Disputes over intellectual property express more complex power relations in 
universities, argues Corynne McSherry, in her analysis of the ownership of academic 
work in higher education in the United States. She suggests that academic claims to 
intellectual property in America simultaneously represent compliance with a higher 
education market and resistance against those who would dominate it.11 
The growth of intellectual property policies in the universities in Australia, then, is an 
important moment for understanding the impact of the growth of a market for 
education and research. The earliest policy that explicitly deployed the phrase 
‘intellectual property’ was in the Australian National University in 1986. The latest 
was from the University of Western Australia in 1996.12 These policies represent the 
period for development of intellectual property as a central plank of university reform. 
                                                
8 Ronan Deazley, Rethinking Copyright: History, Theory, Language (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 
2006), 5. 
9 Mark Rose, Authors and Owners: The Invention of Copyright (Cambridge M.A.: Harvard University 
Press, 1993). 
10 Ramon Lobato, ‘The Six Faces of Piracy: Global Media Distribution from Below’, in R. Sickels 
(ed.), The Business of Entertainment, Volume 1: The Movies (Westport: Praeger, 2008), 15–36. 
11 Corynne, McSherry, Who Owns Academic Work? Battling for Control of Intellectual Property 
(Cambridge M.A.: Harvard University Press, 2001), 19. 
12 Access to their first Intellectual Property policies was granted by Adelaide University, Australian 
National University, Macquarie University, Monash University, Royal Melbourne Institute of 
Technology, University of New England and University of Wollongong (also representing a range of 
university types in Australia). The University of Western Australia’s policy is available as an 
attachment to the publicly available case of UWA v Gray. Some details about the University of 
Melbourne’s policy development process were included in the files at Monash University, for reasons 
that will be discussed. 
 227 
It is quite a specific set of dates, suggesting new policies were triggered by particular 
events, requiring analysis of the government policy framework. Ann Monotti and Sam 
Ricketson, authors of Universities and Intellectual Property: Ownership and 
Exploitation, maintain that it was in this period that all Australian universities had 
discovered that intellectual property was important to them. It was like finding one 
has ‘been speaking prose for over forty years without realising it’, they argue.13 Their 
assumption that the development of intellectual property policies in Australian 
universities was more a kind of legal awakening than actual change points to a 
significant question: did intellectual property represent a new way of talking about 
university knowledge or did it indicate the emergence of something new in higher 
education?  
The change underpinning university intellectual property, Monotti and Ricketson 
claim, was the development, globally, of new patterns of research. These new 
research relationships were analysed by Michael Gibbons and colleagues in the 
Netherlands.14 Gibbons and others describe a shift from traditional flows of 
knowledge where basic research had led to commercial use along a single conveyer 
belt of discovery and application. This linear connection was a result of scientific 
norms that had perpetuated a hierarchy of disciplines. ‘Pure’, or experiment-based 
discovery, was structured as the necessary antecedent to application and commercial 
development.15 
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This stratified system of research was collapsing, Gibbons and his colleagues argue, 
giving way to research where industrial and academic problems were encountered and 
tackled in more integrated and collaborative ways. The past fetish of ‘pure’ inquiry 
was based on academic self-importance, they claimed, and by sustaining rarefied 
knowledge, university and community interests had stayed artificially separated – a 
separation that universities controlled. Now, the previously distinct spheres of 
university and workplace knowledge were merging.16  
Unlike subsequent work by another group of Dutch scholars led by Henry Etzkowitz, 
it was not the intention of Gibbons and his colleagues to promote a commercial 
purpose for university research. Their political agenda was derived from the 1960s 
New Left: they sought to break down the barrier between scholarship and other kinds 
of knowledge, which they believed the university traditionally and wrongfully 
excluded.17 Nevertheless, their widely read book was grasped eagerly by politicians 
and bureaucrats seeking justification for new commercial linkages between science 
and industry.18 Those linkages were not without consequence, however. As the 
separation between university and workplace knowledge disintegrated, Gibbons and 
colleagues found, so did the separation of their financial stake: universities and the 
commercial bodies with whom they collaborated might, in this new pattern, both have 
a legitimate claim to intellectual property. The result was uncertainty around who 
owned intellectual property rights.19 Monotti and Ricketson conclude that universities, 
in this environment, were compelled to develop policies regulating their intellectual 
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property.20 While connecting intellectual property policy to the changing research 
environment is useful, Monotti and Ricketson’s analysis, however, as this chapter will 
argue, is not wholly borne out by the policies themselves. An historical, rather than 
legal, approach to the process of intellectual policy development in Australian 
universities raises new questions about the motives and concerns of university policy 
makers.  
It is not clear in Australian university intellectual property policies that the struggle 
for control of intellectual property was between universities and commercial 
organisations. The Commonwealth government, academic staff and university 
students (particularly postgraduate researchers), also had a stake in the ownership of 
research and any income it produced. The public, too, had a vested interest in 
university research and teaching, which had been funded by taxpayers for decades. 
The public interest has been the focus of academic concern. Scholars of both higher 
education and intellectual property have often advocated public ownership of the 
products of intellectual labour, even within a marketised system of intellectual 
property trade.21 Simon Marginson describes the knowledge that universities produce 
as ‘public goods’, meaning publicly owned commodities.22 As discussed in the 
Introduction, although Marginson’s argument is intended to assure knowledge is 
excluded from the market economy, it also fixes knowledge to the market-derived 
ideal that all intellectual labour produces a form of alienable property. While seeking 
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to assure that university knowledge is considered to be a shared public possession, his 
argument also shores up its status as a commodity. 
Similar concern for public possession of university research has often been expressed 
in ethical terms. Should biotechnologists patent the genes they identify?23 What 
responsibility do developers of pharmaceuticals have to the public on the one hand 
and to investors on the other?24 While these questions focus on the ethical 
consequences of commercialisation of university-produced intellectual property, at 
their core they are about the ownership of knowledge. Who owns genes and other 
objects of scientific discovery and observation? What right to medical advances in 
public universities should the public expect to have and how does that weigh against 
intellectual property claims by corporations who have paid for the research? 
Arguments that seek an ethical foundation for public ownership of intellectual 
property are based on a claim, most prominently asserted by Yochai Benkler and 
Lawrence Lessig, that the world is richer when knowledge is shared.25 They, like 
Gibbons and colleagues, promote a ‘knowledge economy’ in which knowledge, 
produced in collaborative networks often funded from a variety of sources, both 
public and private, is no longer the possession of an individual, all-powerful 
originator, author or institution. 
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Those arguments that endeavour to problematise the political economics of 
intellectual property are informed by re-considerations of authorship that emerged 
from continental philosophy in the 1960s and 1970s. In a work that has had a 
significant influence on critical legal approaches to intellectual property, Michel 
Foucault explored the historical roots of the construction of modern individual 
authorship, identifying authorship as a seventeenth century instrument of surveillance; 
the ability to locate an individual to blame for a transgressive text.26 Historicising the 
author in that way opened the possibility for other ways of thinking about the 
production and regulation of knowledge. In 1967, Roland Barthes disputed the 
romantic pre-eminence of authorship in the construction of knowledge, emphasising 
instead the sustained and organic agency of the reader: 
The Author, when believed in, is always conceived of as the past of his own book: book and 
author stand automatically on a single line divided into a before and an after. The Author is…in 
the same relation of antecedence to his work as a father is to his child.27 
The author’s antecedence gave her or him an authority over knowledge that Barthes 
considered undeserved. 
The kind of shared construction of meaning that Barthes claimed was the task of 
author and reader together resonated in educational thinking. Student-centred, ‘neo-
progressive’ pedagogies, which had their roots in 1960s and 1970s student protest 
movements, altered dominant scholarly practices in universities worldwide towards 
the end of the twentieth century. Learning was increasingly seen as an active act of 
knowledge construction mediated by social context rather than the passive receipt of 
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truth.28 Collaborative problem solving grew in importance in university curricula, 
slowly supplementing individual achievement as the mechanism of learning.29 The 
mind was understood to be influenced by its community, more like a participant in a 
network than the detached individual idealised by earlier scholarly traditions.30 
Indeed, knowledge was inseparable, some educational theorists claimed, from its 
environment.31 In the context of such epistemological and pedagogical shifts, the 
Lockean connection between intellectual labour and intellectual property ownership 
was becoming increasingly ambiguous: if originators were the ‘natural’ owners of 
intellectual property as the product of their labour, exactly who the originators were, 
was becoming very difficult to identify. 
These complex and changing ideas about learning and research had a substantial 
influence on the debates that emerged about intellectual property policies in Australia 
and internationally. Authorship in particular was a target. It was attached to the 
intellectually autonomous scholar, the figure whose right to publish was a central 
tenet of academic freedom. It was this author figure in particular that the American 
Association of University Professors sought to protect from United States universities 
which tried to claim ownership of academic copyright. Universities had granted 
scholars the financial proceeds of their publications, but had claimed the copyright as 
the possession of the institution as part of a larger claim to intellectual property. The 
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American Association of University Professors took exception, arguing that an 
academic author’s ownership of copyright, since that was attached to the right to 
publish, edit or derive new work from it, went to the core of the scholarly pursuit.32 
How the Australian universities navigated these complex tensions was distinct from 
the American case. Lacking the imperative that the Bayh-Dole Act gave universities 
in the United States, Australian institutions developed intellectual property policies in 
more uneven ways.33 It took around a decade for all universities to have policies and 
each institution chose from a wide selection of legal and commercial positions. These 
academic and institutional approaches to intellectual property, and the government 
policies that informed them, are revealing of changes in university values and 
priorities towards the end of the twentieth century. To grasp these, it is necessary to 
first consider the specific government policy environment in Australia in the 1980s. 
Research Policy after Dawkins 
Australian higher education, as Chapter Four discussed, was transformed, in the late 
1980s, by the Dawkins reforms. Research policy in particular was directed towards a 
strengthening of the relationship between university research and the national 
economy. The government was keen to support useful research that would have 
observable economic benefits. Research commercialisation was one way of achieving 
that goal.34 Research policy was a specific and complex aspect of reform, however, 
which needed close scrutiny to assure the right funding priorities were achieved. The 
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details of Dawkins’s plans for research were considered by a committee chaired by 
Purple Circle member Robert H.T. Smith, former Vice-Chancellor of the University 
of Western Australia who became, by 1989, head of the National Board of 
Employment, Education and Training. This committee was given the broad task of 
reviewing higher education research policy, producing a report that would shape the 
environment in which universities now approached research.35 
Three members of that committee, Robert Smith, David Penington and Don Aitkin, 
understood Dawkins’s aims in a different way. Smith claimed that Dawkins needed a 
solution beyond the binary system – how would research funding work when former 
colleges were all now universities? Smith was passionate about this issue. Some 
lesser-known institutions were doing very good research that was neither 
acknowledged nor funded. For Smith this was an injustice, an egalitarian outlook that 
extended to a broad concern for academics denied research opportunities.36 Moreover, 
if the national economy was to thrive, the best researchers, wherever they were, had to 
be supported, not just those who had by luck, circumstance or connection secured a 
position in a particular institution. 
Penington took a very different, and considerably more malign, view of Dawkins’s 
aims. Penington’s opposition to the Dawkins agenda, described in Chapter Four, 
focused on the need for concentration of research funding in older institutions that had 
stronger research traditions.37 According to Penington, the Smith committee was 
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established in response to his public condemnation of government reforms, an attempt 
by Dawkins to keep him quiet. In a private meeting with Dawkins, Penington agreed 
that, for the duration of the review, his criticisms of the government would cease.38  
Don Aitkin’s perspective was informed by his close knowledge of Canberra’s 
political machinery. According to Aitkin, Prime Minister Bob Hawke had been 
unexpectedly heckled over research at the opening of a Science centre. Embarrassed 
that he did not understand the problem, Hawke asked for a review of research policy. 
Without that, Aitkin maintained, the review would never have taken place.39 To 
conduct it, Dawkins assembled those with the highest stake in research to hammer out 
their differences. Smith, Aitkin and Penington each felt they got what they wanted. 
Aitkin and Smith achieved structural changes to government research funding, but 
Penington’s reward was increased income for the University of Melbourne 
specifically.40 The report itself, despite the varying aims of the Smith committee’s 
members, focused on enhancing university performance. It asked universities to 
establish and strengthen links with industry. It sought increased and measurable 
research output. In short, it reflected government priorities.41  
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The Smith Committee, however, was not the only research review that year. In June 
1989, the Australian Research Council released a report, On the Public Funding of 
Research, recommending a review of the whole system of innovation to identify any 
gaps in the process of converting basic research to industrial products.42 The 
Australian Science and Technology Council was simultaneously commissioned to 
report on ways that ‘Australia’s research effort will best support the Government’s 
national policy objectives’.43 This report argued that research was not the creative and 
serendipitous process academics had claimed. For the Australian Science and 
Technology Council, research could be, indeed should be, channelled to specific ends, 
not driven by mere curiosity. They made a case for increased government intervention 
in research planning: 
There has been a significant rethinking of the long-held belief that discoveries are essentially 
unpredictable… Globally there is now much greater awareness that there must be conscious 
decision-making about where to put the national emphasis in research.44 
Competitive allocation of research funding through the Australian Research Council 
was by now the government’s accepted way of achieving this outcome. In May 1990, 
a National Board of Employment, Education and Training committee chaired by Don 
Aitkin suggested that even more of the research funding for universities should be 
funnelled through the Australian Research Council.45  
The subject continued to demand attention, leading to more reports. In 1991, the 
Department of Industry, Technology and Commerce, which by then held the research 
portfolio, released the Report of a Task Force chaired by private sector economist, 
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Ray Block, on the commercialisation of research. The Block Report advocated a 
market-driven focus, claiming market-pull, rather than technology-push, was a more 
successful strategy for research commercialisation. This was not just a preferred 
business methodology for the task force members, but also a subtle argument about 
how the market might drive national research priorities: 
The task force believes that Australia cannot afford to let technology drive our business 
direction; rather, the market must drive the direction of our business growth and innovation 
behaviour…unless research has relevance to a market it will have no commercial potential. 
Indeed, the task is perhaps more aptly described as how to bring the market to bear on research 
rather than how to commercialise research.46 
The Block Report demonstrates that government and industry both sought control of 
research priorities, each deploying the logic that Nugget Coombs predicted decades 
earlier (see Chapter One): research directions should be decided by those who paid for 
it and not the academics who produced it. 
These public reports and debates about university research focused anxieties 
concerning the future of academic freedom. Such fears, arising as a result of the 
Dawkins reforms, had already prompted the universities to ask for an Academic 
Freedom Charter – an idea they abandoned when the relevant committee found it 
likely that a charter would limit, rather than assure, academic freedom.47 In a further 
threat to academic freedom, the shift away from recurrent funding as a result of the 
Australian Research Council was beginning to impact tenure. This is evident in the 
discussions about how many academics with the security of tenure to conduct 
research, free from interference, would be ideal for the intellectual health of 
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Australian higher education. In the 1970s, the academic salaries tribunal had 
formulated a ‘sixty percent rule’, meaning they had determined that the ideal balance 
of tenured and untenured staff was three fifths to two fifths. The Dawkins reforms, 
however, made this untenable. The Industrial Relations Commission eventually found 
the rule was no longer enforceable, since non-recurrent research funding made it 
impossible to appoint the same proportion of continuing positions as universities 
could prior to the reforms. The percentage of tenured positions did fall steadily, 
though only by a total of four percent between 1988 and 1995.48  
Acknowledging the tensions over academic freedom, the Australian Research Council 
commented in a reassuring spirit on the Block Report and a similar document on the 
commercialisation of medical research, known as the Coghlan Report.  The Australian 
Research Council argued: 
Universities should be free to determine the extent of their links with industry, again 
acknowledging that, in most instances, this [Block Report recommendation] target level of 
commitment would already be exceeded.49 
The Australian Research Council preferred financial incentives to regulatory controls. 
This enabled them to indicate their support for institutional autonomy and academic 
freedom. As they did so, the Australian Research Council gave universities choice in 
the level of engagement with industry, but using funding structures, the Council also 
limited the space in which they could choose. Recurrent funding was reallocated to 
competitive funding through the Research Council. Small grants of up to $15,000 to 
$25,000 were administered by the institutions themselves, though this allocation was 
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based on an assessment of ‘peformance’. This relative autonomy, however, was offset 
by the larger grants, which made up eighty percent of the Australian Research 
Council’s funding. Those were not only assessed by their ‘excellence’ but also by 
their relevance to national priorities, which included ‘commercial potential or 
utility’.50 Moreover, if universities sought other avenues of research funding, which 
they were encouraged to do, the most likely source, as the Australian Research 
Council acknowledged, was industry. The Australian Research Council particularly 
supported externally funded professorships: 
Encouragement of further such liaison [appointment of industry-funded chairs] was supported 
by the board, which emphasised, however, that specific institutional appointments should not be 
dictated by government.51 
Despite being nominally hands-off, in this way, funding nevertheless functioned as a 
form of regulation, compelling increased links with industry and with commercial 
goals. 
It took nearly two years for the universities to feel the influence of the new funding 
schemes with respect to intellectual property policy. Established in 1988, the 
Australian Research Council released its first advice to applicants in January 1989 for 
grants for 1990. In this advice, the Council required that if an ‘invention or process 
improvement’ arises, either the grant recipient or their university must protect the 
‘industrial property in that invention’. Then, at their own expense, they may apply for 
a patent, at which point they must notify the Commonwealth. A threat was embedded 
in the advice: 
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If the grantee and the institution do not wish to apply for a … Patent…the grantee and the 
institution shall, at the request of the Commonwealth, assign to the Commonwealth the 
right…and no amount will be payable by the Commonwealth for any such assignment.52  
The government was keen to ensure that none of the wealth they believed was buried 
in the universities was wasted: if universities were not planning on actively exploiting 
the product of their research, perhaps the government ought to do so themselves. 
This clause in the Australian Research Council’s instructions, more than any other 
single event in the 1980s and 1990s, drove the universities to develop policies to 
assure their ownership over intellectual property. University administrators were 
alarmed that the government might seek to control even more funding. Institutions 
were beginning to identify potential financial value in intellectual property and they 
worried that the Australian Research Council planned to claim the proceeds of 
research, just as it had already taken control of previously recurrent research funding. 
This compelled the universities to tighten their intellectual property policies.53 At the 
Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology, the Intellectual Property Committee 
advised the university to take care: 
[We recommend]…caution over the proposed introduction of intellectual property agreement 
requirements which could presage an increasing attempt by DEET or the ARC to control and 
define university intellectual property.54 
The Australian Research Council advice shows that the Council was indeed 
considering controlling and deriving income from intellectual property produced in 
the universities. Despite this statement, there is no evidence that the Council actually 
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attempted to acquire intellectual property. Nor is it really possible to imagine what the 
Australian Research Council would have done with it if they had: they were not 
positioned for prototyping or development, to manage a portfolio of patents, offer 
courses, distribute software or any of the range of things universities could do.55  
Research Commercialisation and the Intellectual Property Market 
From the early 1980s, university administrators had been conscious of untapped 
sources of income embedded in the university’s business. They initiated research 
commercialisation ventures without any prompting from government, developing 
strategies that would deliberately and methodically seek opportunities to 
commercialise research.56 On-campus business liaison offices were established, 
designed to both support relationships with industry and place a mediator between 
businesses and supposedly less-savvy academic researchers who might otherwise give 
away their intellectual property without realising the import of their actions.57 
Universities also leased property to businesses on or near campus in the expectation 
that proximity would facilitate links with industry (though the roles of universities 
more often resembled that of real estate agents).58 For-profit companies were created, 
wholly or partly owned by the universities.59  
Little of this would have been new to Philip Baxter, given the company Unisearch, 
which he established at the University of New South Wales in the late 1950s. It 
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facilitated connections between industry and academic research, for Baxter believed 
tangible economic development was the university’s responsibility to society.60 
Baxter was keen to replicate his experience in industry where scientific and 
application questions were interrelated. He was also convinced, however, that only 
high levels of public funding could provide the investment in higher education that 
western industrial progress required.61 So when Baxter sought alliances with industry 
through Unisearch, his focus was not profit, it was knowledge. His patenting strategy 
(described in Chapter One), which sought to best support the spread and use of the 
research, affirmed this, a stance reproduced in the University of Wollongong’s 1979 
Patent Policy. 
At first, the discourse on the importance of commercialisation in the 1980s sounded 
similar to Baxter’s pioneering approach. Commercialisation advocates argued that in 
extending university activity into the commercial world, research would have greater 
impact.62 Academics would be able to demonstrate, in tangible terms, the relevance 
and usefulness of university research.63 Nevertheless, there were some important 
differences in the new commercialisation strategies. Caught between a budget squeeze 
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and the kinds of demands government could make through research funding priorities, 
university administrators were more interested in new sources of income and greater 
independence, than in new knowledge for its own sake.64 Hoping to loosen the 
government’s grip on higher education, expand their revenue base and increase their 
freedom, universities were anxious to diversify their sources of income. 
Commercialisation of research offered the tantalising prospect of significant benefits 
for institutions.65 
The new Higher Education Supplement provided a moral justification for this 
commercialisation, which, to some scholars, seemed alien to university traditions. 
‘Companies [were] exploiting universities’ ideas for next to nothing’, read the 
Murdoch paper’s headline.66 Private sector organisations were profiting from public-
sector research while the public universities struggled financially. Commercial 
research offered the universities an opportunity to recoup the value of their work. 
Government and treasury were supportive of this view – if profit was derived from 
publicly-funded research, it should be used to reduce the necessity of future public 
outlay.67 With government encouragement, research commercialisation became an 
even higher priority for universities.68  
Intellectual property protection was key to assuring that universities, rather than 
private companies, profited from research. This required universities and government 
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to gain a new understanding of the global intellectual property market. The Prime 
Minister’s Science, Engineering and Innovation Council’s 1993 report The Role of 
Intellectual Property in Innovation affirmed that the lack of research income for 
universities was due to a failure to protect intellectual property. The report claimed 
that ‘worthwhile participation in this market will often be determined by whether or 
not there is enforceable intellectual property protection’. Such protection was likened 
to a fence: 
Laws for the protection of intellectual property…provide a protective barrier against third 
parties who seek to appropriate the work of the innovator and take a free ride on that work. 
Without this barrier innovation is like a crop in an unfenced field, free to be grazed by 
competitors who have made no contribution to its cultivation.69 
The Prime Minister’s Council deployed the Lockean connection between labour and 
property to add force to government goals. The Labor government’s contention was 
that the private sector, which received the benefits of research, should contribute 
directly to its funding.70 
The government had been seeking increased industry funding for university research, 
with limited success, since the mid-1980s.71 Australian industries were generally 
uncooperative, not persuaded by the government’s arguments that they had a moral 
obligation to pay for the research that benefited them. Government hoped intellectual 
property might solve the problem. The Prime Minister’s Council proposed that the 
private sector would be compelled to invest, if only universities could be persuaded to 
sell their research rather than give it away.72 In so doing, the Prime Minister’s Council 
repositioned the public as competitors with, rather than beneficiaries of, the 
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university. Universities and commercial organisations began to appear to be in the 
same business – a trade in (intellectual) property. Sociologist of science, David 
Biggins, had claimed: 
Universities are barely distinguishable from any other government or privately funded think-
tank. They espouse the same values, do the same job, serve the same political masters.73 
The longstanding and, many politicians, bureaucrats and business leaders felt, elitist, 
separation of the university from the rest of the community was difficult to justify. 
Moreover, older qualms about using publicly funded research for private monopoly 
were difficult to maintain at a time when research commercialisation seemed to solve 
a multitude of problems. 
Research commercialisation was not always an easy fit, however, with the economic 
agenda embedded in the Dawkins reforms. Dawkins had envisaged a university 
system that produced useful research and educated a significant proportion of 
Australian youth to underpin more efficient production, creative commercial 
initiatives and increased economic productivity. Such a plan would not be achieved 
unless new research was extended, in the form of the latest techniques and 
technologies, throughout whole industries.74 If a single company were instead to 
purchase a piece of intellectual property from a university, that organisation might 
gain some competitive advantage over others within Australia, and this would impede 
the free flow of research between researchers and to a wider range of organisations. In 
doing so, discoveries would not have the effect of making the whole industry more 
productive.75 In the opinion of Dawkins and subsequent Labor education ministers, 
                                                
73 David Biggins, ‘The Politics of Knowledge’, Australian Society 3 (10), 1984, 9. 
74 John Dawkins, Higher Education: A Policy Discussion Paper, DEET (Canberra: AGPS, 1987), 66–
7. 
75 Chiara Franzoni and Giuseppe Scellat, ‘Academic Patenting and the Consequences for Scientific  
Research’, The Australian Economic Review, 44 (1), 2011, 95–101. 
 246 
however, the past strategy of investing in research for broad economic growth had led 
to complacent universities. A market for intellectual property, compelling industry to 
either fund or reimburse universities for the research they needed and forcing 
universities to compete for private investment would be a better way, Labor believed, 
for reducing the problem of ‘hobby’ research and promoting efficient and quality 
work. Even if intellectual property protection initially hampered the widespread 
uptake of new knowledge and techniques by confining the benefits of research to its 
purchaser, eventually Australian competitiveness would be enhanced, since research 
would be higher quality and more targeted to identifiable needs.  
Raising awareness about intellectual property was therefore a key priority for the 
Minister for Education – now Simon Crean – in 1993. What could the Australian 
Research Council do to encourage universities to exploit more of it?76 Within two 
years, the Australian Research Council produced a report, Maximising the Benefits: 
Joint ARC/HEC Advice on Intellectual Property. In this report, the Australian 
Research Council claimed that universities should prioritise research that would 
enhance income. Commercialisation, it asserted, would not only lessen the taxpayer’s 
burden it would also maximise the social benefits of knowledge.77  Fifty percent of 
university-based research, the report said, was classified as either ‘strategic’ or 
‘applied’. Its authors were persuaded that all this research ‘therefore could potentially 
lead to commercial outcomes’.78 They recommended that Australian Research 
Council grants be conditional on the possession by institutions of an intellectual 
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property policy that ‘[has] as one of their aims the maximisation to Australia of the 
benefits arising from research’.79 
These claims were met with scepticism in parts of the university sector. The Royal 
Melbourne Institute of Technology Intellectual Property Committee was suspicious of 
the motives and intentions articulated in Maximising the Benefits. This committee was 
concerned that the Australian Research Council document did not align to advice 
recently received from the universities’ own body, the Australian Vice-Chancellors’  
Committee (AVCC), who they trusted to a greater extent.80  
The AVCC took a stance that balanced government interests and institutional 
concerns. They were assisted by the Committee’s chair, Robert Smith, who had by 
now left the National Board of Employment, Education and Training to become Vice-
Chancellor at the University of New England. The AVCC discussion paper mirrored 
government concern that ‘financial return is obtained from activities which have 
potential for commercial exploitation in order to lessen the contribution from public 
funds’.81 Despite this alignment to government goals, the report sought primarily to 
secure each university’s financial interests. In so doing, it refigured research as a 
commodified service requiring an ‘appropriate return’ from its beneficiaries. Labour, 
facilities and equipment were university expenses that should be recovered by 
producing research of greater financial value than its cost. Beneficiaries now needed 
to be identified. On one hand a key beneficiary was government; since national 
economic growth, population health, food safety, market reputation and political 
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decision-making relied on university research, so a good deal of public funding was 
justified. But where research benefited the private sector, these costs, the discussion 
paper claimed, should be recouped by the institution through its ownership of 
intellectual property. In arguing this, the AVCC sought to protect university income 
from the Australian Research Council’s apparent desire to claim it themselves. 
Allowing the universities to exploit the products of their work would relieve the 
public purse of some of its responsibility for higher education, a benefit that would 
not occur if the Australian Research Council was to control intellectual property. 
University failure to claim intellectual property, warned the AVCC, exposed 
institutions to legal threats: 
It is possible for an institution to be faced with considerable liabilities in respect of intellectual 
property with which it is associated but over which it has not exercised a great deal of control. It 
may not be easy to disassociate itself if problems arise and it is suggested that it is better to 
exercise prudent control from the outset.82 
Ownership of intellectual property, according to the AVCC, was not just about 
claiming an institutional stake in financial rights. Rather it was necessary, they 
argued, to enable ‘an institution to exercise control over decision-making relevant to 
the subject matter’.83 The production of knowledge, it implied, required greater 
planning than was traditional: 
Control is exercised over the development of intellectual property to ensure that programs of 
research and teaching comply with institutional policies and objectives.84 
Just as the Commonwealth claimed that university research priorities should align to 
national goals, so, according to the Australian Vice-Chancellors, should individual 
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academic research align to institutional objectives. The policy implications, for 
universities, were significant. 
Intellectual Property Policies 1986 - 1996 
In the late 1980s, universities were venturing into the new territory of intellectual 
property at a time of rapid and far reaching higher education reform. This was a 
chaotic and contested environment. Internal and external changes, many derived from 
the Dawkins reforms, were causing confusion. Many of the universities were in the 
process of amalgamating with other institutions, trying to become large enough to 
qualify for membership in the National Unified System. Under those conditions, 
administrative and governance systems needed to be re-thought, facilities and 
equipment re-distributed and academic cultures negotiated. At the same time, student 
numbers were growing as the government’s ‘clever country’ strategy sought a mass 
system of higher education. Despite this growth and change, additional funding was 
not forthcoming: Labor, along with many members of the public, were persuaded that 
academics were lazy and spoiled and should learn to do more with less. As a result, 
all of these transformations were being managed in a financially constrained 
environment, forcing university administrators to seek productivity increases. Their 
initiatives added to the chaos, since efficiencies were typically through often times 
radical and disruptive restructuring of university governance. The shift in attention 
towards applied research and skill development was leading to the growth of 
commercial research as yet another reform strategy.85 
Universities found it difficult to navigate such unfamiliar waters. Intellectual property 
policy was often unevenly prioritised. The University of Western Australia started 
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discussing an intellectual property policy in 1988 but did not have one in place until 
1996.86 The University of New England did not have a policy at all between 1989 and 
1995, despite possessing a patents policy before that. Their archivist speculates that 
the university had left policy in the hands of their new commercialisation company, 
UNE Partnerships, during that time.87 
Confusing as it was, universities helped each other out where they could. Those that 
had an easier time passed copies of their policy to those just starting out. Macquarie 
University’s intellectual property file, for example, held a copy of the Australian 
National University’s 1986 policy.88 In 1992, Sam Ricketson, an academic intellectual 
property lawyer (later co-author of Universities and Intellectual property with Ann 
Monotti), moved from Melbourne University to a new job at Monash. The Monash 
University solicitor, Renn Wortley, gratefully accepted a draft policy from Ricketson, 
which he had previously prepared for Melbourne (but which their academic board had 
rejected).89 Monash then modified and adopted it. These patterns of information 
exchange were common, so that university files regularly refer to approaches by other 
institutions.90 Together, institutions were inching towards a regulatory regime that 
gave universities greater control over intellectual property. 
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Despite this tendency to share and model policy on that of other universities, not all 
policies were the same. The following table summarises eight sample intellectual 
property policies.91 Only three mentioned external collaborators: Monash and 
Macquarie claimed all intellectual property from externally funded research while 
Adelaide University negotiated each case. This raises important questions about 
Monotti and Ricketson’s assumption that intellectual property policies arose out of the 
new research environment. Universities, it seems, were not initially concerned about 
intellectual property in their interactions with industry and the commercial world. On 
the contrary, their key priority, as these documents demonstrate, was to assure the 
ability of universities to claim the intellectual property of their own staff.  
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Academic staff did not fail to note that intellectual property policies were primarily 
directed against them: they became conscious that policy change might impinge on 
their personal financial interests. Some aspects were particularly worrying. At the 
University of Melbourne, Penington sought to claim royalty income from copyright 
on books. Staff protested, the National Tertiary Education Union became involved 
and the policy was rejected by the University Council, forcing Penington to drop this 
section of his proposed policy.92 Starkly opposing interests emerged, prompting some 
staff to stake unexpected claims to forms of intellectual property. At the Royal 
Melbourne Institute of Technology, for example, there was a move for a share of 
income from full-fee postgraduate coursework, newly deregulated under the Dawkins 
reforms.  
Academics at the Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology argued that fee income 
from postgraduate coursework should be subject to the same rules as commercial 
research income. Like patent dividends, they contended, thirty percent of fee income 
from postgraduate coursework should be granted to the staff that wrote postgraduate 
course material: 
My personal belief is that the only basis for arguing that a developer of courseware should begin 
the negotiation on economic benefit expecting less than one third of net profits would be that 
more material (as opposed to intellectual) input is made by the university to courseware than to 
applied research and technology transfer. My experience is that the reverse is common.93 
Student fees had for a century been a key source of university income. As 1970s free 
education policies were abandoned and commercial language entered higher 
education, university members began to identify all non-government income as 
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profit.94 Neither university administrators nor academic staff ceded to the other a right 
to one hundred percent of that profit. Each started to battle to claim their portion. 
For universities to claim the products of academic labour, they needed to clarify the 
nature of the employer-employee relationship in the university setting. Between the 
institutions, policy wording was variable on this subject, highlighting ambiguities 
about the nature of academic work. Some universities claimed ownership of 
intellectual property that ‘arose’ (as if by accident) from an academic’s labour.95 
Some claimed work that was ‘produced’ by ‘originators’, using language of agency 
and intent.96 But in every case, universities used their status as employers to possess 
the work staff produced. As an employer, however, universities were in a complicated 
position. Most Australian public universities had Acts that defined the university as 
consisting of its members, which normally meant the academic staff. Academics were 
likely to constitute, rather than just work for, the university.97 This structure 
notwithstanding, contracts of employment, as would exist under other kinds of 
employers, governed the relationship between all institutions and their employees. 
These contracts specified employment conditions for academic staff that set broad 
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expectations about their workload and activities.98 Despite the existence of such 
contracts, academic staff were not normally directed to do specific types of research 
that would result in specific types of benefit for the institution. In fact, in the tradition 
of academic freedom, it would be most unusual if they were. As a result, while it 
sounds straightforward enough for an employer to claim the work of their staff, even a 
cursory evaluation of the character of academic work reveals it was not.  
It was an important task, then, if universities wished to claim that they owned 
intellectual property produced by their academic staff, to establish that intellectual 
property was created as a requirement of their employment. As Ann Monotti points 
out, no organisation can claim other people’s property. Employers need to 
demonstrate that each item of intellectual property was explicitly created by the staff 
member for their employer.99 For universities, this created a problem. The policies 
implying that intellectual property might be developed by accident were right: 
university research could be unpredictable. Despite the claims of government to the 
contrary, university policy makers knew that protectable intellectual property may 
well come about as a result of serendipity rather than intent. Moreover, any policy 
attempting to make the production of intellectual property a requirement of academic 
employment encountered a tangle of problems.  Research did not look the same for 
every person, project, approach or discipline, so the policy descriptions were difficult 
to frame. The sample policies had to grapple with such awkwardness:  
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Notwithstanding subsection (a) the University may require that member of staff or student 
formally assign to the University his or her interest to any intellectual property.100 
The relevant subsection had specified that the university claimed all intellectual 
property produced by staff. Unsure that ownership via employment would be 
sufficient, the university thought it had better require some staff assign their rights 
individually, to be safe.  
Nevertheless, some sought expansive ownership claims on the basis of the employer-
employee relationship. The Australian National University, like most others (six of 
eight), claimed all intellectual property: 
The ownership of intellectual property created in the course of employment by the University, 
and hence the sole right to use such intellectual property, belongs to the university.101 
To avoid the conflict with the National Tertiary Education Union that Penington had 
faced, however, those that claimed one hundred percent of intellectual property 
waived their rights to income derived from publications.102 Unlike the American 
Association of University Professors, which had argued that copyright was connected 
to academic freedom, the Australian National Tertiary Education Union did not object 
to university ownership of copyright as long as academic staff retained the right to 
income from publications. This suggests that the Australian union did not locate 
academic freedom rights in copyright, as the American Association did. The 
American organisation had stressed that copyright expressed rights additional to the 
financial ones: since copyright included the right to edit, amend or suppress work, 
academic freedom deemed that it must be the possession of the scholar. The National 
Tertiary Education Union was only concerned about staff financial rights and did not 
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press the issue. Of the sample policies, only staff at Monash and the University of 
New England owned the intellectual property attached to their publications, the rest 
merely received royalties. 
Time, Labour and Academic Freedom 
Despite an apparent lack of concern about academic freedom implications in the 
ownership of copyright, some Australian academics and higher education 
commentators were concerned about the potential for research commercialisation to 
actually suppress research, preventing it from spreading to the parts of society who 
needed it most. In 1985, The Australian Higher Education Supplement reported that, 
sometimes, commercialising research meant that its potential utility was limited. 
Commercial research may not reach its desired beneficiaries because the very idea of 
‘beneficiary’ embedded in the commercialisation process assured that research 
benefited its owner, not the public. It was in the interests of business to create a 
monopoly over knowledge, giving them a market edge and potentially greater profit 
margin.103  
This presented the risk that its benefits would fail to reach the community. It also 
threatened traditional structures that, past academic leaders like Ashby and Clunies 
Ross had argued, protected the reliability of university research. Free scholarly 
inquiry was to be separated from financial and other interests, a freedom that was 
embodied in the right of an individual academic to publish their work, regardless of 
their findings.104 Despite that tradition, five out of the eight sample Australian 
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university intellectual property policies required academic staff to refrain from 
publishing their work until granted permission by the institution.105  For example: 
The staff member shall notify his/her Head of Department and the General Manager of ITC 
(Uniadvice) Ltd that intellectual property has been created. Where intellectual property has been 
created all reasonable care must be exercised by staff and students not to disclose, publish or use 
the property in any way which would prejudice its protection.106 
Under these conditions, a researcher was theoretically not allowed to discuss their 
research – whether privately with colleagues, publicly at conferences or in published 
work – without approval by the institution. By owning the intellectual property, 
institutions also claimed the decision to commercialise or make research publicly 
available.107  
It was not only from staff that universities sought to claim research. Half of the 
sample policies also claimed all intellectual property produced by students. Students, 
however, were not staff: they were not contracted to produce commercialisable 
research in a way that would grant an employer the right to claim their intellectual 
property. Some universities, consistent with the recommendation of the AVCC, made 
it a condition of student enrolment that they assign their intellectual property rights to 
the institution.108 Macquarie University made this a requirement for all students, 
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despite written advice that to do so would infringe the legal rights of students to their 
own property.109  
There were practical, as well as legal, impediments to claiming student work. Policing 
the protection of intellectual property produced by students, or assuring that work that 
might lead to patents is not discussed outside the laboratory, was an improbable task. 
More common complications would be attached to the question of honours or 
postgraduate research students doing further study or obtaining employment at 
another university upon graduation and needing to use their own research.110 
Universities have since abandoned the practice of claiming student work, opting 
instead, as half of those original policies did, to offer students the option to assign 
their intellectual property to the institution if needed – for example, if the student 
collaborated on a larger project dominated by academic staff or if they wished the 
university to assist in commercialisation.111  
These early, expansive claims, demonstrate that policy makers assumed that, in a 
sense similar to the books in the university library, any knowledge existing within 
their community belonged to the institution; thus they had the right to all intellectual 
property of staff and students. In attempting to articulate this belief in legally 
definable terms, some universities argued that it was time that they owned. Contracts 
of employment required academics work a certain number of hours: their salaries 
were evidence that those hours had been purchased from them. This was a problem, 
however. Despite the existence of Industrial Relations Commission awards that 
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specified the number of these hours, academic time was unlikely to be constrained by 
them.112 What if a scientist worked in their laboratory late at night? Would the 
university own her or his work? Demonstrating this uncertainty, the Australian 
National University 1986 intellectual property policy contained an unusual clause: 
The whole of the professional time of an academic staff member is required to be devoted to the 
performance of the duties of office of that staff member. Thus, any intellectual property 
developed by staff members in the performance of the duties of their office belongs to the 
university.113 
Academic staff were thus expected to have no intellectual or inventive life beyond 
their academic duties. This clause suggested the university could claim ownership 
over patent rights to an invention made in the course of an academic’s hobby, even if 
unrelated to their academic field, since all professional time belonged to the 
university. Income from intellectual property, the policy suggests, was the indicator 
that work was ‘professional’ and therefore the university’s.   
General staff were treated differently: 
In contrast to academic staff members, general staff members have fixed times of working: 
however, any intellectual property developed by them in the course of their employment, or 
using resources and facilities provided by the University, also belongs to the University.114 
Academic work, in this framework, tended to resemble the task-oriented peasant work 
that E.P. Thompson described in 1967: the activity, rather than the length of the 
workday, was important.115 In academia less distinction existed between ‘work’ and 
‘life’ than the Australian National University’s legal team would have liked. 
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Academic work was not only difficult to define by the length of the workday. 
Academic time, especially research time, was often spent doing one’s ‘own’ work, 
pursuing knowledge in the way scholars saw fit, following untrodden and sometimes 
unpredictable pathways. How could an employer define it in order to claim it? The 
Australian Vice-Chancellors saw the problem immediately: 
It is not always clear whether the activity which produces the property is one which comes 
within the terms of the contract of employment. It is difficult to determine whether the property 
is produced in the institutional employer’s time or in the staff member’s time.116 
This is why universities like the Australian National University were so careful to 
claim everything an academic staff member ever did. If the university could claim 
time, according to the Australian National University’s logic, they could claim 
anything within time.  
Beyond Intellectual Property: Owning Knowledge  
In claiming time, universities attempted to obtain more than staff intellectual property, 
they also sought ownership of its potential. Universities were not alone in this: 
Knowledge resides in the human brain, and unlike plant and equipment or other physical means 
of production, knowledge is easily replicated and transferred to others. With knowledge 
generally equating to value, not only does it matter who owns what is in a person’s head but 
also harvesting that knowledge and controlling its dissemination is critical in a competitive 
environment.117 
It was easy to confuse knowledge and intellectual property. The University of 
Adelaide policy, for example, declared that it was ‘essential that intellectual property 
with potential for commercial development should be appropriately protected before 
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it is published’ (that is, before it is in fact intellectual property).118 The language of 
knowledge and intellectual property were similar and they were related, since 
intellectual property (the rights attached to knowledge) could not exist without the 
underlying substance that the University of Adelaide also sought to protect. For 
businesses, and now universities, hoping to enter the ‘knowledge economy’, it was as 
if the pursuit of knowledge and the protection of intellectual property was only a 
semantic distinction. 
Universities, however, had more reason than other kinds of organisations to equate 
knowledge and intellectual property, and to try to own what was in a person’s head. 
Universities hoped that it would allow them to assert rights over commercialisation 
opportunities that arose out of serendipitous research. This was the commercial reason 
for needing to own what was in an academic’s mind, for in a university environment, 
owning intellectual property was not sufficient. Staff were not directed to invent: 
indeed, except through broad funding priorities, research could not really be directed 
at all. Universities could never predict where intellectual property might suddenly 
appear. So university leaders became keen to own the knowledge that preceded it.  
In some respects this supported institutional interests by seeming to locate intellectual 
property within university traditions. Claiming that knowledge and intellectual 
property were practically synonymous smoothed over the contradiction between its 
acquisition from staff and academic freedom. It made it seem that intellectual 
property was in fact the mission of the university. The Australian National University 
2011 website suggests the potency of this formulation: 
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Intellectual property lies at the centre of all basic, strategic and applied research conducted 
across Colleges and disciplines at the ANU. Put simply, IP is the ANU’s core business: it’s what 
we produce.119 
If universities were about knowledge but called it ‘intellectual property’, this made 
commercialisation seem consonant with their traditional goals.  
Forcing a fit between the individual private monopoly that characterised intellectual 
property with the traditional values of public universities was a challenge. Despite 
such difficulties, the ideal of the ‘community of scholars’, ironically, helped to justify 
institutional claims to intellectual property. Membership in the community of scholars 
had created the university; the university owned staff and student knowledge because 
staff and students did. The character of research further reflected this collegiality. 
Research was almost never a purely individual act, the AVCC suggested. Even if 
research was individually constituted, academic association with the university 
demonstrated their reliance on the institution to be able to conduct research. The 
infrastructure: ‘rooms, electricity, gas, water, telephones’, were just the beginning. 
Science relied on expensive laboratories, the humanities on expensive libraries.120 The 
scholarly environment, argued Macquarie University’s research management team, 
though intangible and unquantifiable, acted as the inspiration and enabler of quality 
research, validating the institution’s claim to income derived from it.121  
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Reliance on the research environment to strengthen intellectual property claims 
complicated questions of originality. In much contemporary research, the AVCC 
argued, it was simply ‘not possible to identify one person as the author, inventor, 
creator, maker or originator’.122 As George Eliot had said in Middlemarch, ‘There was 
no need to praise anybody for writing a book, since it was always done by somebody 
else’.123 The AVCC were concerned that the complexity of attributing originality 
carried the potential for exploitation. There were many in the university with a 
potential interest in claiming intellectual property. The universities had the task of 
protecting vulnerable staff and students. Students and research assistants, in 
particular, the AVCC argued, might ‘have difficulty in claiming any rights if a person 
of comparative power is permitted to claim sole ownership or to assume control’.124  
Despite this offer of protection, the contradiction between originality, innovation and 
institutional support remained. The difficulties of identifying a single originator were 
most dramatically evident in the sciences. The images and ideals that had shaped 
modern authorship and copyright – the hermit-like humanities scholar scribbling in 
the garret – had been largely superseded by collaborative teams of scientists pouring 
over microscopes in laboratories. The ascendancy of science, especially since the 
Second World War, changed the dominant culture in universities so that towards the 
end of the century scholarship was rarely experienced as a singular individual 
endeavour. Mario Biagioli suggests that, globally, this came to a head in the 1990s. 
Authorship, as it was defined by intellectual property, had always been at odds with 
scientific discovery. In earlier centuries, however, this was effectively veiled by 
publication norms, which on the surface made scientific publishing seem similar to 
                                                
122 AVCC, Ownership of Intellectual Property in Universities, 10. 
123 George Eliot, Middlemarch (London: Penguin, 1874), 890–1. 
124 AVCC, Ownership of Intellectual Property in Universities, 10. 
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literary work.125 Nevertheless, towards the end of the twentieth century, large-scale 
multi-authored papers, sometimes listing more than one hundred contributors (a 
symptom of the growing size and complexity of ventures like the human genome 
project) exposed some fundamental problems with authorship in universities, 
especially in science.126  
Knowledge in the basic sciences, Biagioli demonstrates, simply could not be owned, 
since it described a reality that existed beyond its authors. Once large multi-
disciplinary teams published discoveries to which each could only have contributed a 
small part, there was an increasingly apparent disjuncture between the assumptions of 
‘ownership’ embedded in copyright’s construction of authorship and the realities of 
scientific publication.127 The scientific community struggled with questions that 
seemed a reprise of the requirement for an author, as Foucault had described it, to 
prevent publication of transgressive texts.128 Who took responsibility for the 
discovery? Who would take the blame if results were found to be fraudulent? How 
were the rewards of publication understood when one article might have so many 
authors? Was it realistic to think that they all contributed sufficient original 
knowledge to warrant authorship? How would journal editors find reviewers if nearly 
every expert in a field was listed as author? 129 
                                                
125 One or two scientific authors listed on an article or book do not on the surface appear any different 
from the literary authors copyright envisaged, Biagioli argues. He suggests that they are in fact 
fundamentally different and that the originality looked for under intellectual property definitions 
contradict the very nature of scientific discovery. Mario Biagioli, ‘Rights or Rewards?’, in Mario 
Biagioli and Peter Galison (eds), Scientific Authorship: Credit and Intellectual Property in Science 
(New York: Routledge, 2003), 253–80.  
126 Ibid. 
127 It would be more accurate to describe scientists as contributors to publication than authors, suggests 
Biagioli. Ibid. 264–7 
128 Foucault, ‘What Is an Author’, 205–17. 
129 Mario Biagioli, ‘The Instability of Authorship: Credit and Responsibility in Contemporary 
Biomedicine’, FASEB 12, 1998, 3–16. 
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University leaders, however, used this kind of uncertainty to make claims for 
intellectual property. The AVCC outlined the complexities around identifying an 
originator, encouraging universities to use the arguments they provided to 
demonstrate to academic staff that it would be best if the institution owned all 
intellectual property alone.130 In assuming the rights of the originator (or author) in 
the face of difficulties identifying the responsible scholar, universities sought 
authority in the new research environment, not just commercial income. Now that 
research and innovation tended to occur in more collaborative ways with industry and 
the community, universities had lost the clout that had been attached to the 
antecedence assumed in ‘pure’ research. In other words, the reliance of society on 
university knowledge as the foundation for scientific, social, cultural, technological 
and eventually economic advancement, was collapsing as industry and universities 
worked together in more integrated ways. In intellectual property ownership, that 
antecedence, they hoped, would be returned, reasserting the university’s prominence 
in the knowledge economy and regaining the public support that, as Chapter Four 
demonstrated, had been waning since the early 1980s.131 
The singularity of intellectual property ownership, however, also threatened the very 
structure – the university’s collectivity – the AVCC had used to claim it. University 
policies demonstrate the prevailing assumption that all knowledge – not just employee 
intellectual property rights – belonged to the university, for that which was the 
possession of its members also enriched the institution. Australia’s dominant tradition 
of public universities, defined in their Acts by their members, had been designed to 
assure the quality (and sometimes, as in the 1973 Philosophy Strike discussed in 
                                                
130 AVCC, Ownership of Intellectual Property in Universities: A Discussion Paper. 
131 Ibid. 
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Chapter Three, the complicity) of university knowledge. Members of these collegial 
structures tested, evaluated and approved scholarly work. Once transformed into 
institutional intellectual property claims, this shared authority was undermined, 
investing it instead in the institution, in this case understood in its singular sense. The 
AVCC suggested that institutional ownership of intellectual property meant it would 
be managed in ‘the best interests of all concerned’, all now considered separate 
entities – interested parties, rather than disinterested scholars.132  
Conclusion 
Academics, as the ‘entrepreneurial university’ emerged in Australia, regularly argued 
that there was something not right about emphasising the exchange value of 
knowledge, as intellectual property did.133 This went beyond political-economic 
opposition to commodification: it seemed, according to many scholarly accounts, to 
conflict with the mission and structure of the university tradition, which was more 
collectively oriented than intellectual property could be.134 The singularity of owning 
intellectual property was indeed a new way of structuring academic work, not just 
another way of describing existing knowledge practices. It contradicted the richness 
that was idealised in the community of scholars and expressed in the membership-
based structure of most Australian public universities. Tensions between institutions 
and staff were exacerbated as they began to compete with one another for the 
financial wealth they were told was embedded in university knowledge. 
                                                
132 Ibid. 
133 For example, Anthony Welch, Australian Education: Reform or Crisis? (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 
1996). 
134 Roger Scott, ‘Biscuits, Bicycles and BScs: The Impact of Market Forces on the Management of 
Publicly Funded Universities’, in David R Jones and John Anwyl (eds), Privatizing Higher Education: 
A New Australian Issue (Melbourne: Centre for the Study of Higher Education, 1987), 57–74. 
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As it turned out, however, the potential for wealth had been overstated. Collectively 
they had constructed what Elizabeth Garnsey called a ‘consensual vision’, a fantasy in 
which teaching and research, reconstructed as a trade in intellectual property, would 
solve their pressing financial problems.135 The idea that fifty percent of university 
research outcomes had commercial potential shows a clear misunderstanding of the 
market for intellectual property – commercialisation specialists have since suggested 
that only a tiny proportion (as little as 0.03 percent in some estimates) of the new 
ideas generated within a university will ever successfully find their way to market.136  
The search for new wealth through intellectual property and research 
commercialisation was deemed, by its advocates, as a modernising task, reorienting 
the university towards contemporary society and a globalising economy. The 
changing priorities, however, grated against many expectations. Hands-off 
government investment in research and its infrastructure had come to seem central to 
the university tradition. As a tradition, however, it was surprisingly new. Research 
had not long been central to the idea of the university in Australia. Before the Second 
World War, while it was gaining strength in the sciences, research was not yet high 
among scholarly priorities. Research became the hallmark of higher education, 
however, as government funding forged an uneasy alliance of the university to the 
                                                
135 Elizabeth Garnsey, ‘The Entrepreneurial University: The Idea and Its Critics’, in Kaoru Nabeshima 
(ed.), How Universities Promote Economic Growth (Washington DC: The World Bank, 2007), 227–38. 
Christopher Newfield’s research revealed that after the costs of commercialisation are taken into 
account the profits, even from spectacular discoveries, constitute a very small proportion of the income 
of American universities. The costs of higher education are not borne by industry then, he 
demonstrates, leaving its burden largely with the fee-paying middle class. Christopher Newfield, 
Unmaking the Public University: The Forty-Year Assault on the Middle Class (Cambridge M.A.: 
Harvard University Press, 2008), 195–207. 
136 Greg A. Stevens and James Burley, ‘3,000 Raw Ideas = 1 Commercial Success!’, Research 
Technology Management 40 (3), 1997, 16–27. See also, Franzoni and Scellat, ‘Academic Patenting and 
the Consequences for Scientific Research’, 95. 
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state. Government funding of research was not granted for the purpose of pure 
inquiry, but for nation-building. 
Despite their link to government aims, universities sought to assure their autonomy, 
while at the same time welcoming the additional funding that would support their 
work. They emphasised that the quality and reliability of university research and 
teaching was based on their independence from vested interests. But the principles of 
accountability in a government-funded system suggested to policy makers that the 
Commonwealth ought to have some say in university research decisions and 
educational priorities.  
Amidst their reflections on the purpose and nature of autonomy, academics also 
grappled with their responsibility to society and what that meant for the types of 
knowledge with which they were preoccupied. Wartime leaders like Eric Ashby and 
Ian Clunies Ross had sought to serve society by maintaining the university’s 
separateness and coherence. But despite their efforts, research had not stayed isolated 
and disinterested: researchers from Philip Baxter onwards found that some research 
produced more useful results when it was connected with real-world problems. 
Relationships with industries and professions grew. Detached scholarship was 
increasingly criticised by scholars themselves as the rarefied knowledge it produced 
seemed evidence of the university’s traditional elitism. 
An emerging imperative to a more inclusive approach to knowledge merged with a 
growing government expectation that higher education would function as a research 
and teaching arm of the state. There had been suggestions since the 1940s and again 
in association with the 1957 Murray reforms, that government might use its control of 
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funding to make claims on the universities. Concerns for government control, asserted 
in association with its financial support, however, were superseded by more 
immediate worries when, during the Cold War, government sent ASIO agents to 
observe and influence the political and ideological aspects of academic thinking.  
Apart from those Cold War interventions, from a government perspective there was 
little need to use funding to impinge on academic freedom. Universities more often 
than not supported government goals, a systematic coalition of the power of 
government and education which earned the anger of student radicals. Student and 
staff radicalism in the 1960s and 1970s disrupted that alliance to the state so that by 
the 1980s, the universities’ association with government was far less convivial. 
Despite the strained relationship, government did not finally assert its latent control 
until the Dawkins reforms of 1987. 
Changes inside the universities augmented the growing unease that resulted from 
Dawkins’s revolutionary policies. The shock of the Dawkins reforms belies the reality 
that some of its transformations had been brewing for decades. Since the court’s 1956 
finding that the University of Tasmania and Sydney Orr were in a master-servant 
relationship, university staff increasingly related to their institutions in a way that 
reflected their sometimes-competing interests.  This was strengthened when 
university administrators, faced with severe funding cuts, were compelled to do the 
government’s business. In order to protect their interests, the academic staff 
associations became a formally registered union in 1993. The union was not the 
primary source of adversarial feeling, however: the tense environment was forged by 
scarce, competitive research funding, which began to take the place of collegial 
authority as the signifier of quality. 
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In this environment, the worth of research was now often difficult to assess except by 
its financial value. By pushing for independence through the trade in intellectual 
property, the universities enhanced, rather than challenged, that transformation. As 
their focus became more commercial, government began to look upon universities in 
a different way, despite their increased reliance on higher education for the public 
good. Instead of national institutions requiring public investment, university research 
seemed an industry, competing with others for government support and commercial 
income.  
By the mid-1990s, deregulated student markets, intellectual property strategies, 
research commercialisation centres and academic incentive schemes structured the 
university environment so that it increasingly resembled the industry that members of 
the Federal government imagined it to be. At the University of Western Australia, a 
professor of surgery was by this time taking advantage of the commercial 
opportunities university employment now provided. He set in motion a sequence of 
events, recounted in the following Epilogue, which, over the next decade or so, rattled 
the academic community’s confidence in the durability of the intellectual property 
and research commercialisation strategies they had established in the 1980s and 
1990s. 
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Epilogue: UWA v Gray 
 
In 1981, Dr Bruce Gray, a specialist surgeon, received the John Mitchell Crouch 
Fellowship, offered by the Royal Australasian College of Surgeons, to pursue 
research into cancer treatments.1 His research flourished and a few years later Gray 
secured a professorial appointment at the University of Western Australia. 
As soon as Gray began work in Western Australia in 1985, he staked out his territory: 
research staff were handpicked, space was negotiated and equipment purchased. Gray 
was working on microparticles that could target cancerous cells in the liver. 
Eventually, this research led to the invention of a technology Gray called 
microspheres.  
Next, Gray navigated the uncompromising world of medical technology 
commercialisation. He worked hard to attract substantial external grant income. 
Competitive income notwithstanding, paid a university salary, using university 
resources, drawing on the expertise of university colleagues and trading on the status 
of a university professorship, Gray’s work led to commercial products that were 
developed and sold through a publicly listed company called Sirtex. In 2010, the 
Australian Stock Exchange listed Sirtex as sixteenth in the top one hundred 
companies of the health and biotechnology sector, with shares worth $273 million.2 
                                                
1 Royal Australasian College of Surgeons, ‘Premier Surgical Science Award: John Mitchell Crouch 
Fellowship’, Surgical News 10 (1), 2009.  http://www.surgeons.org/media/273608/ATL_2009-06-
26_JMC_SN_feature_Jan.pdf Retrieved 18 October 2011. 
2 Australian Stock Exchange, ‘Research: Health and Biotechnology Sector’,  
http://www.asx.com.au/documents/research/health_care_sector_factsheet.pdf  Retrieved 1 March 2011. 
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From the early 2000s, Bruce Gray personally owned a $75 million stake in Sirtex.3 
The University of Western Australia did not receive a cent. 
Leaders of the University of Western Australia tried to talk to Gray, to invite him, in a 
spirit of collegiality, to share the financial benefits of his research with the university. 
When that did not work, the university took legal action. The legal fracas that 
followed was complicated. The case UWA v Gray included other claims and cross-
claims: the University of Western Australia against Sirtex; Sirtex against Gray; Gray 
against the University of Western Australia; Sirtex against the University of Western 
Australia and Gray against a fellow researcher. The central question, however, and 
that which attracted the higher education sector’s attention, was who owned the 
intellectual property in Gray’s inventions – Gray or the university? 
The University of Western Australia argued that, as an employee of the university, 
Bruce Gray’s work was the property of the institution. In a judgement by Justice 
Robert Shenton French, the court found that, while Gray was certainly contracted to 
teach and conduct research, there was no requirement – or even implied expectation – 
that he would invent. Invention, the court found, was not what he was paid to do. If he 
invented, which he clearly did, he owned the intellectual property himself. 
The university submitted their intellectual property policy, demonstrating they had 
claimed the whole of an academic’s professional time. This was the source of some 
embarrassment. Like other universities in the complex post-Dawkins era, the process 
of developing the policy had been patchy, so that the responsibilities for intellectual 
property protection were unclear. While the new policy was developed and even 
                                                
3 Rebecca Lawson, ‘UWA Loses $75m Gray Appeal’, WA Business News, 3 September 2009. 
 274 
officially adopted by the time Gray patented the microspheres, it had not been 
properly communicated to the university community – it had not been ‘promulgated’, 
as the court called it.  
This did not help the university’s case. But it was not the main issue, according to 
Justice French. In fact, he described it as ‘the least of its difficulties in this case’.4 The 
university argued that, even if the policy was not in force at the time, ownership of 
intellectual property was implied in Gray’s employment contract. The policy merely 
demonstrated the inherent rightfulness of their claim. The court was not persuaded. 
Justice French found that ‘UWA cannot, by regulation, acquire property from its staff 
members’.5  
The University of Western Australia pointed to Gray’s responsibilities as an 
employee. His ‘fiduciary obligations’ required him to protect the university’s 
property, university lawyers argued. But this too was a problem. Not only was Gray’s 
invention not the university’s property, the court found that there was also some doubt 
about Gray’s status as an employee. Gray was not really an employee, the court found 
– at least, not in the same sense used in other cases where employees had failed in 
their fiduciary obligations. Properly speaking, Gray was a member of the university. 
Gray was not under managerial direction; indeed it was necessary to the work that he 
controlled his research himself. Gray’s membership in the university, Justice French 
found, was a precondition to his academic freedom. Moreover, that academic freedom 
was what enabled the university to fulfil its legal obligations.  
                                                
4 University of Western Australia v Gray, French, J. FCA No. 20, FCA 498 CORRIGENDUM 2 (Perth: 
Federal Court of Australia Western Australia District Registry, 2008), Paragraph 11. 
5 Justice French’s 2008 judgment is excessively long partly because in it he offers the higher education 
sector a great deal of advice. Universities could not use intellectual property policies to claim automatic 
ownership over invention as an employer’s right, he shows, but they could, in their employment 
contracts, require staff to assign their intellectual property rights to the university. Ibid., Paragraph 90. 
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Theoretically, if the purpose of the university was the commercial production of 
intellectual property, Gray might have some fiduciary obligation to protect it. Was 
this the purpose of the university? 
It was understandable, said Justice French, that lawyers for the University of Western 
Australia were reluctant to discuss something as abstract and contested as the purpose 
of the university. French was willing to do so, however, based on the legal document 
defining this particular institution: the Act of Parliament that created the University of 
Western Australia. In examining that Act, Justice French found that the protection of 
the commercial value of intellectual property was clearly not a primary obligation of 
either the institution collectively or any of its individual members. Knowledge, not 
intellectual property, was the legal purpose of the university.  
It was the obligation of the university – and the court – to protect the university’s 
capacity to foster knowledge. This required academic freedom. The university’s legal 
purpose was dependent on its expert members, individually and collectively, pursuing 
and communicating knowledge without interference or bias from the institution.  If 
the university – as it appeared to do in the case of UWA v Gray – prioritised the 
protection of financial interests over academic freedom, it failed to accomplish its task 
as outlined in the Act. 
Therefore, as a member of the university, Gray’s obligation to knowledge superseded 
any responsibility to protect the institution’s financial interests. If the university 
owned Gray’s research prior to the patent, theoretically the university could override 
Gray’s will in relation to it: they could modify, publish or suppress it. The obligation 
to knowledge carried by both the university and Gray therefore required Gray to own 
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the intellectual property in his research. As owner, he could do with it what he wished 
– that was his academic freedom.6 Choosing to use that knowledge for personal 
financial gain might be morally dubious – indeed, Justice French pointed out that 
Gray’s personality no doubt made him a difficult man to work with on a collegial 
basis – but it was nevertheless his legal right.7 
To the shock of the Australian higher education sector, Justice French found, in a 
544-page decision, for Bruce Gray. The $75 million in shares were Gray’s alone. 
Universities were shaken, but none were as traumatised as those who had the most to 
lose from the decision: the sector’s intellectual property lawyers.8 Legal commentary 
declared the judge to be out of touch with the realities of the modern university. 
Justice French, they claimed, is imagining universities to be ivory towers. Of course 
universities have a commercial purpose, they declared in the media, where have you 
been?9  
Staff of university research commercialisation offices rightly assumed that the 
University of Western Australia would appeal. The decision seemed so obviously 
erroneous that many also assumed that the university would win.10 They were wrong. 
The 2009 decision of the full bench of the Federal Court confirmed everything Justice 
                                                
6 It would be quite acceptable, Justice French showed, for Gray to willingly assign his rights – or, more 
realistically, a portion of them – to the university. As owner, he would be just as free to gift or trade 
rights to the university as he is to sell or trade them in any other way. French suggested that universities 
would do better to look to incentive schemes that would encourage staff to do this than to try to claim 
ownership in a way that violates academic freedom and the mission of the university. Ibid., Paragraph 
14. 
7 Ibid., Paragraph 622. 
8 Bernard Lane, ‘UWA Fails to Appeal’, HES, 17 February 2010.  
9 Lawyers Weekly, ‘Universities Put on Notice over IP Rights’,  
http://www.lawyersweekly.com.au/blogs/top_stories/archive/2009/09/07/universities-put-on-notice-
over-ip-rights.aspx. Retrieved 18 October 2011. David Bushby, ‘Friday Partner's Lunch Audio 
Webcast: UWA v Gray Round Table’, News Limited, 
http://www.brr.com.au/event/60552/partner/theaustralian Retrieved 8 March 2011. 
10 Bernard Lane, ‘Federal Court Backs Inventor Bruce Gray's Intellectual Property Claim’, HES, 9 
September 2009. 
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French had said. Justices Lindgren, Finn and Bennett even went further in 
contemplating the relationship between academic freedom and academic ownership of 
intellectual property. A fundamental characteristic of academic freedom, they agreed, 
was the right to publish.11 The university’s reliability was dependent on the 
willingness of scholars to open their work to public and collegial scrutiny through 
publication.12  
Publication of research findings prior to commercialisation, however, destroys the 
patentability of knowledge. The criterion for a patent is that the knowledge in 
question is not in the public domain – it must necessarily be privately owned. If, 
under principles of academic freedom, an academic has the right to publish and thus 
the right to destroy the commercial potential of knowledge, the court considered this 
to be firm evidence that they own it. Patent attorney Rob McInnes said that the 
destruction of commercial potential through publication was as irresponsible as an 
academic taking a sledgehammer to their own laboratory. Publication in this sense 
was a destructive behaviour that amounted, he argued, to a waste of public money.13  
With the Federal Court case unsuccessful, the University of Western Australia sought 
leave to appeal to the High Court. In a media release, the Vice-Chancellor, Alan 
Robson, supported their decision by invoking the collegial character of academic 
research: 
                                                
11 The University of Western Australia v Bruce Nathaniel Gray, Wad 93 of 2008 on Appeal from a 
Single Judge of of the Federal Court of Australia, Lindgren, Finn, and Bennett, J.J., (Perth: Federal 
Court of Australia Full Court, 116, 2009).  
12 See Mario Biagioli, ‘The Instability of Authorship: Credit and Responsibility in Contemporary 
Biomedicine’, FASEB 12, 1998, 3–16. 
13 Bushby, ‘Friday Partner's Lunch Audio Webcast: UWA v Gray Round Table.’ 
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Research and innovation undertaken within universities, by their very nature, builds on the work 
of those who have gone before. We must ensure that this research - which will almost always be 
done for the benefit of the broader community – is recognised as university IP.14 
Robson’s aim was already achievable. Justice French had outlined, in his original 
lengthy and detailed judgment, ways that the university would be able to claim 
intellectual property from staff in the future, but without violating their academic 
freedom. The University of Western Australia’s legal position, contrary to Robson’s 
media release, was not based on the university’s ability to fulfil its mission, but rather 
on an insistence on Gray’s status as an employee. They submitted to the high court 
that there should be no separate category of employment for academic staff and that 
the university, as an employer like any other, should own their research.15  
But the court had shown that scholarly work must be directed to the purpose of the 
institution. Academic freedom could not be just an antiquated tradition. Rather, it was 
the legal responsibility of the university.  The universities had for some time been 
behaving like commercial entities, Justice French acknowledged. But the law required 
that they protect knowledge first. If the universities were not going to uphold this 
primary purpose, the court, it seemed, would do it for them. 
On 12 February 2010, the High Court of Australia, now led by Chief Justice Robert 
Shenton French, refused to grant the University of Western Australia permission to 
take the case any further.16 
                                                
14 UWA Media release, 1 October 2009 http://www.news.uwa.edu.au/200910011722/media-
statements/uwa-seeks-leave-appeal-high-court-over-gray-decision Retrieved 23 November 2011. 
15 ‘UWA turns grey – ownership of IP’. Freehills, 12 February 2010 
http://www.freehills.com/5790.aspx Retrieved 23 November 2011. 
16 High Court of Australia, High Court of Australia Bulletin [2010] HCAB 1 (19 February 2010), 
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